

**Decentralisation and Service Delivery in Urban Areas of Uganda;
A Case of Masaka Municipality**

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**Decentralisation and Service Delivery in Urban Areas of Uganda;
A Case of Masaka Municipality**

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The Faculty of Business Administration and Management
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DEDICATION

I am profoundly honoured to dedicate this piece of work to my family with whom I closely shared the joy and sweat of this study process as and when need to balance academic and social responsibilities. You are my source of inspiration, courage and determination.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ALC: Area Land Committee

DLB: District Land Board

GPT: Graduated Personal Tax

LC: Local Council

LG: Local Governments

LGA: Local Governments Act

MoLG: Ministry of Local Government

MoLHUD: Ministry of Lands Housing and Urban Development

NEMA: National Environment Management Authority

NRM: National Resistance Movement

PPDA: Public Procurement Disposal Assets Authority

RC: Resistance Council

ROU: Republic of Uganda

SMC: School Management Committee

UBE: Universal Basic Education

UBOS: Uganda Bureau Of Statistics

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNRA: Uganda National Roads Authority

USMID: Uganda Support to Municipal Infrastructure Development

ABSTRACT

The study investigated the effect of decentralisation on service delivery in Masaka Municipality. The objectives of the study were to: find out how local leadership affects service delivery; to establish how land management affects service delivery and; to determine how physical planning affects service delivery in Masaka Municipality.

The study adopted a cross sectional research design on a sample size of 127 respondents. Data were collected by use of questionnaires, interviews and analysed both qualitatively and quantitatively. Quantitative data was analysed using SPSS 16.0. At univariate level, data was analysed by frequencies, percentages, mean and standard deviation. At bivariate level, data was analysed basing on correlational analysis and at multivariate level data analysis was carried out using regressions. Qualitative data was analysed basing on study themes.

The findings revealed that: Local leadership is significant in explaining service delivery outcomes by 24%; Land management is significant in explaining service delivery outcomes by 40.8 % and Physical planning is significant in explaining service delivery by 63.8%

The study recommends that: Create strong and respected legal framework which clearly assigns roles and responsibilities to different levels of local governance; invest in building systems of accountability at all levels of local governance; promote and encourage interface with the citizens and act in accordance with their aspirations; build capacities in financial management, human resources, monitoring and supervision; streamline and strengthen systems for raising own local resources to finance local development plans and budgets; Strengthen and improve land administration and management function to conform to the needs and development aspirations of the local people; coordinate and harmonise the activities and operations of Municipal Physical Planning Committee and the District Land Board; amend the law on land to cater for creation of Municipal Land Boards in the interest of ensuring orderly developments in urban centers; and Invest heavily in physical planning; change mindset for both leaders and citizens towards planning. Strengthen institutions that enforce urban rules and codes. Develop a comprehensive strategy that foster public participation in physical planning.

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

Decentralisation is a process of reform designed to strengthen local governments and enable them deliver the specific services for which they are responsible to the populations living in the area they administer (Lambright,2011). It is the antonym of centralization and refers to anything that reverses the political and economic hegemony of central government (Hankla, 2009). Decentralization policy is based on two basic generic assumptions. First, it brings public services closer to the people and secondly, it contributes more to effective participation of citizens in the design and delivery of government services (Cheema &Rondinelli, 2007). This study therefore investigated the how decentralisation affect service delivery. This first chapter covered the background to the study, statement of the problem, study purpose, objectives, research questions, conceptual framework, significance, justification, scope and operational definition of key terms.

1.1 Background to the study

Over the last three decades an increasing number of countries in Developing World adopted the policy of decentralisation in planning, administrative, fiscal, and political functions of the central government to lower-level governments (Kim, 2008). Initially, around 1960s and 70s countries tended to follow a centralised policy in national development (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007). Decentralisation was later attempted as an alternative approach, in the face of apparent failures in development policy (Kim, 2008).

The motivation for the decentralization has varied (Ahamad, 2005). In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, it was part of the political and economic transformation; in Latin America, it was to reinforce the transition to democracy (Ahamad, 2005); In South Africa, decentralisation was a way of maintaining stability at the time of negotiated transition away from apartheid in 1994

(Dickovick, 2011); and in Chile, Uganda and Cote d'Ivoire, it was to improve the delivery of basic services (Shah and Thompson 2004). In all the above cases, even when it is not explicit; Shah and Thomson, (2004) concluded that improving the provision of services was an implicit motivation behind most of the decentralisation efforts.

Decentralisation programmes in Africa followed the recommendations of the World Bank for developing countries to devolve political and administrative powers to local and autonomous units (Kahuzya, 2007). The reason for this focus was that most of the social services such as health, education, water and sanitation that were a responsibility of government were systematically failing (World Bank, 2003). The recommendation was made on the basis that decentralisation would improve efficiency, quicken decision making processes and increase participation by the local people (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007). This would result in decisions better tailored to people's needs, reduced corruption, patrimonialism and clientelism, which went along with centralised government (Golooba Mutebi, 2008). The above cases demonstrated inefficiency in the provision of services by the central government thus calling for decentralization with hope of improving on service delivery (Stoker 1998).

Although the proponents of decentralisation consider it as a panacea for radical reforms in the delivery of essential services in the public sector other opponents of decentralisation consider it as a road to wrecks and ruins (Tanzi, 1995). Questions such as availability, accessibility and acceptability of services delivered by local governments come to the forefront (Green, 2010). It was reported by Filmer, Hammer and Pritchett (2000) that central governments were falling short of their responsibility to ensure adequate health, education, water and sanitation to their people. It has been pointed out that decentralisation has failed to empower local citizens to gain confidence, power and authority to make key important decisions (Tukahebwa, 1998). Issues of transparency,

accountability, full participation of the citizens in the local affairs have been pointed out as concerns of decentralisation (Makara, 1998). Cases of corruption and bribery in local governments have been reported by the office of Inspectorate of Government (Inspectorate of Government report, 2008).

It has been reported that lack of capacity at sub-national levels of government to exercise responsibility for public services, is another problem associated with decentralization effect on service delivery (World Bank, 2003). In Uganda and Tanzania, it was reported that the lower tiers of government lacked the ability to manage public finances and maintain proper accounting procedures (Ahamad, 2005). While decentralisation is in some cases intended to strengthen the political power of lower tiers of government as compared to the center, it has also increased the possibility of political capture within these lower tiers (Manyak and Katono, 2010). In fact, some critics say complete devolution of power to lower levels of the administrative structure has never been possible in developing countries because of the desire to retain administrative and political control over the entire geographical area of the nation (Rondinelli, 1999). At local community level, it is difficult for decentralisation policies to break through the traditional political and social structures which have historically benefitted the rich, the powerful and the influential elites (Golooba- Mutebi, 2008).

According to the Local Governments Act, Cap. 243, local governments were given powers to initiate, make and implement their own development plans; make and approve their budgets; raise and use resources according to their own resources and according to their own priorities; to appoint statutory boards and commissions; to make bye laws; to hire and fire personnel; to manage pay roll and to implement a broad range of decentralized services such as solid waste management, master structural plans, road construction and maintenance, architectural and design standard, approval of

building plans, street lighting among others (Second schedule, Part V of Local Governments Act, 1997 as amended). Central government supports decentralized services with fiscal transfers in form of conditional and unconditional grants (Article 193, of the Constitution of the republic of Uganda). It was hoped that this devolution of power would improve service delivery, promote good governance by placing emphasis on transparency in public sector management, develop, broaden and deepen administrative competence in the management of public affairs (Kiyaga-Nsubuga, 2007). Unfortunately, service delivery systems have continued to run down and urban areas are experiencing chaos and decay (Goodfellow, 2013).

Solid wastes generated in Masaka Municipality overwhelms its capacity to collect and dispose due to financial and technical challenges (Masaka Municipal Council Statistical abstract, 2016). Masaka Municipal Council procured dumping site in the financial year 2012/2013 at 120,000,000= and this dumping site has never been operationalised (Masaka Municipal Council Five Year Development Plan, 2015-2019). It has been reported that 60% of the Municipal roads are in poor motorable state due to inadequate revenue and high maintenance costs (Masaka Municipal Council Statistical Abstract, 2017). Infrastructural and service provision is affected by too much congestion in slum areas of Nyendo, Kijjabwemi and Kyabakuza (Masaka Municipal Council Statistical Abstract, 2017). It has been reported that land administration decisions made in Masaka Municipal Council is not informed by physical planning (Auditor General's report, 2015). The above evidence shows that decentralisation has issues which affect service delivery. This study thus investigated whether decentralisation affect service delivery.

1.2 Statement of the problem

Uganda, like any country of developing world implemented decentralisation with the aim of improving local democracy, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability in the delivery of essential

services country-wide (Tukahebwa,1998). Improved service delivery was in turn expected to make significant positive impact on people's quality of life (Makara, 1998). However, decentralization seems to have failed to achieve the above objectives (Manyak and Katono, 2010). Reports reveal how service delivery in many urban centers is in poor state. For instance, Masaka Municipal Council out of 100.5 tonnes of solid wastes generated only 45 percent is collected and disposed per day (Masaka Municipal Council Statistical abstract, 2017). Similarly, Masaka Municipal Council is bedeviled by various spatial development challenges many of which are a result of uncontrolled/unplanned settlements (Masaka Municipal Council Statistical Abstract, 2017). Although Masaka Municipal Council has an approved physical development plan, only 20 percent of the total planning area has detailed lay out plans (Masaka Municipal Five Year Development Plan, 2015-2019). Majority of residents in most urban areas reside in slums often unrecognized and unserved by urban authorities (Cities alliance 2006). Haphazard development in Masaka Municipal Council has claimed natural landscapes needed for urban parks, green belts and recreation areas in the Central Business District (Masaka Municipal Development Plan 2015-2019). Infrastructural facilities such as roads and drainage systems are poor and only 40 percent of municipal roads are in motorable state (Masaka Municipal Council Statistical Abstract, 2017). Bureaucratic corruption which affects citizens and companies in their daily interactions with public officials to access public services is also a significant problem in urban authorities (Inspectorate of Government report, 2008). Surprisingly, this is happening amidst external praise that decentralisation reform in Uganda is one of the most far reaching local government reform programmes in the developing world (Francis and James, 2003) and as 'one of the most radical devolution initiatives of any country at this time' (Mitchinson, 2003). This research study investigated whether decentralisation explains service delivery outcomes in Masaka Municipality. Possible explanations to the problem are in local leadership, land management and physical planning.

1.3 Purpose of the study

The study investigated the effect of decentralisation on service delivery in urban areas of Uganda.

1.4 Objectives of the study

The specific objectives of the study were;

- (i) To find out how local leadership affects service delivery in urban areas;
- (ii) To assess how Land Management affects service delivery in urban areas; and
- (iii) To examine how Physical Planning affects service delivery in urban areas.

1.5 Research hypotheses

- (i) Local leadership does not affect service delivery in urban areas.
- (ii) Land management does not affect service delivery in urban areas.
- (iii) Physical planning does not affect service delivery in urban areas.

1.6 The study scope

1.6.1 Geographical scope

The geography of the study covered Masaka Municipality. Masaka Municipality is one of the oldest towns of Uganda and it is located in Masaka District. Masaka Municipality is comprised of the three Divisions and these include: Nyendo Ssenyange, Katwe Butego and Kimaanya Kyabakuza. Masaka Municipality is approximately 127 kms by road south west of Kampala on high to Mbarara and Mutukula Boarder (Masaka Municipal Five Year Development Plan, 2015-2019). This Municipality was chosen because it implements a wide range of decentralised services that support the populations both within and outside the District.

1.6.2 Content scope

The content scope of the study was decentralisation and service delivery. The study focused on decentralised structures and their impact on service delivery. These included local leadership, land management and physical planning. As regards local leadership, the study focused on participatory planning, consultations, involvement, mobilisation, transparency, sensitisation, empowerment, monitoring and accountability. As regards land management, the study concentrated on land tenure system, land subdivision, allocation, and land administration. On physical planning, the study put much attention on the institutional capacity of physical planning department, strategic planning, and political will toward physical planning. This research studied the 1995 Constitution of the republic of Uganda, the Local Governments Act Cap 243, the Land Act, Cap 227, the Physical Planning Act, 2010. The study further looked into the theoretical debates that underpin decentralisation and service delivery in urban areas and finally it concluded with findings and recommendations.

1.6.3 Time scope

The time scope covered by this study was between 2013 and 2017. During this period, Masaka Municipal Council for the first time since 1986, implemented decentralised multibillion projects under the World Bank funded Uganda Support to Municipal Infrastructural Development Program Project (USMID) (Masaka Municipal Council Statistical Abstract, 2017). The project was to enhance institutional performance of local governments to improve urban service delivery. The core of the program comprised of two grant flows to municipalities: The Municipal Development Grant (MDG) which provided substantial funds to targeted municipalities for investment in urban infrastructure and Municipal Capacity Building Grant amounting to 7% of the MDG to build institutional capacities in order to achieve superior performance. A number of infrastructural projects such as roads, drainage system and street lighting were implemented. Similarly, capacity

building programs for both technocrats and local leadership were conducted where various study tours for both technocrats and local leaders were carried out within and outside the country. Capacity building programs aimed to equip them with the required skills for service delivery improvements. Masaka Municipal Council also enhanced the performance of its institutions wherein various departments were equipped with required tools and the core staff capacities built through trainings. On the other hand, it is during this period that Masaka Municipality was bedeviled with land management issues and physical planning challenges where it lost public land meant for open spaces, green belts and urban parks to private investors. This period was long enough to help the researcher obtain sufficient information about the study of decentralization and service delivery in urban areas.

1.7 Significance of the study

This study may contribute to existing literature on decentralization, local governance, service delivery, urban management and development. To different stakeholders such as policy makers, development practitioners and donors, study findings suggest the best way to improve and sustain service delivery systems in urban areas. The study findings have unearthed well urban challenges and development contradictions in urban areas. This study has enabled the researcher obtain academic qualification leading to award of Master of Business Administration and management.

1.8 Justification of the study

Decentralisation policy in Uganda has not successfully addressed the social ills of urban areas despite the fact that it has been praised as one of the most far-reaching local government reform programmes in the developing world (Francis and James, 2003). Local Governments have continued to suffer from institutional deficiencies and malfunctions hence affecting services delivered in urban areas (Scot-Herridge, 2002). It is important to note that the rate of growth of urban areas is high and the challenges brought by this growth are overwhelming (UN-Habitat,

2009). It has placed an increased pressure on access to public utilities particularly on education and health services and on infrastructure particularly electricity and water (Cities-Alliance, 2006). This study therefore was carried out to offer solutions to these challenges.

1.9 Definition of key terms as used in the study

Local leadership: this comprises of elected leaders at Municipality, Division, Parish and the Village levels. Local leaders at the Municipality level comprised of the chairperson carrying the title of the Mayor, a Councillor representing each parish or part of the parish in the Municipality. Two councilors representing persons with disabilities in the municipality, two youth councilors, women councilors forming one third of council and two elderly councilors (male and female) representing elderly persons in the municipality (Section 23 (3) of Local Governments Act Cap 243).

Land management: refers to a system made of actors and activities which interact to produce efficient identification, allocation, registration and use of urban space especially land aimed at guiding and controlling growth of towns and cities to ensure to ensure orderly growth and Development (Fakade, 2000, Lall, et.al, 2009).


Physical planning: refers to a design exercise that uses the land use plan as a framework to propose the optimal physical infrastructure for a settlement or area, including infrastructure for public services, transport, economic activities, recreation, and environmental protection (Hirasskar, 2007). Physical planning allocates land uses to meet the economic and social needs of the people while safeguarding future resources (Good fellow 2013).

Decentralisation: is defined as transfer of powers from the central government to local governments (MoLG, 2016). Decentralisation takes many forms; these are deconcentration (shifting of responsibility and workload from the central government to ministry staff located outside the national capital), devolution (total transfer of discretionary decision making, planning and financial management from the centre to local governments with powers to sue and be sued), and delegation (shifting of responsibility of administering public activities and decision making from the central government to semi-independent organizations).

Service delivery: refers to a relationship between policy makers, service providers, and consumers of those services, and encompasses both services and their supporting systems (MoLG, 2013). Service delivery is a mechanism used by an organization to meet the needs and aspirations of the people it is meant to serve.

1.10 Conceptual frame work

There is a relationship between decentralisation and service delivery. The relationship is demonstrated in the framework below.



Source; *Frame work developed basing on the ideas of Steiner (2005) and Jütting et al. (2004).*

In the above conceptual frame work, shows that there is a relationship between decentralisation and service delivery. This relationship is reflected in the roles leaders play in ensuring essential services reach the intended beneficiaries. Local leaders ensure that there is transparency, accountability and citizens' involvement in their local development agenda. It is the duty of elected leaders to hold government employees accountable for the use of public resources for effective service delivery. On the other hand, local leadership can cause chaos and decay in the provision of services if at all it has no integrity and sense of direction.

Proper and efficient land management ensures accessibility to land ownership, information as regards land availability, allocation and planning for infrastructure and social service provision. However, if there is poor land management, service delivery is likely to be affected. Physical planning relates well with service delivery.

Efficient planning function facilitates orderly infrastructural developments such as roads, electricity, water and residential facilities. It ensures the growth of orderly settlements, livable and vibrant cities. Physical planning affects service delivery on the other hand if the planning functions have challenges such as inadequate capacities in terms of skills and staff required to carry out physical planning.

The framework however shows there are intervening variables such obsolete laws (Public Health Act, Cap. 281 of 1935), weak enforcement of rules and regulations by enforcement officers and political interference in the management of local government affairs. A combination of the above three intervening variable affect decentralisation to deliver effective services. Other scholars suggest that there is a relationship between decentralisation and service delivery. For instance, Ahamad (2005) asserts that decentralisation increases service delivery outcomes to the extent that physical

proximity increases voter information, participation and monitoring of performance. Similarly, Azfar, et al, 2005 argued that decentralisation leads to efficient delivery of service delivery because it allows for a variety of bundles of local public goods to be produced and enjoyed by individuals at a lesser cost. However, Conyers (2006) asserts that despite some isolated examples of success, decentralisation has not had a significant positive impact on the quality of public services especially in developing regions. She argues that the main reason for poor service outcomes stems from the fundamental characteristics of contemporary African states than decentralisation as such. These include the centralisation of power, weak structures of accountability and lack of countervailing pressure from civil society. For these reasons, African governments have largely been reluctant to devolve power and finance to local governments, which consequently lack the capacity and resources to deliver improved services. Conyers concludes that the problems of decentralisation cannot be addressed in isolation from wider problems of governance prevailing in many African countries, and therefore have to be addressed as part of a slow and gradual process of state-building.

1.11 Conclusion

The proceeding chapter suggested that decentralisation affect service delivery. Possible explanations were local leadership, land management and physical planning. These possible explanations therefore were the basis on which this research study was undertaken in the context of local governments of Uganda.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter presents a review of literature on the theories that guided the study and a review of related literature on the variables under the study. While reviewing the literature, the relevancy and gaps of the study were established. The related literature, therefore were presented following the order of the objectives of the study.

2.1 Theoretical review

Theories reviewed to support the study included: Principal Agent theory, public choice theory, liberal theory, and neoliberal theory.

2.1.1 Principal Agent theory

This theory suggests an arrangement in which an entity legally appoints another to act on its behalf. The theory suggests an arrangement where one entity (the agent) is able to make decisions on behalf of, or that impact another person or entity the principal. In principal agent relationships the agents act on behalf of the principal and should not have conflict of interest in carrying out the act. This happens because each party wishes to extract as much value as possible from the relationship in money or other terms. The principal agent theory emerged in 1970s from combined disciplines of economics and institutional theory. The proponents of this theory are Stephen Ross and Barry Mitnick (Mitnick, 2006). The Principal Agency theory helps central – local government relations because it describes the behaviors of bureaucratic and public institutions. The central government in this case is identified as principal and local government as agent (Bossert, 1998). The relevancy of this theory is that the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda has defined the relationship between central and local governments in terms of powers, functions and services to be offered and the financing arrangements (Article 176 (2) of the Constitution of RoU, 1995).

Principal - Agency theory is however criticized on ground that that given its roots in economics, it suggests that the actors who work in an organization have utility maximization logic, and seek to get what is in their best interest, even if it is perhaps not in the best interest of the organization (Eisenhardt, 1989). Central government and local governments have different interests and asymmetrical information such that the Central government cannot directly ensure that local government (agent) is always acting in their principal's best interests. It is impossible for the principal to make sure, at no cost, that the agent makes the best decisions for him (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Under these circumstances, the principal and the agent will have to assume monitoring and obligation costs. Costs occur when suspicion arises between the two parties. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), these costs are monitoring costs borne by principal to limit opportunistic behavior of the agent and; the incentive costs incurred by the principal to orient the agent's behavior.

2.1.2 Public Choice theory

Public choice theory contributed by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962) can be useful in analysing the benefits and costs of decentralizing the provision of some public services. Public choice theories are based on the assumption that people act rationally, always pursue their own economic self-interests, and will make optimal economic choices if left unfettered by government regulations and constraints. However, it is important to note that most governments have not decentralised primarily for economic but political reasons (Ahamed, 2005). This is supported by empirical research provided by Rondinelli and Nellis (1986). They found out in their studies of decentralization for the World Bank that many recent experiments with decentralization could not be assessed entirely by economic criteria because they were initiated primarily for political reasons.

Public choice theory states that when the size of the functional field of Government of providing goods and services to the public increases, the quality and operational efficiency of the bureaucracy decreases since it lacks the necessary skills and technical expertise required in order to complete a particular job (Buchanan&Tallock, 1962). Centralisation of power in the hands of the bureaucracy tends to make them self-centered (Klugman, 1994). Hegemony of bureaucracy seeks to promote self-aggrandizement and unnecessarily inflate Government. Public choice theory therefore strictly opposes the bureaucratic model of administration. It opposes bureaucracy, favours decentralization, believes in the concept of institutional pluralism and propounds the idea of the participation of the masses in the public administration as well as democratic decision making (Buchanan & Tallock, 1962). From the public choice perspective, decentralisation is a situation in which public goods and services are provided through the revealed preferences of individuals by market mechanisms. Public-choice theorists contend that under conditions of reasonably free choice, the provision of some public goods is more economically efficient when a large number of local institutions are involved than when the central government is the provider. The argument here is that a larger number of providers of goods and services offer citizens more options and choices that they need.

Public choice theory is criticized on grounds that it may not necessarily address the needs depending on their choices. Sometimes grants given to local governments are based on various considerations depending on the nature of local governments for example size, population, needs and resources of local governments (Smith, 1985). Political support of the population within a local government determines the grants and support to be provided by the central government (Golooba-Mutebi, 2008). The main assumption of the public choice theory which assumes that people act rationally, always pursue their own economic self-interests and will make optimal economic choices in order to achieve their self-interests is unrealistic and un tenable in the real world. This is

because the preferences of an individual or groups/institutions are not the same. Similarly, interests of different actors differ significantly (Smith, 1985).

2.1.4 Neoliberal theory

Neoliberal theory is an economic theory which emphasizes deregulations and reduction of state in the provision of services (World Bank, 2003). It traces its origins from Adam Smith's works of *Wealth of Nation* published in 1776. Neoliberal theory both as a political philosophy and as a policy mix advocated for modernizing reforms in respect to public service delivery and stimulation of economic progress (Olum, 2010). The policy reform framework that ultimately led to the development of New Public Management was based on the growing reality of government failure in the efficient delivery of services and enhancement of an environment conducive to sustainable economic prosperity (Kaul & Collins, 1995). Government failures in turn led to economic stagnation, fiscal crises and deteriorating public services (Hope, 1997). At the same time however, there was increasing demand for quality public service delivery. Neoliberalists advocated for restructuring of state institutions and proposed structures, institutions and policies capable of addressing the above challenges and decentralization was proposed. (Osborne and Gaebler 1993). According to neoliberal theory, decentralization brings the process of decision making closer to the people (Gaventa, 2006), contribute to the deepening of democracy, generation of new spaces for development of civil society and expansion of citizenship ideas (Avritzer, 2002). This leads to the deepening and thickening of democracy at the local level and mobilisation and participation of formerly excluded classes.

All the theories reviewed neoliberal theory relates well with the meaning of decentralization. This is demonstrated by the emergency of civil societies capable of carrying out a whole set of development and welfare functions (Kiyaga Nsubuga, 2007). Greater involvement of local people

in development planning and decision making, encouragement of consensus building and dialogue in solving local problems, decentralisation contributes to efficiency and effectiveness in the implementation of development efforts (Manor, 1998, Rondinelli, 1994) in contrast to centralization which is characterized of inefficiency and corruption (Conyers, 2008). Efficiency and effectiveness are associated with enhanced mobilisation of local resources, better coordination by decentralised bodies, reduced transaction costs and reduced delays arising from bureaucracy (Smoke, 2010) leads to improved quality and quantity of service provision.

Neoliberalism is criticised on ground that they are more applicable in western democracies and not in developing countries. The role of the state in guiding development agenda is critical. Decentralisation efforts based on the ideals of neoliberal school of thought are not appropriate in steering local development agenda. Decentralisation cannot thrive on local resources alone and therefore the role of state is paramount in offering substantial support in funding development programs at the local level (North, 1990). Although neoliberal theory advocate for deregulation and reduction of state in the provision of essential services, most of the structural adjustment programs advocated by the World Bank have failed to achieve their objectives and therefore plunged the countries implementing the programs into more debts. Neoliberal theory advocates creating more democratic institutions and hierarchies at the local level that would increase and maintain administrative expenses for both central and local governments. This means that citizens have to suffer with financial burden by creating more hardships. All in all, from the foregoing theoretical review it appears that decentralisation is good in theory but bad in practice. Despite of the above shortcomings neoliberalism theory helped the researcher to understand the perspectives on which decentralisation is based. Neoliberal theory provides the foundations for decentralisation and service delivery in Uganda. It advocates for reforms in public sector management and deepening of democracy at the local level; a foundation on which decentralisation and service delivery is based.

2.2 Over view of the study variables

The study variables covered under this study included decentralisation and service delivery. Similarly, local leadership, land management and physical planning were some of the dimensions of decentralisation identified and covered under this study.

2.2.1 Decentralisation

According to Rondinelli (1999) decentralisation is the transfer of authority and responsibility for public functions from the central government to intermediate and local governments or quasi-independent government organizations and/or the private sector. There are basically three types of decentralisation within the public sector: 1) Political decentralization, (2) fiscal decentralisation and (3) administrative decentralisation (Olum, 2010). Political decentralisation is the transfer of political power and decision-making authority to sub- national levels such as elected village councils, district councils and state level bodies. Such transfer is made to a local level of public authority that is autonomous and fully independent from the devolving authority and this form of form of decentralisation is called devolution. Fiscal decentralisation involves a level of resource reallocation to local government which would allow it to function properly and fund allocated service delivery responsibility, with arrangements for resource allocation usually negotiated between local and central authorities. The fiscal decentralisation policy would normally also address such issues as assignment of local taxes and revenue-sharing through local taxation and user and market fees. **Administrative decentralisation** involves the transfer of decision-making authority, resources and responsibilities for the delivery of selected public services from the central government to other lower levels of government, agencies, and field offices of central government line agencies. According to Nsibambi, (1998) the most radical form of administrative decentralisation is **devolution**, with local government having full responsibility for hiring/firing of staff and assigning authority/responsibility for carrying out tasks.

Decentralization takes many forms (Rondinelli, 1984) and these are deconcentration, delegation devolution and privatization. He says that these four forms of decentralization are primarily distinguished on the basis of the powers that Central Government transfers or gives to the local units. **Deconcentration**; this is shifting of the responsibility and workload from the central government ministry headquarters to staff located outside the national capital for example Regional Local Administration or Field Administration. **Delegation** is the shifting of responsibility for administering public functions, making decisions, producing goods, (functions previously done by central government ministries) to semi-independent organisations which though not wholly controlled by the government, are ultimately accountable to it. Such organizations include Marketing Boards, Parastatal Bodies, and Public Corporations. **Devolution**, this is the transfer of discretionary decision making, planning, administration and financial management to local governments with powers to sue and be sued. The political base of officials in these units is in their locality not at the centre. They invest or spent resource at their discretion provided that they are operating within the legislative limits and their actions do not conflict with the legal regime and broad national goals (MoLG, 2016). Privatisation, this is the giving up by the government primarily for reasons of efficiency of certain functions and services to various sections of the private sector.

Decentralisation was designed to achieve the following objectives: *“transfer real power to the local governments and thus reduce the work load on remote and under resourced central officials; bring under control (political, managerial, administrative delivery of services of local people to improve effectiveness and accountability and to promote a sense of people’s ownership of local government programs and projects; free managers in local governments from the constraints of central authorities to allow them to develop organizational structures that are tailored to local conditions; improve financial accountability and responsible use of resources by establishing clear link between payment of taxes and the provision of the services they finance and; improve the capacity*

of local councils to plan, finance, and manage the delivery of service to their constituents”
(Nsibambi, 1998: p. 2).

The powers and functions that were devolved to local governments in Uganda include: political powers to elect local leaders (See part X of local Governments Act Cap 243), planning and budgeting powers (Section 35-37 of Local Governments Act Cap 243), physical Planning powers (Section 4 of the Physical Planning Act, 2010), financial powers to plan and raise own source of revenue, budgeting, accounting and reporting (Part VIII of Local Governments Act 243), legislative powers that is making bylaws and ordinances (Section 38-39 of Local Governments Act Cap 243) and; land administration and management function (Section 60 of the Land Act Cap 227). For purpose of this study emphasis was placed on the decentralized powers such as local leadership (political powers), land management function and physical planning (planning powers) and how they affect service delivery.

2.2.2 Service delivery

Service delivery is concerned with the provision of a product or service, by a government or government body to a community that it was promised to, or which is expected by that community (Riekert, 200 1: 90). Service delivery is a mechanism used by an organization to meet the needs and aspirations of the people it is meant to serve (MoLG, 2013). Confidence in local governments derives from demonstrated capability to deliver services in a way that meets national and public needs (GoU, 2013). In order for service delivery to be effective, services should possess these attributes: available and timely, dependable and reliable, usable, useful, credible, authentic, responsive and flexible to the evolving user needs, sustainable affordable and consistent over time, and expandable [to be applicable to different kinds of services] (GoU, 2013). At the centre of service delivery is accountability, value for money, efficient and effective use of resources, improved communication and decision-making processes. If the accountability process is weak, value for money will not be realized. Effective service delivery is about providing the services that

meet the needs of the users in the most efficient and effective ways. According to MoLG, (2013) local governments improve service delivery by (i) evaluating citizens' needs, priorities and decisions; (ii) increase understanding and act upon socio-economic needs of the citizens in order to design appropriate service delivery mechanisms; (iii) improve decision-making capacity of leaders at all levels; (iv) provide relevant, timely, cost-effective and useful services that are beneficial to the people; (v) effectively use performance management approaches, tools and methods to evaluate the services delivered and (vi) increase participation of people in decision-making for service delivery.

2.3 Local leadership and service delivery

Leadership is understood from different point of view. From a management perspective, leadership is a process of influencing individuals towards goal attainment (Yukl, 1989:12). It can be argued that leadership can be assigned, based on the position the person is appointed to, or it can be emergent leadership, resulting from what one does and how one acquires support from followers (Bell, 2006:123). This means that leaders need to adapt, innovate and carve out a new path through the bush to allow change that will improve service delivery. Leadership is about the functions of guidance, alignment of people, motivation and inspiration of teams (Covey, 1992). There is lack of consensus on the operational definition of leadership (Mouton, 1996: 35). According to Kotter (1999) leaders are people who direct others and followers have little authority over the decision making processes related to goals and programming of activities. Kotter, (1999) opined that a leader is required to be able to determine direction, gather a broad range of data and provide correct interpretations, direct and guide from the premise of a vision and strategies that are beneficial to the people, organisation and the employees. Therefore, Covey (1992) concludes that leaders are there to serve others as well as to lead at the will of their followers.

Mondy & Premeaux, (1993) have identified autocratic, democratic, free rein and participative leadership styles that may influence others. The autocratic leader commands and expects compliance from the followers, democratic leader consults with the people and the free rein leader uses very little power, giving the followers a high degree of independence (Mondy & Premeaux, 1993). Goleman (2000) reports that leaders will achieve results by applying six distinct leadership styles and these are: coercion, authoritative, affiliate leader, pace setting leader, coaching leader and democratic leader. The coercive style works best in a crisis situation when the leader needs to demand immediate compliance without any further consultation, negotiation with staff or input from staff, but it has a damaging effect, in particular with regard to the leader's top-down decision making (Coleman,2000). Kouzes & Posner (2002) explain that there are practices of leadership that manifest themselves in providing practical model that represent reality; inspiring a shared vision; challenging the process and enabling others to act in accordance with the norms and values of the society.

In most formal institutions leaders are guided by rules and guidelines (North, 1990). The primacy of local leaders in directing development agenda is enshrined in Chapter Eleven of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda and the Local Governments Act (as amended) 1997; the two most authoritative documents on local governance in Uganda. According to these two documents local leaders are democratically elected and have provisions for incorporating marginalized groups for instance women, youth elderly and persons with disabilities. These leaders are charged with implementing a broad range of services (see schedule 2 of Local Government Act, 1997) in addition to locally determined ones that are consistent with the Republic of Uganda Constitution. The Local Governments Act, Cap 243 spells out powers, functions and responsibilities of local leaders in local government to deliver the much needed services to the people in their area of jurisdiction. These powers, functions and responsibilities were transferred from the central

governments to local leaders in accordance with Article 176 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. However, while power may be transferred to lower levels of authority this does not necessarily mean that operations will be more efficient, transparent or accountable, or that people at the local level will have more say in matters that affect them (Deepa Narayan, 2002). Ironically the powers are coming under threat from the central government itself the principal promoter of decentralisation (Gore&Muwanga, 2014). The problem originates from widespread irregularities that have been documented in the tendering, procurement processes, human resource management at the local level and the uneasy relationship between political and technical leaders that has continually undermined effective delivery of services (Lewis, 2014).

The perennial problem facing people at the grassroots is that their lack of organization almost always exposes their agenda to risk of elite capture, and this weakness often extends to some of their leaders (representatives) as well (Kiyaga-Nsubuga, 2007). The problem is compounded if local leaders have minimal understanding of their roles and functions, or if they deliberately distort the development process to their advantage. These factors make promoting transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs, and facilitating popular participation in decision-making and implementation a complex undertaking (Kiyaga-Nsubuga, 2007). There is a general perception that decentralization has increased cases of corruption among leaders at the local. It is not clear whether this perception is due to increased exposure of corrupt practices by the press, or increase in the number of persons in positions that are vulnerable to corrupt practices (Makara, et.al. 2009). Development goals cannot be achieved unless there are mechanisms are in place to check on corruption, abuse of office and other malpractices (Steiner, 2008).

It has been equally pointed out that decentralisation has not effectively empowered leaders to gain confidence, power and authority to make decisions (Prinsen, &Titeca, 2008). Unless their freedom

of choice and action is expanded to enable them to have more control over resources and decisions that affect their service delivery will always be a failure (Manyak and Katono, 2010). Lack of transparency, accountability, full participation of local citizens in the local developments has been identified as some of the leadership gaps in local governments (Tukahebwa, 1998). Much as decentralisation has devolved powers to local leaders in local authorities, these powers have gone with opportunities for abusing them. Leaders seem to think that it is right to use public funds and other resources for private gains (Tukahebwa, 1998). The office of the Inspector General of Government has implicated local leaders in corruption and bribery scandals and the culprits have been convicted and imprisoned (Inspectorate of Government report, 2008). Delivery of services requires strong relationship between the actors in the service delivery systems (Ahamed, 2005). The delivery of public services involves at least two relationships of accountability. First, clients as citizens have to hold local leaders or politicians accountable for allocating resources for the services and the leaders in return have to hold service providers accountable for delivering the service (Ahamed, 2005). This implies that if one or both of links of accountability breaks down there will be a weakness in service delivery outcomes.

Okipo (2007) reports that local people were unable to hold their leaders accountable for resource allocation decisions. Power at the local level is more concentrated, more elitist and applied more ruthlessly against the poor people than at the centre (Grindle, 2007). Power which is handled by politicians and local elite tend to allocate the government resources in favor of their interests. If this is the case the gap between the rich and poor at the local level could be widened leading to incidence of poverty in urban areas. Constitution and the Local Governments Act allowed local governments to collect revenue from a number of specified sources formulate plans and budgets, allocate expenditure, and make investments in a wide range of services (Muriisa, 2009). It is important to note that significant amount of the funding comes from the centre which creates

dependency syndrome (Saito, 2003). This implies that the local leaders lack the capacity to mobilise their own source of revenues. However, reports of government interference in the management of local affairs have been documented. A president can simply abolish local taxes such as graduation tax, market dues and parking fees meant for local development without either consulting local leaders or involving them in a discussion about alternative ways of addressing the issue comprehensively (Manyak & Katono, 2010).

Local leaders have developed service delivery standards to specify the quality, quantity and time of service to be delivered to the clients (MoLG, 2013). For specialized services such as road works building construction, medical services, the ministry plays a leading role in developing specifications. However, it has been pointed out that service delivery standards remain on paper and are rarely followed (Muyomba- Tamale, 2011). Some gaps have been identified between service provision and local needs resulting from decentralisation (Muriisa, 2009). This gap is created by lack of adequate funding at the local level, and is largely reflected in the education, health and sanitation sectors and local leaders have not helped to address the gap (Golola, 2003). Kayizzi-Mugerwa (1999:42) argued that the success of decentralisation will depend on the capacity of districts and urban leaders to raise their own revenue and use it efficiently in the provision of services. However, the generation of local revenues is limited, with local governments largely depending on central government financial transfers. The abolition of the Graduated Personal Tax (GPT) meant that the local and urban governments had limited financial sources to finance public services, as is the case with education and health cited above. As a result, there has been an increase in the reliance by local governments on central government. This lack of financial autonomy affects the implementation of development plans and consequently limited service delivery since most of funds are diverted by leaders before they reach their final destination.

Local leaders lack the capacity to exercise responsibility for service delivery at the local level (Muriisa, 2009) and it the most daunting challenge facing decentralisaion. Local leaders especially at the lower levels lack the ability to oversee management of public finances for local development. Lack of political will and failure to cede political power to locally elected leaders in local governments undermines service delivery. Although the section 12 and section 72 of the Local Government Act Cap.243 of the laws of Uganda defines the roles of the District Chairperson and Resident District Commissioner, it has not prevented conflicts between political leaders and civil servants. Local conflicts arising from conflict in roles limit efforts of decentralisation policy to improve services at the local levels. It is documented that conflicts stem largely from the demand for accountability by the civil servants from the politicians. It was reported in the Daily Monitor of 20th August 2007 that the Ntungamo Resident District Commissioner claimed to be under threat from the LCV chairman because he demanded accountability and had exposed the LCV chairman's corruption practices.

Lack of financial autonomy and insufficient funds to facilitate local government councils, means that many of the local government leaders including councillors have remained voluntary (Green, 2010). Owing to lack of resources to pay councilors sitting and transport allowances, local councils take long to hold meetings and are therefore unable to discharge their policy making and over sight functions. Such people are difficult to hold them accountable to the local communities (Golola 2003). There is increased corruption by these officials who try to compensate themselves by misappropriating funds and by extortion from the citizens (Tukahebwa, 1998). However, Golooba-Mutebi (2007) argues that central government bureaucrats have little wish to cede power and resources to local governments for service delivery. It is assumed that government bureaucrats propose reforms ostensibly to strengthen decentralisation when they expect benefits for themselves (Golooba-Mutebi, 2007). This is a big gap in service delivery because much of the available

financial resources end up enriching individuals employed in the public sector, particularly local governments.

2.4 Land management and service delivery

Land provides a means of livelihood for the majority of the population and therefore issues pertaining to land administration and management are at the heart of everybody in Sub-Saharan Africa (FAO, 2002). Land management is a system made of actors and activities which interact to produce efficient allocation and use of urban space especially land aimed at guiding and controlling growth of town and cities to ensure orderly growth and efficient functioning in provision of housing services and facilities (Fakade,2000). Land management therefore concerns the rules, processes structures through which decisions are made and enforced about land. Land management is governed by principles such as equitable access to land, security of tenure to all members of the society, transparency in decision regarding land and national resources, decentralised land administration and effective efficient and responsive land administration services. Although land is an essential ingredient in all urban growth, most cities therefore have no effective measures to control land development. Many cities have formulated master plans at some time or another that included guidelines on land development and the future direction of urban growth, rarely, if ever, have these plans been realized. Reasons for this development include poor urban governance, poor urban population projections underpinning these plans. Formulating equitable land development policy therefore remains one of the largest challenges facing planners and policy makers in many cities in the developing world.

Land policies for instance (Uganda National Land Policy, 2013) provide a framework for articulating the role of land in national development, land ownership, distribution, utilization, alienability, management and control of land. The policy harmonizes views on historical land

injustices, land use management and contemporary land issues. It further addresses the protection of the rights of citizens to own land which should be optimally utilized. The policy also provides reform geared at having efficient and effective land delivery systems which is a basis for wealth creation and social economic transformation. Although the government of Uganda formulated the National Land Policy, there are several concerns that affect the implementation of this policy. For instance, it is reported that some sections of the society especially women are still discriminated against owning land. The Government of the Republic of Uganda ratified several international human rights instruments on gender equality and protection of women rights. Similarly, the constitution of the republic of Uganda outlaws traditions, customs, practices which discriminate against women in matters of access, use, and ownership of land, the traditional practice does not acknowledge these changes. Custom, culture and traditions continue to support transmission of land to men inheritance.

Land disputes and land conflicts have become part of the definition of contemporary Uganda. Land conflicts are on the rise and evictions on the registered land between owners and occupants are on the rise. The capacity of government, local governments and politicians to tackle land conflicts is overstretched. The Land (amendment) Act, 2010 intended to criminalise evictions of tenants are yet to bear effect because of implementation challenges. Cases of land grabbing are common as customary owners are insecure because they do not possess formalized rights over land. The land management hierarchy in Uganda starts with the Uganda Land Commission, which is responsible for any government land (Constitution of the ROU Article 238). District Land Boards are responsible for administration of public land (Constitution of the ROU Article 240). The constitution provides that District Land Board should be independent of the Uganda Land Commission in the performance of their functions and not to be subject to the direction or control

of any person or authority but to take into account national and district council policy on land (Article 241(2) of ROU Constitution, 1995).

According to section 59(1) of the Land Act Cap 227 of the laws of Uganda, the functions of the board among others shall be to (a) hold and allocate land in the district which is not owned by any person or authority; (b) facilitate the registration and transfer of interests in land; (c) take over the role and exercise the powers of the lessor in the case of a lease granted by a former controlling authority. Section 59 (6) of the same Act indicate that each district council shall have a district land office comprising the offices of the district physical planner, the district land officer, the district valuer, the district surveyor and district registrar of titles. Section 60(2c) of the Land Act says that the board shall have powers to sell, lease or otherwise deal with the land held by it and; section 60(3) of the same act says that in the performance of its functions, a district land board shall prepare and publish an annual report and shall have regard to any comments that the district council may make on that annual report.

Land Committees are also important actors in the district land management. Section 64 (1) of the Land Act cap 227 establish land committees appointed by the district councils upon recommendations by the sub-county councils. Land committees are also applicable in urban areas. According to section 64(2) of the Land Act, there shall be for each gazetted urban area and each division in the case of a city, a land committee consisting of a chairperson and three other members appointed by the council on the recommendation of the urban council, and in the case of a city, on the recommendation of the city division council. According to section 64(6) the committee shall assist the board in an advisory capacity on matters relating to land, including ascertaining rights in land, and shall perform any other function conferred on it by or under this Act or any other law. Remuneration of members of the board and the committees may be determined by the district

council on the recommendations of the district executive committee (section 66(1) of the Land Act); and all expenses incurred by or on behalf of the committee shall be charged on the district administration funds (section 66(2) of the Land Act). It is reported most districts are short of locally generated revenue and majorly rely on central government transfers which accounts for 85 percent of overall local government budgets (Local Government Finance Commission report, 2012). This is in line with the views of Alden (2003) who reported that land administration system is inadequately resourced; hence resulting in performance below expected standards.

In respect of controlling developments, a person who owns or occupies land shall manage and utilise the land in accordance with the Forests Act, the Mining Act, the National Environment Act, the Water Act, the Uganda Wildlife Act and any other law (section 43 of the Land Act). Equally section 44 (1) of the Land Act, protects environmentally sensitive areas and it says that “the Government or a local government shall hold in trust for the people and protect natural lakes, rivers, ground water, natural ponds, natural streams, wetlands, forest reserves, national parks and any other land reserved for ecological and touristic purposes for the common good of the citizens of Uganda.” In the same vein section 45 of the Land Act says that “any use of the land shall conform to the provisions of the Physical Planning Act, 2010) and any other law. Section 51(1) of the Physical Planning Act, (2010) limits the powers of the Districts Land Boards to dispose land and extend leases without authority of the physical planning committee; This law came as a result of growing concerns raised about the land allocations made by the district land boards without taking into account the existing land use plans.

Land management present a number of challenges and these include: The dual system of land administration (informal/customary) and (formal/statutory) which breeds conflict, confusion and overlaps in the institutional mandates. Allocations of public land and natural resources by District

Land Boards have raised serious concerns in the land sector. Some allocations have not considered ecological, esthetic, environmental, economic, and social impacts and as such have displaced vulnerable land and natural resources dependent communities whose rights to land access, food security and livelihoods are lost. Whereas private sector investments in land and natural resources is necessary and should be promoted, safeguards ought to be put in place to ensure transparency process with due diligence so that land rights of vulnerable sections of the society and environment are not compromised.

Land administration services are characterized by excessive long delays, laxity by land officers, slow processes, poor public relations, poor record keeping and payment of bribes by the clients demanding land services. Manual record keeping system has severely hindered progress in the delivery of land services to the public making it slow, cumbersome, frustrating and too costly. (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Equally, Bearse, Glomm & Janeba, (2000) reports that when services become inaccessible, the quantities decline and revenue is lost leading to poor service delivery. Government decentralized land management and dispute settlement mechanism. The Land Act cap 227 created institutions for land management/administration and land dispute resolution. These have been designed to shift the focus of land management to the local level, and provide for effective community involvement in land management decisions. However, decentralisation of land delivery services has not yet yielded much due to human and financial constraints.

Land information system is a major and integral component of land management and administration for urban centers in particular (UN-ECE, 2005). Land related information is an important resource that must be managed efficiently in order to maximize potential benefits that can be obtained from land. According to Lamba (2005), land information management strategies are concerned with the effective management of land information resources to achieve specific

objectives and improve decision making in urban centers. Ahene, (2009) revealed that without good land information policies on land to support economic growth cannot be achieved. Dale and McLaughlin, (1999) reveals that land registration provides an underlying structure on which ownership rights in land are recognized. Similarly, Steudler, (2004) maintains that land registration also helps in resolving or reducing land disputes and provides information for processes like land valuation and planning. However, land information is largely manual and according to GIC Ltd, (2007), 60% of the information in the land registry has never been updated. There is no centre for readily and accessible land information maintained by the government, different institutions generate their own data sets which they use to meet their institutional mandates but do not readily share information with each other (Giddings, 2009).

A study on the land registry revealed that high transfer costs and ignorance of the law were the major reasons why people preferred not to register their properties (Greenwood, 1990). Maluku (1997) reports that although the government tried to come up with strategies like decentralization and computerization to overcome this problem, it has persisted. Ignorance of the public coupled with bureaucratic procedures affect land delivery services (Giddings, 2009). Majority of public does not understand the costs or even procedures for registering a property in case the property has changed hands whether through transaction, inheritance or gift (Ahene, 2009). It is also very difficult to get land information from the registry (Giddings, 2009). As a result, for one to get land information, they employ a chain of people which not only led to high costs but a breeding ground for theft and forgery (GIC, 2007). Dawall & Clerk, (1996) identified poor tenure, cadastral and regulatory systems as factors hindering the growth and development of cities in developing countries. Fakade, (2002) confirming the above developments, said that unreformed tenure relations is to blame for insufficient provision of affordable developable land in most cities of Sub-Saharan Africa. Land tenure rules define how people access rights to land (FAO, 2002). Rights

over the land define what can be done on the land (Dale & McLaughlin, 1999). Jacobs (2003) reports that land rights are often held by many people on the same piece of land which makes planning difficult. The security society offers to holders of land rights affects the willingness to make investments on land. Van Asperene & Zevenbergen (2007) report that security of tenure exists when individuals perceive that they have rights over a piece of land on a continuous basis and land is free from encumbrances. The capacity gaps, inefficiency problems, inadequate staff and low morale have pitted the land management and administration department (Barata, 2001). According to Barata, (2001) the whole process has been ineffective and slow.

Zakout et al (2009) and Williamson et.al (2009) propose good governance in land administration and management for improved service delivery. Measures such as training more people to manage and administer land record practices in the various districts. People to be trained at both a lower and higher level since systems/technologies are dynamic and change at all times and levels. There is a need for people involved in land information management to have broader knowledge on land which will enable easy exchange and interaction of information. Augustinus (2003) observes that unless Uganda gets an appropriate land management system, economic and social services will not be delivered to the citizens and worst still, sustainable and affordable security of tenure will never be offered.

2.5 Physical planning and service delivery

Uganda is growing largely at unprecedented and challenging pace thus experiencing rapid urbanization (MoLHUD, 2016). The country has a population base of 35 million and a high population growth rate of 3.2% (UBOS, 2014) making it one of the fastest-growing populations in Africa. This has serious implications in terms of urban services, as well as impacts on the environment. While Uganda still has a low level of urbanization (18.2%) it has a high urban growth

rate of 5.2% per annum (Uganda Bureau of Statistics UBOS, 2014). The Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area (GKMA) has the highest urban population representing over 50% of Uganda's total urban dwellers (MoLHUD, 2016). It is projected that by the year 2035 Uganda's population will have grown to 68.4 million of which 30% will be in urban areas (MoLHUD, 2016).

Since they are places where challenges and opportunities of development meet, they need to be adequately planned and effectively guided by these plans in order for enabling their expansion, functional specialization above all sustainability (Devas & Rakodi, 1993). However, due to their institutional fragility as well as the failure to implement existing physical plans, most urban residents in Uganda live in informal settlements (UN-Habitat, 2006). Most towns with the exception of traditional municipalities of Uganda have been growing and expanding without a clear physical development strategy ((MoLHUD, & UNDP, 2008). They equally continue to grapple with the challenge of funding basic infrastructure such as roads, piped water and schools due to inadequate revenue base (MoLHUD, & UNDP, 2008). It is further reported that most slum settlements are inaccessible because of poorly planned transport infrastructure (MoLHUD, & UNDP, 2008). Due to plot sub-division as well as the lack of a clear land compensation policy, the provision of centrally planned services such as roads, piped water and garbage collection in most towns is virtually impossible (Goodfellow, 2013). Therefore, urban planning is an important tool to guide the growth of urban areas. (UN-Habitat, 2009). The planning tradition of most of African countries followed the European tradition owing to the past colonial history of the continent (Devas, 1993).

Like any country in East Africa, Uganda has a tradition of planning practice (Good fellow, 2013). It indicates therefore that there is an understanding of physical land use planning which mainly comprised of master planning, planning and building standard and regulation and a system of

development control. (MoLHUD, & UNDP, 2008). Master plans, sometimes named as ‘end-state’ plans or ‘blueprint’ plans, refer to the physical plans that depict on a map the future scenario of the town when the plan is fully implemented (Hirasskar, 2007). However, master plans have been criticized by some scholars and practitioners as elitist, rigid, top-down, professional and technocratic exercises with little or no participation of the ordinary citizens (Hirasskar, 2007). Progressive scholars have therefore advocated for preference of structural plans because of their flexibility. Yet, master planning practice tends to dominate the planning practice of developing countries particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. Whatever the case may be master plans help guide urban development and expansion (Devas, 1993).

It is reported that the dominance of privately owned land has deleterious effect on the physical planning services in urban areas of Uganda. Goodfellow, (2013) reports that although it is true the British colonial administration ignored private land in planning endeavors, to claim that preponderance privately owned land affect physical planning, this explanation is not convincing. The Physical Planning Act 2010, declared the whole country a planning Area. He concluded that in fact regulatory breaches are common on public land which in most urban areas is controlled by the District Land Board (Land Act, 1997) and there is a general failure of regulatory enforcement on all land, private and public.

Political will play a significant role in ensuring development control and enforcement of building rules in urban areas (Goodfellow, 2013). It is reported that demolition of illegal structures in urban areas did not take place since National Resistance Movement (NRM) captured power until 2010 (ibid, 2013). Potts, (2006) reports that the strong hand of the state to enforce legal codes on illegal construction is poor and not uncommon phenomenon. Desrosiers and Thomson, (2011) observed that one resource the government does have to draw on is its reputation for clamping down on

corruption. Patronage and patrimonialism as observed by Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, (2012) are highly visible forms of corruption associated with waiving formal planning rules for the elites in exchange for favours is dangerous for any growing city. According to Goodfellow (2013), master plans have to be implemented without motivated obstructions and implementation of development controls mattered for both the country's future and for the career prospects. Concluding on physical planning issue Goodfellow, (2013) observed that critically it is not through foreign expertise, technical capacity-building or rigorous planning and regulatory rules on paper that effective urban development control is likely to be achieved. Rather it is through changes to the political bargaining environment. He says that the political bargaining environment in Kigali City was therefore conducive to the effective implementation of plans and enforcement of regulations unlike in Kampala whose political environment favoured large scale corruption. The political environment was reflected in the political resource mobilised by the Kigali Administration aimed at bringing order to the country marred by devastating violence and rejecting visible corruption which incentivized a culture of planning and against waiving regulatory rules.

A closer review of reports from the office of the Auditor General made to parliament revealed that although the Physical Planning Committees are mandated to undertake all the planning for the municipality, the District Land Boards and the Uganda Land Commission charged with the management of public land in these areas, there is no coordination in their activities and this affects planning for services in urban areas. However, section 51 of the Physical Planning Act forbids the subdivision, consolidation of land, renewal or extension of leases by the District Land Boards without approval by the relevant Physical Planning Committees. The Auditor General's report also revealed that service delivery in municipalities is affected by inefficiencies of the physical planning committees charged with responsibility of approving development applications. It was reported that the majority of the developments 98.4 percent were completed without any inspections carried out

during the construction phase; a reflection of major development control weaknesses. The same report further revealed that Municipalities rarely budget for monitoring, inspection and control of developments in their area of jurisdiction. The report concluded that this has resulted in cases of alteration of approved plans by developers and in some cases illegal developments that pose risks to urban residents.

Physical planning function in urban local councils is suffering from systemic failure. Findings of the value of money audit of physical planning in municipalities conducted by the office of the auditor general in five municipalities of Mbarara, Mbale, Jinja, and Fortportal and Gulu revealed that: (i) One Municipal Council had not detailed her physical development plan; while two municipalities had less than 20 percent of their plans detailed; (ii) one municipal council had no data for roads planned for opening while the rest had opened approximately 73 percent on average ranging from 90 percent to 42 percent; (iii) all municipal councils delayed to evaluate the applications for development as stipulated 30 days' timelines; delays ranging from 50 percent to 95 percent of the applications; (iv) up to 95% of the developments in all municipal councils were not inspected. Only Mbarara and Jinja had undertaken some inspections before issuance of occupation permits; (v) there was no coordination mechanism to harmonize land administration decisions and physical planning activities leading to irregular allocation of public land by either District Land Boards or Physical planning committee. (Letter ADM/F/150/01 from the permanent secretary MoLG addressed to all Town Clerks of Municipalities and Town Councils dated 19th October, 2015).

2.6 Conclusion

The literature above relates decentralisation and service delivery largely showing decentralisation explains service delivery outcomes. However, the literature raises a number of theoretical,

contextual and empirical gaps. At the theoretical and contextual levels, most of the studies took place in western world and some lessons learnt from them may not necessarily be applicable in Uganda's context. For instance, studies carried by Stephen Ross & Barry Mitnick, (2006); Bossert, (1998), James Buchanan & Gordon Tallock, (1962); Rondinelli and Nellis, (1986); Smith, (1985); Mannor, (1999); Osborne & Gaebler, (1993) and Eisenhardt, (1989). At empirical level whereas other studies established positive relationship between decentralisation and service delivery, Azfar and Livingstone (2002) did not find any positive impact of decentralisation on efficiency and equity in local public service provision. West & Wrong (1995) found out that decentralisation resulted in lower levels of public services in poorer regions. Others have concluded that decentralised countries have higher perceived corruption and service delivery performance in public health services (Tresman, 2000). Decentralised services were inadequately funded and local governments lack financial autonomy (Green, 2010). Decentralisation has not promoted transparency, accountability and empowerment at the local level (Tukahebwa, 1998). Inkoom and Gyapong (2016) found out that ambitious decentralised health care plans in most Sub-Saharan countries were based at the centre and local governments report high dependence on central government for funds; allowing for central government interference. Local power structures obstruct citizen's participation in the development agenda (Saito, 2003), Public disinterest in payment of taxes if not accompanied by improved services (Green, 2010), creation of new districts that are deemed unviable for service delivery, but formed in the spirit of political patronage as compensation for lost reforms with full knowledge of their political and economic limitations (Green 2013) are some of the limitations of decentralisation. These gaps were the basis for carrying out this research study in the context of urban centers of Uganda.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter describes the methodology that guided study. The chapter included the research design, study population, sample size and selection, sampling techniques, data sources, data collection methods, data collection instruments, procedure of data collection, reliability and validity of instruments, data analysis and presentation, and limitation of study.

3.1 Research design

The study adopted cross sectional research designs. Across sectional research design, the researcher collected data at a point at time because a cross-sectional design takes a snapshot. The choice of using cross-sectional research design was influenced by two factors: first, the time required for collecting information was short and second, it was less costly to use because it does not require a lot of time. This helped the researcher to obtain data in a relatively short period and saving costs for data collection. The study used both qualitative and quantitative research approaches of data collection. Quantitative data were the basis for drawing statistical inferences by relating to the study variables. Qualitative data supplemented the quantitative data by providing detailed information in form of statements from interviews for in-depth analysis (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005).

3.2 Study population

The study planned to obtain responses representative from local leaders of Masaka Municipal council, Municipal Division Councils, Wards and Village Councils, Members of the District Land Board (DLB), Area Land Committee (ALC), Physical Planning Committee, and Municipal Development Forum. The targeted population was 190 (Approved Masaka Municipality Five Year Development Plan, 2015/2019). This population was used because local leaders formulate policies,

plan and approve budgets and are charged with the duty of delivering services. Members of the District Land Boards and Area Land committees allocate, manage and control land in the municipality; physical planning committee members were at the centre of implementation and approval of physical developments in the municipality. Municipal Development Forum represented views of the users of the services provided by Masaka Municipal Council. This population had the most appropriate information about decentralisation and service delivery at the local level.

3.3 Sample size and selection

3.3.1 Sample size

The sample size consisted of 127 respondents that included 5 members of the District Land Board(DLB), 10 members of the Area Land Committees (ALC), 5 members of Physical Planning Committee, 56 members of municipal councilors, 36 Local council I chairpersons (LCI) and 15 members of Municipal Development Forum (MDF). The sample size for the respondents was determined using the Krejcie and Morgan, 1970. The sample size is presented in the table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Population and Sample size

Category	Population (n)	Sample (s)
District land board members and officials	7	5
Area land committees (ALC)	15	10
Physical Planning Committee	7	5
Municipal councilors	84	56
Local council I chairpersons	54	36
Municipal development forum	23	15
Total	190	127

Source: Approved Masaka Municipality Five Year Development Plan, 2015/2019 and Krejcie and Morgan, (1970).

3.3.2 Sampling techniques

The unit sampled was selected using three sampling methods, namely stratified sampling, simple random and purposive sampling. Stratified sampling, the population was divided into several strata and by using simple random each individual was chosen by chance basing on the sampling frame containing names of the respondents (Kothari, 1990). Stratified and simple random sampling enabled to generalize the findings. On the other hand, purposive sampling helped the researcher to select a small number of rich cases to provide in depth information and knowledge of a phenomenon of interest (Suri, 2011). Purposive helped in obtaining detailed information through interviews for in-depth analysis. Purposive sampling was used in selecting senior staff and councilors that provided interview data.

3.4 Measurement of study variables

The variables were measured using questions developed basing on the nominal and ordinal scales. The nominal scale was used to measure questions on background characteristics. On the other hand, the ordinal scale which is a ranking scale and possesses the characteristic of order was used to measure the items of the variables of the study (Marateb, Mansourian, Adibi & Farina, 2014). The study used a five ranking Likert Scale where 1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3 neutral, 4= agree, and 5= strongly agree.

3.5 Data sources

The study relied on primary data obtained specifically for this research from the respondents; namely local council leaders at municipal, division, parish, local council I levels and technical officers. Primary data was obtained through administration of questionnaires and interview guide. Similarly, the study also relied on secondary data that was obtained through reviewing management letters and reports, Masaka Statistical Abstracts (2017) and Masaka Municipality Five Year

Development Plan, 2015/2019. The study consulted various publications of the central, state and local governments. Equally, journals, books, magazines, reports and publications of various associations connected with urban management and development and reports prepared by research scholars, universities were consulted.

3.6 Data collection instruments

Two data collection instruments were used in collecting data. These included a self-administered questionnaire and an interview guide.

3.6.1 Self-administered questionnaire

Self-administered questionnaire was used to collect quantitative data. The questionnaire had two sections; that is section (A) on background characteristics containing nominal questions and section (B) containing questions on the independent and dependent variables based on a five point Likert Scale; 1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neutral, 4=Agree, and 5= Strongly agree. The questionnaire was selected because it enabled collection of data from large number of respondents from a short period of time. It also gave respondents more time to understand and fill the questions asked and this improved the quality of answers generated. The questionnaire was simple and structured and enabled respondents to fill them easily (Burns & Grove, 1993:368).

3.6.2 Interview guide

The study used interview guide to collect qualitative data. It gathered information from few key respondents to obtain their opinions, feelings and emotions regarding particular subjects of the study. The interview guide contained open ended questions which obtained detailed information from respondents.

3.7 Data quality controls

3.7.1 Validity of instruments

Content related validity was considered in this study and was achieved through consultation with research supervisors and fellow students who carefully read the questionnaire in order to validate the items. The researcher used the services of two research consultants to test content validity. Each consultant rated the items on a two-point rating scale of Relevant (R) and Irrelevant (IR). The computation of CVI (Content Validity Index) was done by summing up the consultants' ratings on either side of the scale and dividing by two to get the average. The items rated irrelevant for the study were replaced with relevant ones. The formula used to calculate CVI was;

$CVI = n/N$. Where: n = number of items rated as relevant and N = Total number of items in the instrument. The CV results are presented in the table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Content validity index

Items	Number of items	Content validity index
Local leadership	10	0.722
Land management	8	0.720
Physical planning	10	0.728
Service delivery	10	0.730

Source: Primary data

The CVI for the questionnaire was valid at 0.720 which is above 0.7, the least CVI recommended in any survey study (Polit, & Beck, 2004).

3.7.2 Reliability

Reliability for self-administered questionnaire was obtained by calculating Cronbach alpha values using SPSS (Special Package for Social Sciences) after data collection. Variables that obtained above 0.7 alpha values were retained for analysis. This is because an acceptable reliability score is

the one that is 0.7 and higher (Polit, & Beck, 2004) which indicates internal consistence in the instrument. The Cronbach alpha values are presented in the table 3.3.

Table 3.3: Cronbach alpha reliability values

Items	Number of items	Cronbach (α)
Local leadership	10	0.751
Land management	8	0.722
Physical planning	10	0.731
Service delivery	10	0.726

Source: Primary data

Reliability for the interview guide was attained with help of the supervisors and consultants who read through and guide on the formulation of the questions. The data were systematically checked and corrected.

3.8 Data management and analysis

3.8.1 Data management

Processing of qualitative data involved reading, organization, identification of themes, re-coding and exploration of relationships between categories (Moore & McCabe, 2005, Polit, & Hungler, 1995). The processing of quantitative data involved coding, entering the data into the computer using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS 16.0) summarising them using tables.

3.8.2 Data analysis

Data was analysed at three levels namely; univariate, bivariate and multivariate. At univariate level, analysis involved use of percentages and descriptive statistic especially the mean. At bivariate level, analysis involved correlating two variables. At the multivariate level the analysis involved using

regression analysis to determine the strength of the relationship between independent and dependent variables. The analysis for qualitative data was done through thematic analysis to ensure that clusters of text with similar meaning were presented together (Moore & McCabe, 2005). Qualitative data supplemented quantitative data in generating explanations.

3.9 Ethical considerations

The researcher obtained permission to carry out research from Uganda Martyrs University Nkozi and a letter of no objection was granted to the researcher from Masaka Municipal Council. The research respected the rights of others throughout the study. Issues of anonymity, confidentiality and informed consent were strictly observed. Respondents were informed in the language they understand the purpose of the research study and procedures to obtain information. They were accordingly asked to voluntarily consent or decline to participate and to withdraw participation at any time without conditions. The researcher has tried throughout the research journey to avoid any form of dishonesty by recording truthfully the answers of respondents. The researcher acknowledged all sources of information that have been used throughout the research.

3.10 Limitations of the study

During the course of this study, the researcher encountered a number of challenges: the researcher faced financial constraints in terms of transport, stationary, data collection. However, in order to cut on costs, the researcher relied much on assistance given by volunteers and friends to collect data; it was an insurmountable task to administer questionnaires and interviews guide from the sampled population as planned. However, with the vigilance, zeal and determination the researcher and with the help of volunteers the researcher managed to collect the required data from all the sampled population; the researcher also faced a serious challenge of limited time to collect, analyse and submit a report in the required time. However, with the invaluable support provided by the supervisors, the study was completed in time.

3.11 Conclusion

This chapter covered the methodology and methods that informed the study. It provided the basis for the selection of the best tools that helped in gathering of the required data, analysis and presentation of the study findings.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION, DISCUSSION INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter is a presentation, analysis and interpretation of the findings made by this study. This research studied the effect of decentralisation on service delivery in Masaka Municipality. Specifically, the study investigated decentralised aspects such as local leadership, land management and physical planning on service delivery.

4.1 Respondents characteristics

This section presents facts about the respondents on gender, age and the level of education.

Table 4.1: Respondents characteristics

Item	Categories	Frequency	Percent (%)
Gender of respondents	Male	69	54.3
	Female	57	45.7
	Total		100
Age of respondents	18-30 years	10	7.9
	31-44 years	42	33.1
	45and above years	75	59.1
	Total		100
Level of education	Primary education	20	15.7
	Ordinary education	44	42.6
	Advance education	39	30.8
	Post A 'level education	24	10.9
	Total		100.0

Source: Primary data

4.1.1 Gender of respondents

The results presented in Table 4.1 shows that the modal percentage 54.3 percent of respondents was of males and 45.7 percent females. The results suggest that more males than females participate in leadership positions and influence most of the decisions that affect service delivery. However, the gap between males and females is not big and this implies that women are slowly but sure joining positions of responsibility.

4.1.2 Age of respondents

Results presented in Table 4.1 shows that the modal percentage 59.1 percent of respondents were of the age between 45 and above. The ages between 18-30 years were very few represented by 7.9 percent. This implies that the youths are still a marginalised group in leadership positions. It further shows that people between the ages 45-and above dominate leadership position and take most decisions that affect service delivery.

4.1.3 Level of education of respondents

Results on the level of education shows that the modal percentage 42.6 percent of respondents completed ordinary level certificate of education. This is followed by 30.8 percent of respondents who completed Advanced Level Education and (Table 4.1). Although the picture presented is a good one as far as understanding how to read and write, perhaps their capacity to comprehend technical issues and to quickly respond to complex situations remain a big concern.

4.2 Relationship between local leadership and service delivery

The study investigated opinions on how local leadership affects service delivery. Respondents were asked to respond to numerous questions on various aspects of local leadership and how they affect service delivery. The findings were analysed, arranged and presented in the table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Responses on local leadership and service delivery

<i>Local leadership and service delivery</i>	<i>F/ %</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>SA</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. devn</i>
Decentralisation has not empowered local leaders to make effective decisions.	F	6	16	16	40	49	3.87	1.198
	%	4.7	12.6	12.6	31.5	38.6		
Local leaders fail to sensitise the electorates their obligations to pay taxes to and to demand for services.	F	5	6	15	44	57	4.12	1.051
	%	3.9	4.7	11.8	34.6	44.9		
Local leaders abuse decentralised authority for personal interests	F	6	4	15	44	58	4.13	1.057
	%	4.7	3.1	11.8	34.6	45.7		
Decentralization has not empowered citizens to check abuses and power of local leaders	F	5	13	20	51	38	3.82	1.094
	%	3.9	10.2	15.7	40.2	29.9		
Leaders sensitise their electorates to obey urban rules and regulations	F	63	23	16	15	10	2.1	1.344
	%	49.6	18.1	12.6	11.8	7.9		
Leaders rarely consult citizens and hold accountability meetings.	F	7	11	12	47	50	3.96	1.157
	%	5.5	8.7	9.4	37	39.4		
Leaders fail to involve citizens in development planning and budgeting.	F	7	5	18	39	58	4.07	1.121
	%	5.5	3.9	14.2	30.7	45.7		
Leaders rarely participate in mobilisation of resources for local development	F	6	6	13	46	56	4.1	1.075
	%	4.7	4.7	10.2	36.2	44.1		
Leaders discharging their duties with due regard to personal interests.	F	7	4	9	28	79	4.32	1.105
	%	5.5	3.1	7.1	22	62.2		
Low levels of education affect service delivery	F	2	1	2	48	74	4.5	0.722
	%	1.6	0.8	1.6	37.8	58.3		
Valid N	127							

Source: Primary data

4.2.1 Decentralisation has not empowered local leaders to make effective decisions

The results in Table 4.2 show that 38.6% of respondents strongly agreed, decentralization has not empowered local leaders to gain confidence, power and authority to make effective decisions. Similarly 31.5% of respondents agreed, 12.6% neutral, 12.6% disagreed and 4.7% strongly disagreed with the opinion. However, majority of respondents with a mean= 3.8 agreed with the opinion. However, the highest standard deviation = 1.198 suggests that the responses were

dispersed. However, evidence from the interviews conducted, revealed that local leaders have no real power to make and effect decisions. They believe that government wields much power and doesn't want to release it. Local leaders have to submit to the whims of bureaucrats at the central government. In an interview with a local government councilor representing Nyendo ward to Masaka Municipal Council believes that real power was with the Town Clerk (Chief accounting officer) who is appointed and accountable to the central government. This opinion was echoed by another Local Government Councilor who informed the researcher that many times, the Town Clerk ignored implementing their decisions.

The study found out that central government has on several occasions undermined powers granted to local governments by scraping some taxes without even consulting leaders in local governments. The above observation is collaborated with the findings of other writers. For example; Katono (2010) reported that central government exerts tighter control over the affairs at the local level while at the same time presenting appearance of giving more autonomy to the local governments. Katono (2010) further observed that a president can simply abolish local taxes such as market dues, graduated tax and parking fees meant for local development without either consulting local governments or suggesting alternatives. ACODE (2014: 3) reports that local government delivery failures are to large extent connected to distortions inherent in the decentraslisation policy and national budget resources. Conyers (2007) asserts that decentralization transferred responsibilities to lower local leaders in local governments without capacity and decentralization efforts to build that capacity has been minimal. Widmalm, (2008:44) pointed out that the fact that responsibilities are given to a certain institution does not mean that the institution in question has the capacity to fulfill them. He concluded that capacity, be it human, financial and infrastructural, is crucial. Rondinelli, (2007) asserts decentralization has increased the possibility of political capture within these lower tiers which undermined service delivery. He therefore concluded that there is no

country in the developing world that has ever achieved complete devolution for numerous reasons including the desire to retain administrative and political control over the entire geographical area of the nation. For selfish reasons central government has always kept a large degree of power and therefore favoured for partial decentralisation. This explains why the government had to recentralize the appointment of Chief Administrative Officers and the Town Clerk to have a strong grip and tighter control on their operations (Green, 2010). Lack of capacity by local leaders to deliver quality services has raised questions about the effectiveness of decentralisation in Uganda.

4.2.2 Local leaders fail to sensitise their electorates to pay taxes and to demand for services

As to whether local leaders fail to sensitise their electorates on their civic duties, such as to pay taxes and to demand for services, 44.9% of respondents strongly agreed. Similarly, 34.6 of respondents agreed. However, 11.8% of the respondents were neutral, 4.7% of respondents disagreed and 3.9% strongly disagreed. Majority of respondents represented by a mean= 4.12 agreed that local leaders have not performed their duties to sensitise the electorates on their civic obligations to pay taxes and demand for services. Never the less a higher standard deviation = 1.051 meant that there were variations in the responses. This implies that leaders have not taken their duty of sensitizing the population on their civic obligations seriously. In the open interviews, however, it was revealed that the local leaders have not performed the duty of sensitizing the population to perform their civic roles. They agreed that local population should be informed on the government programs in order to attract their continued support. This view was strongly supported by Town Agent who said that the community does not appreciate the importance of payment of local taxes and yet those taxes play a big role in service delivery. He argued that local leaders have a duty to sensitise their electorates to appreciate the importance of supporting service delivery by way of payment of local taxes and to demand for quality services. A member of Masaka Municipal Development Forum echoed the above observation and said that creating community awareness on

ongoing government programs was critical for service delivery. He said the irresponsible disposal and littering of garbage on the streets and along the main roads was perhaps attributed to inadequate community sensitization on sound solid wastes management practices.

Other scholars have provided evidence to support the above observations. For instance, Schwarte (2008) pointed out that effective access to meaningful information is the first step in empowering citizens to own and to exercise control over resources and institutions. Similarly, Chege et al. (2008) assert that only informed citizens can stand out for their rights and hold public officials accountable for their actions and decisions. However, according to Tise (2009) access to information is not a guarantee that will create informed citizens without understanding and capacity to use that information effectively. However, structural and political barriers constrain citizens to harness this information to access services and demand accountability. For the devolution to be meaningful and successful, citizens must be aware of the channels through which they can exercise their rights and local leaders have a duty to fulfill this obligation (Tise, 2009).

4.2.3 Local leaders abuse decentralised authority for personal interests

With respect to whether local leaders abuse decentralised authority for personal reasons, 45.7% of respondents strongly agreed and 34.6% of respondents agreed, 11.8% were neutral, 3.1% disagreed and 4.7% of respondents strongly disagreed. However, majority of respondents who participated in the interview with a mean= 4.13 agreed that leaders abuse their powers and authority for personal gains. The high standard deviation =1.057 suggest that the responses were dispersed. Respondents who participated in the face to face interviews agreed with study findings. They revealed that local leaders collude with technocrats to pay shoddy work where huge amounts of tax payers' money are put to waste. The study also established that there was no transparency in sharing of resources as stipulated by the law. Local Government Regulation 19 (1) part v fifth schedule of Local Governments Act (1997) shows how locally generated revenue is shared between the municipal

and division councils. However, it was revealed that financial regulations were regularly flouted by Masaka Municipal council for no clear reasons. In an interview with division leaders one of the councilors said:

“Masaka Municipal council has on numerous occasions failed to remit 30 percent share meant for implementing decentralized services at the division in time. These monies are meant to pay for solid waste management, street sweeping, drainage disilting and road maintenance. For the last financial year, the division has not received this money and thisomission has serious consequences for the practice of transparency and service delivery.”

Councilor interviewed on 19th June 2017

The study further found out that most of the local council I chairpersons have not bothered to account for 25 percent remitted to their councils and therefore such funds have been spent on non-eligible areas and therefore simple development projects such as protection and maintenance of spring water sources and community access roads were not attended to.

4.2.4 Decentralisation has not empowered citizens to check abuses and power of leaders

Regarding whether decentralisation has not empowered citizens to check abuses, power and authority of leaders, respondents gave diverse responses on the subject. 29.9% of respondents strongly agreed and 40.2% of respondents agreed. However, 15.7% of respondents were neutral, 10.2% of respondents disagreed and 3.9% of respondents strongly disagreed with the opinion. However, with a mean= 3.82 indicate that respondents agreed with the view that decentralization has not empowered citizens to check on abuse, power and authority of leaders. Conversely, with a high standard deviation =1.094 suggests that responses were dispersed. However, in open discussions, respondents informed the researcher that instead of citizens condemning leaders for abusing their authority they exalt those implicated in corruption scandals. It was revealed in respondent’s interviews that whenever citizens were called to participate in accountability meetings and other development forums they either fail to attend or attend in small numbers. Empowering ordinary citizens in decision making is yet to take root. In a related development Green, (2013)

revealed that local leaders have neglected their roles of being catalysts for development. They have done little in mobilizing their electorates to participate in local development. Failure to empower citizens to hold their leaders accountable have crippled service delivery since citizens seems not to be following what is done in local councils.

4.2.5 Leaders sensitise their electorates to obey urban rules and regulations

Results in the Table 4.2 shows that 49.6% of respondents strongly disagreed with the view that leaders sensitise their electorate to obey urban rules, regulations, keeping the city clean and preservation of the environment. 18.1% of respondents disagreed, 12.6% were neutral. However, 11.8 % respondents agreed and 7.9% of the respondents strongly agreed that leaders perform the duty of creating awareness among their people to obey the rules and regulations. However, majority of respondents with the mean= 2.10 disagreed with the opinion. The higher standard deviation=1.344 suggested that responses were dispersed. However, from open discussions respondents opined that strict observation of rules and regulations ensure livable town, orderly developments and promotion of good governance. Perhaps the majority of respondents seems not be impressed with developments taking place in their town. Respondents noted with concern that developers construct without approved building plans, commercial buildings are constructed in places gazetted as road reserves and sanitary lanes, illegal developers encroach on wetland and other ecologically fragile zones. Residents have turned municipal open spaces and green belts as grazing areas with impunity. Respondents revealed that a significant number of the animals that stray on the streets of Masaka town belong to local leaders. Residents litter garbage irresponsibly on the streets and roads. Local leaders rarely hold village meetings to discuss development issues such as the process of acquiring a building plan and local fees involved, and where to obtain the plan. It was further revealed that corrupt local bureaucrats have taken advantage of the ignorance of the public on urban rules and procedures to fleece illegal developers of their money. Local

leaders have not addressed this issue to its final conclusion for fear of losing votes. Instead they have aided wrong doers to encroach on wetlands, road reserves and to build without acquiring necessary approvals. The above developments have deleterious effect on the service delivery at the local level.

4.2.6 Leaders rarely consult citizens and hold accountability meetings

Responding on whether leaders rarely consult citizens on issues that affect them and to hold accountability meetings, results in the Table 4.2 shows that 39.4% of respondents strongly agreed and 37% of respondents agreed, 9.4% of respondents were neutral, 8.7% of respondents disagreed and 5.5% strongly disagreed with the opinion. With mean=3.96 it implies that majority of respondents supported the view that local leaders rarely consult their citizens and fail to hold accountability meetings. The higher standard deviation=1.157 implies that the responses were dispersed. However, in open discussions held with respondents strongly believe that this deficiency on the side of local leaders to consult and to hold accountability meetings explain loopholes in service delivery. Information gathered from respondents who participated in face to face interaction in Kimanya-Kyabakuza Division revealed that local councilors rarely consult their electorates on issues affecting them. Evidence availed at the division headquarters indicated that it was only the Office of the Prime Minister which conducted accountability meetings. In an interview with the Committee Clerk Kimanya-Kyabakuza Division revealed that the division conducted a consultative meeting to gather community views on budgeting. When asked how often they hold such meetings, he confirmed that they hold it once in a financial year. However, the records reviewed [with permission from the authorities] at the division headquarters indicated that the number which attended was very small. Perhaps, the views captured for budgeting were not representative enough of the entire division community.

Similar observations were pointed out by other writers. Ahamed (2005) opined that the quality of services provided by government depends on the quality of governance which defines the nature of actors and accountability relationship; a situation in which those in authority are held responsible by the citizens. Mutahaba, (1991) opined that accountability is an invisible motivational force that drives the system, and decentralisation is potentially the best system for delivering accountability because it brings actors closer. (Yilmaz et al., 2008) noted that Community driven/social accountability approaches are indicated as most critical in ensuring the desirable attainment of local government outcomes. However, both the citizens and the leadership at lower levels of government feel powerless to demand for accountability from the leaders. There is lack of knowledge and information among actors that would enable them demand for better services and hold leaders accountable (Steiner, 2007) As a result, the demand for accountability by the citizenry is still very low and there is a generally negative attitude over civic matters, unavailability of relevant information especially at the municipal level, loss of trust and confidence in government by citizens and absence of effective mechanisms for holding leaders accountable.

4.2.7 Leaders fail to involve citizens in development planning and budgeting

As regards failure of leaders to involve citizens in development planning and budgeting as shown in *Table 4.2*, 45.7% of respondents strongly agreed and 30.7% of respondents agreed that leaders failed to involve citizen in planning and budgeting. However, 14.2% of respondents were neutral, 3.9% of respondents disagreed and 5.5% of respondents strongly disagreed with the opinion. With the mean=4.07 implies that majority of respondents agreed that failure to involve citizens in development planning and budgeting explain significantly service delivery failures in Masaka Municipality. On contrary, the higher standard deviation 1.21 suggests that there were variation in responses. This situation perhaps shows that opinions of a significant population were not represented in the development plans and budgets of the Municipality and all the divisions

combined. This development has deleterious effect on service delivery since development projects fail to meet the expectations of the consumers of the services. In other open discussions respondents presented similar observations. Respondents opined that leaders do not involve residents in development planning and budgeting. In principle, in order to develop a good plan that address the needs and concerns of the people, the planning process should be participatory and consultative in nature therefore embracing needs, views and the opinion of the consumer of services. The process should also be comprehensive including all the physical, economic and social aspects of the municipality as well as showing multisectoral linkages (MoLG, 2013). As it currently appears, development planning and budgeting process does not follow the above mentioned process. Respondents interviewed strongly believe citizens are not consulted when planning and budgeting for development projects and services. This was confirmed by Local Council I member of Market Cell of Nyendo Senyange Division who informed the researcher that *“I last witnessed a village consultative meeting in the financial year 2013/2014”*. Similarly, a local leader of KumbuLCI echoed this observation and said *“planning and budgeting meetings are rarely held at the village level”*. Failure to consult the citizens at the lower local level affects service delivery and this is demonstrated by failure to maintain and sustain development projects implemented by councils. Grindle, (2007) sharing the above mentioned concerns reports that the results of democratic participation in decentralised countries remain largely elusive and disappointing. Similarly, Tukahebwa, (1998) assert that citizens’ participation at the lowest tier of government only ends during elections and after committees assuming responsibilities of council they very rarely convene council meetings where members would be involved. Although citizens are not barred from attending council meetings where most of the planning decisions are made, the study established that citizens seem not to be interested in what takes place in councils. This apathy can be attributed to the failure of local leaders to mobilize people and lack of civic competence (Tukahebwa, 1998).

4.2.8 Leaders rarely participate in mobilisation of resources for local development

As regards to whether leaders rarely participate in mobilisation of resources meant for local development, results in Table 4.2 show that 44.1% of respondents strongly agreed, 36.2% of respondents agreed, 10.2% of respondents were neutral, 4.7% of respondents disagreed and 4.7% of respondents strongly disagreed. The mean=4.1 suggest that majority of respondents agreed that leaders rarely participate in resource mobilization for development. On contrary, the higher standard deviation=1.075 suggests that the responses dispersed. The above findings were found to be similar with the observations of the face to face interactions. Respondents interviewed noted with concern that local councils face serious challenges of low levels of revenue collection and perhaps limited participation of local leaders in revenue mobilisation and enhancement partly explains this challenge. Respondents revealed that locally generated revenue have been declining over the years and this development has been attributed to negative attitudes of local leaders towards local taxes and central government interference (Masaka Municipal Five Year Development Plan, 2015-2020). This development featured prominently during presidential, parliamentary and local elections where numerous pronouncements were made to halt collection of revenue. This trend presented a serious challenge for delivery of services at the local level. It was further revealed that revenue mobilization issues take a small percentage in the council debates. This means that strategies to raise revenue are not accorded serious attention by local leaders yet the electorates need services. Other scholars have pointed out similar concerns. Green (2013) for example asserts that strong local revenue base is essential for the sustainability of decentralization programs and local revenue forms a core means of building an independent and accountable local governance system. Similarly, Smoke (2005) suggested that local governments with strong local revenue collection have greater scope for the autonomy and are more responsive to the needs and priorities of their citizens.

4.2.9 Leaders discharging their duties with due regard to personal interests

As to whether leaders discharge their duties with due regard to personal interests, 62% of respondents strongly agreed, 22% of respondents agreed, 7.1% of respondents were neutral, 3.1% of respondents disagreed and 5.5% strongly disagreed. Considering a mean= 4.32 suggests that majority of respondents agreed. Therefore, majority of respondents agreed that local leaders discharge their duties with due regard to personal interests. However, the high standard deviation =1.105 implies that the responses were dispersed. However, in the open discussions conducted with respondents they confirmed the above development. Citizens interviewed faulted their leaders at the municipality for selling council land under unclear circumstances. Similarly, some leaders have been blamed for colluding with quack companies and developers to defraud council in what they called ‘bogus’ civil suits. Respondents further reported that leaders connive with contractors to do shoddy work anticipating kickbacks. It was further revealed that conflicts between councilors and technocrats that regularly feature in councils are indicators of pursuit of personal interests. This observation was echoed by a Municipality councilor who informed the researcher that: *“The most important objective of a local councilor today is to look for money. Councilors invest a lot of resources to get political offices in anticipation of returns in a very short period of time”*

The perception of leaders to seek personal fulfillment and greed violates the principles of good governance, transparency and accounts for service delivery failures in urban areas. Ojambo (2012) asserts that where leaders are compromised effective monitoring of government programs cannot be effectively carried out and this affect the quality of services delivered.

4.2.10 Low levels of education affect service delivery

With respect to whether low levels of education affect service delivery, 58% of respondents strongly agreed, 37.8% of respondents agreed, 1.6% of respondents were neutral, 0.8% of respondents disagreed and 1.6% of respondents strongly disagreed. Considering that those who

strongly agreed and agreed, the majority percentage 95.8% were positive and 2.4% negative about the idea. The mean= 4.5 suggest that majority of respondents strongly agreed. The standard deviation 0.722 suggests that responses did not vary significantly. In the open discussions with respondents, confirmed the above developments. Respondents opined that councilors who were not conformable with official language communicated by the technocrats were likely not to understand issues well and this affects democratic representation. This observation was confirmed by a Councilor of Nyendo-Senyange Division who informed the researcher that local government budget (Contract form B) is presented in a *technical* format that was not easy to understand by majority councilors. The quality of debates in councils was poor and councilors have failed to grasp council rules of procedures which are documented in English language. This view is supported by Muyomba- Tamale (2011) in his study on local government councils' performance on public service delivery in Uganda found out that there was knowledge gap regarding in-depth knowledge of exactly what the constitution requires of them in terms of the legislative role. He concluded that there was generally poor performance by councilors on the aspect of moving motions and bills. Local leaders have equally failed to monitor projects and those who try to do so have no capacity of documenting what was monitored as evidence for presentation to relevant committees. This certainly undermines their roles as political leaders as monitoring is a vital part of what councilors do since it can make such a huge difference when undertaken effectively

4.3 Land management and service delivery

The study investigated opinions of respondents on how decentralised land management affects service delivery. The results of this investigation are shown in the table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Land management and service delivery

Land management and service delivery	F/ %	SD	D	N	A	SA	Mean	Std. Devn
Land tenure system is a big challenge in service delivery	F	27	11	11	35	43	3.44	1.546
	%	21.2	8.7	8.7	27.6	33.9		
Plot subdivisions by land agents is a challenge to physical planning and service delivery	F	3	5	11	48	60	4.24	0.938
	%	2.4	3.9	8.7	37.8	47.2		
DLB allocate public land without considering land use plans	F	3	6	28	44	46	3.98	0.996
	%	2.4	4.7	22	34.6	36.2		
Un guided activities of land agents are a big challenge in land management	F	3	2	5	32	84	4.5	0.872
	%	2.4	2.4	3.9	25.2	66.1		
Lack of land information is big challenge in land management and service delivery	F	3	4	3	25	92	4.57	0.872
	%	2.4	3.1	2.4	19.7	72.4		
Allocation of green belts, open spaces and urban parks to private developers by DLB affect service delivery	F	12	3	30	35	47	3.8	1.235
	%	9.4	2.4	23.6	27.6	37		
DLB and ALC members are nominated with lay skills and sometimes abuse their powers.	F	16	8	34	28	41	3.55	1.338
	%	12.6	6.3	26.8	22	32.3		
Lack of coordination between the DLB and physical planning committee affect service delivery	F	6	3	6	30	82	4.41	1.026
	%	4.7	2.4	4.7	23.6	64.6		
N	127							

Source; field data and researcher's findings

4.3.1 Land tenure system a big challenge in service delivery

With respect to whether land tenure system is a big challenge in service delivery 33.9% of respondents strongly agreed, 27.6% of respondents agreed, 8.7% of respondents were neutral, 8.7% of respondents disagreed and 21.3 strongly disagreed. The mean= 3.44 implied that the respondents were undecided. The higher standard deviation=1.546 suggests that the responses were dispersed. For those who agreed that land tenure system affect service delivery perhaps had reasons because Nyendo parish is owned by a mailo land owner and majority of the population on this land were

tenants. This area is characterized by unplanned settlements and accessibility to basic services such as roads and other social amenities were limited. This development is contrary to Katwe-Butego Division whose land ownership is public. The area is well planned and served with a good network of roads, piped water, electricity and other social amenities. In open discussions with local leadership of the division, it was revealed that Nyendo was not planned mainly because the land was privately owned and the municipality did not have funds to compensate the land lord. This observation was echoed by a member of Nyendo LCII. He said that *“the trustees of Mr. Mukudde, the land lord messed up planning of the area by selling plots of all sizes to tenants without consulting the authorities”*. He further said that *“failure by the land lord to cooperate with the authorities on matters of planning led to the development of slum settlements in areas of Market Triangle, Kitovu Nume and Mukudde”*. For the respondents, who disagreed with the view that land tenure systems affect service delivery, perhaps had it in mind that probably it was due to other factors that affect service delivery such as poor planning and failure to effectively monitor and control developments in the area. According to Section 3 of the Physical Planning Act, 2010 *“the entire country is declared a planning area and this Act shall apply to the entire country in all respects”*. However, developers have continued to erect illegal developments in the area without respecting the rules and regulations and local authorities seems not to be bothered.

Other scholars have also pointed out similar concerns. For example, Goodfellow (2013) opined that although the British colonial administration ignored private land in planning endeavors, to claim that preponderance privately owned land affect physical planning, it was not convincing. Lall, et,al, (2009) argues that the rules of land tenure governs land management, development and planning regulations. However, Dawall & Clerk, (1996) identified poor tenure, cadastral and regulation systems as one of the factors hindering the growth and development of cities in developing countries. Similarly, Giddings, (2009) said that unreformed tenure relations are to blame for

insufficient provision of affordable developable land in most cities of Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the biggest challenge was that local authorities do not own land and land is owned by private individuals who are not willing to surrender their land for planning purposes. Unless local authorities have a budget for land fund for compensating land lords, planning for service delivery will remain a challenge.

4.3.2 Plot subdivisions by land agents is a challenge service delivery

When asked whether plot subdivisions by land agents affect physical planning and service delivery, 2.4% of respondents strongly disagreed, 3.9% of respondents disagreed, 8.7% of respondents were neutral, 37.8% of respondents agreed and 47.2% strongly agreed. The mean= 4.24 implied that majority of respondents agreed with the view that plot subdivisions and fragmentations affect services such as physical planning, road opening and utility service provision. The standard deviation =0.938 suggests that responses did not vary so much. Plot subdivision and land fragmentation were common in the divisions of Masaka Municipality. People divide their land into small plots which are given out to their siblings or sold to prospective buyers. These in turn construct houses without seeking necessary approvals from the authorities. Since small plots are cheap, they attract a huge population of urban dwellers thus creating slums. Slums are heavily populated urban informal settlements characterized by substandard housing and squalor (UNHABITAT, 2006). While slums differ in size and other characteristics, most lack reliable sanitation services, reliable electricity, supply of clean water, law enforcement and other basic services. The challenge was that the plots created were small to the extent of not reserving lanes to accommodate services since no owner was willing to surrender a piece of land to accommodate provision of basic services. These developments take place either with or without the knowledge of the authorities. This is also complicated by the unguided activities of land brokers in land markets who have parceled small pieces of land for sale to the public.

4.3.3 Un guided activities of land agents are a big challenge in service delivery

The study further found out that unguided activities of land brokers affect service delivery in Masaka Municipality. The results in Table 4.3 show that 66.1% of respondents strongly agreed, 25.2% of respondents agreed, 3.9% of respondents were undecided, 2.4% of respondents disagreed and 2.4% of respondents strongly disagreed. The mean= 4.5 suggested that majority of respondents agreed that unguided activities of land brokers and agents in Masaka Municipality were a big challenge in land management and service delivery. The standard deviation=0.872 suggested that responses did not vary so much. Respondents who participated in the interviews echoed the above opinion. They reported that land brokers and agents parcel land into small plots (50ft×50ft) which does not qualify to be given land titles and development plans. It was equally reported by respondents that the actions of land brokers were deliberate since they seek to maximize profits. Land dealings in Masaka Municipality were not regulated and guided by any institution. Similarly, the activities of land agents were carried out without the knowledge of municipal authorities. This development has serious implications on physical planning and service delivery. Settlements that have come up on these small pieces of plots of land were not planned and connecting essential services have not been easy. This observation is in line with the findings of Nkurunziza (2008) who equally reported that plot sub-division renders provision of centrally planned services such as roads, piped water and garbage collection in most towns virtually impossible. The local leaders at all levels have not bothered to solve the problem created by plot subdivisions and land fragmentation. Equally, the enforcement officers in the municipality have not helped either. Land management department at the district has not helped to address the above issue both at the technical and policy level. Unless something tangible is done, plot subdivisions will remain a serious challenge in service delivery.

4.3.4 DLB allocate public land without considering existing land use plans and patterns

Respondents were asked to give their opinion whether District Land Board allocate public land without considering existing land patterns and 37% of respondents strongly agreed, 27.6% of respondents agreed, 23.6% of respondents were neutral, 2.4% of respondents disagreed, and 9.4% of respondents strongly disagreed. A mean=3.98 implied that majority of respondents agreed that allocation of public land by District Land Board in Masaka Municipality without taking into account of existing land use plans affect service delivery. The standard deviation= 0.996 suggested that responses did not vary greatly. In open discussions, respondents confirmed this development and agreed that actions of DLB have distorted planning and service delivery.

4.3.5 Allocation of green belts, open spaces and urban parks to private developers by DLB affect service delivery

As regards to whether allocation of green belts, open spaces and urban parks to private developers affect service delivery, 37% of respondents strongly agreed that allocation of green belts, open spaces and urban parks to private developers by DLB affect service delivery, 27.6% of respondents agreed, 23.6% of respondents were neutral, 2.4% of respondents disagreed and 9.4% of respondents strongly disagreed with the statement. In open discussions with respondents revealed that the situation is made worse by allocating open spaces, green belts and urban parks which serve ecological and esthetic functions. Respondents believe actions of the district land board have deleterious effect on service delivery. A member of MDF, in an interview, said: *“Masaka Municipal Council used to have quite a number of green spaces and urban parks but the District Land Board allocated them to private investors without following the law”*. He blamed the district council for appointing people who failed to appreciate the importance of planning in urban areas. This observation was echoed by a member of the Municipality Executive Committee who said that: *“the district land board allocated Children Park opposite land office and other green belts of*

importance to private investors in total disregard of the Physical development plan of Masaka Municipality; a once upon time beautiful and well planned town with many green spaces and belts have been destroyed by actions of the district land board.”

Other writers have pointed out similar concerns on the actions of DLB. For example, Nkurunziza (2008) reported that in Mbale town, land which was originally planned as a public park was subdivided into several plots and allocated to developers by DLB. Section 51 of the Physical Planning Act, 2010 forbids disposal, subdivision, consolidation of land, renewal or extension of leases by the District Land Boards without approval by the relevant Physical Planning Committees. This implies that the District Land Board has been allocating land in contravention of this Act. In a report made to parliament by the office of the Auditor General dated 23rd March 2015 pointed out that District Land Boards irregularly allocated public land in the municipalities without taking into consideration of the law and existing land use patterns. It is important to note that destroying green spaces and other ecologically fragile environment kills the esthetic functions of those areas and exposes the urban landscape to extremes of the vagaries of weather. The above developments indicate that actions of DLB explain service delivery failures in Masaka Municipality.

4.3.6 Lack of coordination between the DLB and physical planning Committee affect service delivery

With respect whether lack of coordination between DLB and Physical Planning Committee affects service delivery, 4.7% of respondents strongly disagreed, 2.4% of respondents disagreed, 4.7% of respondents were neutral, 23.6% of respondents agreed and 64.6% of respondents strongly agreed. The mean= 4.41 implied that majority of respondents agreed with the opinion that lack of coordination between DLB and Physical Planning Committee affect planning for service provision in Masaka Municipality. High standard deviation= 1.026 suggested that responses were dispersed.

This view was shared by the Municipal Physical Planner who agreed that the coordination of the activities of the District Land Board and physical planning committee was poor. He agreed that sometimes District Land Board make decisions without consulting his office. He observed that Land Act, 1997 is not fair as far as protecting municipality land is concerned. It does not provide for Town Clerk or Municipal Physical Planner to sit or be represented on the DLB. As a result, DLB in some cases take decisions concerning municipal land without the consent of municipal authority. The above observation renders credence with the opinions expressed earlier that district land board allocates public land without the knowledge of planning authority. Similarly, this development is in line with the findings of the Auditor General contained in a report he made to parliament dated 13th March, 2015 which established that there were no coordination mechanisms to harmonize land administration decisions and physical planning activities amongst the Physical Planning Committees and District Land Boards throughout the country.

4.3.7DLB and ALC were nominated with lay skills and sometimes abuse their powers

Responding to the question that DLB and ALC are members appointed with lay skills and sometimes abuse decentralised powers and authority, 12.6% of respondents strongly disagreed, 6.3% of respondents disagreed, 26.6% of respondents were neutral, 22% of respondents agreed and 32.3% of respondents strongly agreed with the opinion. The mean=3.55 suggested that majority of respondents agreed. The higher standard deviation=1.338 implied that responses were dispersed. Interviews conducted also pointed out similar concerns of abuse of powers and authority and deficient in skills as well. Respondents pointed out that DLB members lacked the capacity to perform their duties in accordance to the rules and regulations in place. They opined that social ills affecting land management and service delivery perhaps was due to deficiencies in skills, knowledge and unethical practices of DLB and ALC members. This observation is backed by the fact that the Land Act 1997 does not specify minimum qualifications for any person to be a

member of the District Land Board. It only specifies that one member of land board shall be a person with qualifications and experience in matters relating to land. (Sec. 57(4) Land Act 1998). This means that majority of DLB members are nominated with lay skills and therefore they misuse their power and hide in the excuse of not knowledgeable in technical matters relating to land yet their decisions affect service delivery. Nkurunziza (2008) raised similar concern that DLB members are deficient in the required skills and knowledge to handle land management function. It is important to note that over half of the world's population today resides in cities creating a challenge for urban planners to efficiently accommodate increasing number of residents in a health and a positive environment (UN HABITAT, 2009).

4.3.8 Lack of land information is big challenge in land management and service delivery

As regards whether lack of land information is a big challenge in land management and service delivery, 2.4% of respondents strongly disagreed, 3.1% of respondents disagreed, 2.4% of respondents were neutral, 19.7% of respondents agreed and 72.4% of respondents strongly agreed with the opinion. The mean=4.57 suggested that majority of respondents strongly agreed that lack of land information was a big challenge in land management and service delivery. The standard deviation=0.872 implied that responses did not vary so much. In open discussions with respondents, it was established that land information is vital in land management and absence of it affects delivery of services related to land. Respondents revealed that there was lack of reliable information on land in respect of ownership, available land sizes, location and propriety characteristics, values and land use quality. GIC Ltd (2007) established similar findings and reported that 60% of information in the land registry has never been updated. Leaders at local council I level agreed that lack of land information in respect of use and service quality affect services in their area. A member of Local Council I of Kirumba, cited cases where people have been victims of purchasing pieces of land gazetted for road reserves and sanitary lanes. This

observation was echoed by leaders of Kimanya-Kyabakuza Division who informed the researcher that a stretch of land covering 900 meters gazetted as a road by Municipal authorities was parceled into plots and residents erected permanent structures. The Division was facing a very big challenge to open such roads. The researcher got to understand that the Division Authorities tried to issue out demolition notices to the encroachers but were not successful because the Municipal Town Clerk stopped the demolition fearing severe legal consequences that were likely to happen.

The study found out that there was a problem to obtain information relating to land from Land registry in Ministry of Lands Housing and Urban Development zonal offices in Masaka. A respondent said: *“It is very difficult to know who does what, where and how to get a service. Many people hang around the office premises and whenever a client approaches, unidentified faces ask him/her how he/she wanted to be helped. In the process, he/she is cheated”*. In the studies carried out elsewhere, similar findings were reported. UN-ECE, (2005) reported that the management of land information is a major and integral component of land management and administration for urban areas. Similarly, Lamba (2005) argued that Land related information was an important resource that must be managed efficiently in order to maximize potential benefits that can be obtained from land. Equally, Ahene, (2009) reported that implementing policies on land to support economic growth is not possible if there is no good land information. GIC, (2008) reports that ignorance of the public coupled with bureaucratic procedures has caused land information inefficiency in Uganda. The report further revealed that majority of public does not understand the costs or even procedures for registering a property in case the property has changed hands whether through transaction, inheritance or gift. Obtaining land information from the registry, one has to employ a chain of people which not only lead to high costs but a breeding ground for theft and forgery. Land administration information therefore is important because it is on this information that land management is built.

4.4 Physical planning and service delivery

The study investigated opinions of respondents on how decentralised physical planning affects service delivery. Findings on the opinions of respondents are shown in the table 4.4.

Table 4.4 Responses on physical planning and service delivery

<i>Physical planning and service delivery</i>	<i>F/ %</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>SA</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Devia tion</i>
Lack of institutional capacity and resources of physical planning department affect service delivery	F	12	4	16	21	74	4.11	1.229
	%	9.4	3.1	12.6	16.5	58.3		
Poor involvement of urban residents in the physical planning affects service delivery	F	5	3	9	34	76	4.36	0.997
	%	3.9	2.4	7.1	26.8	59.8		
Lack of clear strategy of physical planning affect service delivery	F	15	7	14	27	64	3.93	1.381
	%	11.8	5.5	11	21.3	50.4		
Poor attitude, perception, illiteracy and poverty affect planning and service delivery	F	3	-	2	4	118	4.84	0.672
	%	2.4	-	1.6	3.1	92.9		
Lack of awareness of physical development plan affect service delivery	F	5	2	6	37	77	4.41	0.954
	%	3.9	1.6	4.7	29.1	60.6		
Weak laws and development control legislations are a hindrance to Physical planning & service delivery	F	11	13	10	41	52	3.87	1.293
	%	8.7	10.2	7.9	32.3	40.9		
Local Governments Act Cap 243 treating urban and rural areas as regions with the same needs and challenges affect service delivery in urban areas	F	8	14	10	41	54	3.94	1.293
	%	6.3	11	7.9	32.3	42.5		
There is lack of political will to enforce physical planning in urban areas.	F	1	14	1	9	104	4.88	0.465
	%	8	10	8	7.1	81.3		
Lack of actual data and information are key challenges to enforcement of physical planning.	F	2	5	5	43	71	4.49	0.653
	%	1.6	4	3.9	38.6	51.9		
Failure to open planned roads affect service delivery	F	2	5	1	32	87	4.67	0.655
	%	1.6	5	8	25.2	67.4		
N	127							

Source: Primary data

4.4.1 Lack of institutional capacity and resources of physical planning department affect service delivery

Results in the Table 4.4 show that 58.3% of respondents strongly agreed, 16.5% of respondents agreed that lack of institutional capacity and inadequate resources of the physical planning department of Masaka Municipal Council affect service delivery. However, 12.6% of respondents were neutral, 3.1% of respondents disagreed and 9.4% of respondents strongly disagreed with the opinion. The mean=4.11 implied that majority of respondents agreed. The high standard deviation=1.299 suggested that the responses dispersed. In the open discussions held with respondents it was established that Masaka Municipal Council does not have a fully-fledged department in charge physical planning. It operates a section within the department of engineering which is also overwhelmed with service delivery challenges such as bad roads, poor drainage system and low morale of the work force. In an interview with the Secretary for Works, Roads and Environment he said: *“the whole municipality with a population of 103,293 people (UBOS, 2014) its physical planning function is managed with one technical staff. This officer cannot efficiently serve physical planning requirements of the people effectively”*. Therefore, issues of physical planning are not given serious attention. Similarly, the section of physical planning is not adequately facilitated to carry out planning function effectively. According to the physical planner, in an interview he said, his office was poorly facilitated in terms of resources to enable him perform his work. He further said that it was not until of recent when the situation improved when USMID program was introduced in the municipality and physical planning experienced fundamental change in its operation and appearance. He acknowledged that his office received funds for development and approval of the physical development plan and it has been equally equipped with tools for carrying out planning. However, the physical planner expressed pessimism of what will be the future of physical planning when the program expires in 2019. In a related development, Kayizzi-Mugerwa (1999:42) argued that the success of decentralisation will depend on the capacity of urban

governments to raise their own revenue and use it efficiently in the provision of services. However, the generation of local revenues is limited, due to numerous challenges such as political interference, negative attitude towards payment, failure to show credible accountability of revenues collected and poor methods of collection. Lambright, (2011) reported that lack of financial resources and autonomy affects the implementation of development plans and consequently limited service delivery since most of funds are diverted before they reach their final destination.

4.4.2 Poor involvement of urban residents in the physical planning affect service delivery

As regards whether poor involvement of urban residents in physical planning affects service delivery, 3.9% of respondents strongly disagreed, 2.4% of respondents disagreed, 7.1% of respondents were undecided. However, 26.8% of respondents agreed and 59.8% of respondents strongly agreed that poor involvement of urban residents in physical planning affect service delivery. The mean=3.6 implied that majority of respondents agreed. On contrary, the standard deviation=0.997 suggested that the responses did not vary greatly. However, in the open interviews conducted with members of MDF revealed that the level of involvement in development planning in Masaka Municipality was very low and therefore the community had little or no contribution to the development of physical development plan. Community involvement provides an opportunity to stakeholders to have a voice in the affairs that affect them. A true community involvement is the one in which every one's perspective is considered, every one's thoughts are respected. (Jamal and Julia, 2009). It is where the beneficiary communities participate in a particular way on the implicit assumption that their participation is critical to cause specific change (UN-Habitat, 2009). Community involvement promotes a feeling of ownership and builds a strong base for intervention for the community members. It also ensures that the intervention will have more credibility in all segments of the community because it was planned by the group representing all segments of the community. Community involvement in planning is equally an expression of and commitment of people's right to be involved in matters where decisions are made that concern or affect them. UN-

Habitat, (2010) concluded that one could simply say, it is a departure from planning for the people to planning with the people. However, this is not necessarily the case with Masaka Municipal council.

4.4.3 Lack of awareness of physical development plans affect service delivery

The results in Table 4.4 show that 60.6% of respondents strongly agreed, and 29.1% respondents agreed that lack of awareness of the existence of physical development plan in Masaka Municipal Council. However, 3.9% strongly disagreed, 1.6% disagreed that service delivery was perhaps affected by other factors not lack of awareness. 4.7% were undecided. The mean=4.41 suggested that majority of respondents agreed and the standard deviation = 0.954 implied that the responses were not dispersed so much. In the open discussions with respondents it was reported that despite the fact that the Municipality approved its physical development plan, very few people got to know about it. In an interview with the Assistant Community Development Officer in charge of Kimanya-Kyabakuza Division, he said that *“when the draft physical plan was put on display for 90 days as required by the law, few people turned up to inspect it”*. This demonstrates that awareness was not done right from the initial stage of planning. When asked whether they were aware of the Municipal Physical development plan, majority of respondents who participated in the face to face interview confirmed that they were aware of its existence. However, the minority claimed ignorance of whether there was a physical development plan or not. The fact that the physical planning office is inadequately facilitated physical planning agenda is not well articulated in the public forum. This explains why the level of awareness of urban community regarding physical planning remained low in Masaka Municipality. Respondents observed that community participation in planning meetings was only limited in a few meetings. These meetings were not organized according to administrative hierarchy of local councils. Ideally such meetings would be meaningful if they were organized based on local council hierarchy. However, on the contrary these

meetings were organized at the municipal level for all the municipality residents. Respondents interviewed informed the researcher that meetings organized at Municipal council level were too technical for them to understand and to deliberate freely. They felt intimidated by presence of prominent personalities and the language used. According to respondents, this level of community involvement was not helpful for them. Successful community involvement in planning process therefore requires to take place at different levels from the village to parish, division and finally at the municipal level. Kayom, (2014) reported similar findings. He said, lack of community involvement and awareness affect planning for services in urban areas. Similarly, Muriisa (2008) concluded that while the decentralisation policy was largely introduced to bring power nearer to the people and to foster citizen participation in the decision making process, planning in most local urban councils is still undertaken with little or no contribution from the local communities and urban residents.

4.4.4 Lack of clear strategy to foster public participation in physical planning

With respect to whether lack of clear strategy to foster public participation in planning affect service delivery, 11.8% of respondents strongly disagreed, 5.5% of respondents disagreed and 11% of respondents were undecided. However, 21.3% of respondents agreed and 50.4 of respondents strongly agreed that lack of clear strategy to foster public participation in physical planning affect service delivery. The mean=3.93 implied that majority agreed. The high standard deviation implied that the responses were dispersed. In open discussions, it was found out that Masaka Municipal Council has no policy on fostering public participation in the development planning. The findings further revealed that Masaka Municipal council has no communication strategy which would address most of the issues relating to public participation in council matters. Failure to have a clear strategy that foster public participation right from the village to municipality level implies that the spatial vision of Masaka Municipal Council was not a shared one and therefore physical development plan do not reflect the real priorities of the local people.

Mohamed (2013) who held similar views, pointed out that improvement in the level of community participation in urban planning process in Ghana, was due to the fact that local authorities adopted clear strategies for community participation. UN HABITAT, (2013: 11) reports that urban planning should not be viewed by the local leaders and subjects as simply developing drawings and images of the city or a town in the future, without discerning how this process and decisions it requires can become a back bone of urban transformation. Constant and consistent engagement of stakeholders in urban planning should be the norm not an option (UN-HABITAT, 2013:11). New feasible strategies are therefore required to encourage the urban residents to participate in planning. In addition, the urban residents need to be encouraged to participate in the implementation of physical development plans.

4.4.5 Poor attitude, perception, illiteracy and poverty affect planning and service delivery

The study found out that poor attitudes, perception, illiteracy and poverty limited people's involvement in physical planning and service delivery. Majority of the respondents 92.9% strongly agreed and 3.1% agreed. However, few respondents 2.4% strongly disagreed and 1.6% undecided on the opinion. The mean=4.84 suggested that majority of respondents strongly agreed. The standard deviation=0.672 implied that very few responses dispersed. According to interviews conducted with key informants, people who were preoccupied with basic survival needs or traumatized by certain diseases will hardly find it worthwhile to participate in community based activities. The high incidence of poverty in Masaka municipality impacted negatively on civic participation in the decision making process in planning in general and in the budgeting process in particular. Citizens tend to focus more on activities which will earn them an income on a daily basis than on activities which will benefit them in medium and long term periods. A respondent said that Ugandans are poor and a day at a community planning and dialogue meeting to discuss planning issues means a day unpaid. If people have to apply economics of opportunity cost and choice

between tending to their life and going to a meeting, they will definitely choose to tend to their life. Perhaps, the poor attitude is due to the fact that people are tired of unending promises which leaders fail to fulfill as Golooba- Mutebi (2004) observed: *“In 1986 when National Resistance Movement came to power, introduction of local councils seized public’s imagination leading to high levels of participation. With time, public meetings succumbed to atrophy due to participation fatigue and unwarranted assumptions about feasibility and utility of public participation as an administrative and policy making advice”* In absence of clear mechanism of changing the mind set and engaging the urban residents and key stakeholders in carrying out physical planning, development has continued to occur chaotically and without control.

4.4.6 Lack of political will to enforce physical planning

The study found out that lack of political will to facilitate physical planning and to enforce development controls affect service delivery. The table 4.4 shows that 66.9% of respondents strongly agreed with the opinion, 7.1% of respondents agreed. However, 8% of respondents strongly disagreed, 10% of respondents disagreed and 8% of respondents were undecided on the matter. The mean=4.3 suggested that majority agreed with the opinion. The standard deviation=0.965 implied that responses did not vary so much. In the face to face interviews conducted confirmed this development. They cited political interference as the biggest challenge faced in promoting physical development plans and orderly urban development. They further pointed out that local politicians often interfere to safeguard their interests and gain support among their electorates. The Senior Community Development Officer said the Technical Planning Committee in collaboration with the Office of the District Police Commander Masaka, recommended proposals to streamline Bodaboda operations in the Municipality but failed to get support from politicians. The streets of Masaka Municipality were messed up by Bodaboda operators who operate from every area in town without designated stages to pick and disembark passengers. Powerful politicians and business people well connected to high profile government

officials in the area often build in wetlands and other ecologically fragile zones with impunity, something that is inconsistent with the existing development control requirements and land use plans of Masaka Municipality. In a related development, face to face interview conducted with residents of the municipality informed the researcher that it was not easy to get an approved plan without bribing officers concerned. They further pointed out that the process was too lengthy and tiresome. Respondents also pointed out that regular inspection of buildings were rarely carried out and one could not rule out the fact that developers erect substandard structures which put lives of the occupants in danger.

Other writers have pointed out similar weaknesses. For example, in the report made to Parliament of Uganda dated 13th March 2015, the Auditor General pointed out that that service delivery in municipalities was affected by inefficiencies of the physical planning committees responsible for approving development applications. It was reported that 98.4% of developments were completed without any inspections carried out during the construction phase; a reflection of major development control weaknesses. Similarly, Good fellow, (2013) pointed out that political interference was to blame for the mess in physical planning and that demolition of illegal structures in urban areas did not take place since NRM captured power until 2010. Similarly, Potts, (2006) acknowledged that the strong hand of the state to enforce legal codes on illegal construction is poor. Desrosiers and Thomson, (2011) observed that one resource the government does have to draw on is its reputation for clamping down on corruption. Patronage and patrimonialism as observed by Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, (2012) were highly visible forms of corruption associated with waiving formal planning rules for the elites in exchange for favours was dangerous for any growing city. Good fellow (2013), asserts that master plans have to be implemented without motivated obstructions and implementation of development controls mattered for both the country's future and for the career prospects. Goodfellow, (2013) advised that critically it is not through foreign

expertise, technical capacity building or rigorous planning and regulatory rules on paper that effective urban development control is likely to be achieved; rather it is through changes to the political bargaining environment. In comparative perspective, he says that the political bargaining environment in Kigali City was conducive to the effective implementation of plans and enforcement of regulations unlike in Kampala whose political environment favoured large scale corruption. The political will therefore is paramount in enforcement of rules and codes.

4.4.7 Institutional weakness and lack of data for physical planning affect service delivery

As regards as to whether Institutional weakness and lack of actual data affect planning and service delivery, 51.9% of respondents strongly agreed, 38.6% of respondents agreed, 3.9% of respondents were neutral, 4% of respondents disagreed and finally 1.6% of respondents strongly disagreed. Comparatively majority of respondents agreed with the opinion. The mean=4.49 suggested that majority agreed. The standard deviation= 0.653 implied that responses did not vary greatly. Respondents who participated in face to face interview agreed with the above findings. They pointed out that Masaka Municipal council enforcement section was very weak. They said that their role was not to enforce the rules of the game but to solicit gratification. They testified that there is no development that can be erected without the knowledge of enforcement officers. They concluded that enforcement section of Masaka Municipal council is a disservice and suggested that it should be disbanded as it was the case for Kampala Capital City Authority if sound planning and orderly developments were to be realized in Masaka Municipality. The study further found out weaknesses of institutional performance was due to inadequate facilitation. Delivery of quality services depend on the availability of funds and staff motivation. If officers supposed to implement plans were not facilitated and motivated to do the work, manifestation of unethical practices may not be ruled out. To demonstrate the point of limited facilitation, in a letter of even reference CR/214/24 dated 25th September 2015 signed by Kimbowa Joseph, the Town Clerk addressed to

the Principal Treasurer and all Senior Assistant Town Clerks observed that *“the facilitation of the activities of the physical planning committee was far from satisfactory. The committee therefore continued to encounter challenges in the discharge of its functions leading to proliferation of illegal developments and loss of revenue from development fees”*. The letter recommended that *“all inspection fees for planning consent and building fees be ring fenced to cater for the activities of the physical planning committee.”* The study also noted that institutional weakness is compounded by lack of political commitment, skilled human resources and endemic corruption, negative attitude toward government programs and ignorance.

Lack of accurate data and information was identified as one of the key constraints to physical planning in Masaka Municipality. The department of planning relies on data extracted from national census reports prepared by the National Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) which may not point out a true picture. Masaka Municipality registers huge volume of traffic and population on daily basis. This means such influx of people need services and the budget for such services was dependent on the census night population statistics prepared and provided by UBOS. This implies that policy interventions made by the urban authorities were sometimes ineffective and irrelevant because they are based on wrong data. Another weakness identified by the study was that Masaka Municipality had inadequate staff to enforce law and order. They sometimes rely on the services of Uganda Peoples’ Reserve Forces who were sometimes unreliable, unpredictable and costly to local authorities. As it was pointed out earlier, staff structures for municipal councils only provide for one physical planner who is affiliated to the engineering and works department. Those who appreciate the importance of planning believe that Municipalities should have a fully-fledged department to handle physical planning issues. The study found out that the planning strategy was defective because the current practice in Masaka Municipal Council was that planning follows developments. It is a common knowledge that where developments are a head of planning, local

councils have failed miserably to achieve their intended goal of promoting orderly development and improving on social service delivery. Equally, respondents also identified weakness such as failure to recognize local urban value system in planning as well as land tenure system as non-planning factors which are deliberately ignored when preparing master plans. Good fellow (2013) observed that under the Kampala Capital City Authority a fully-fledged physical planning department was established and several physical planners were also recruited to promote physical planning and orderly urban development in Kampala.

4.4.8 The weakness of urban laws and development control legislations and service delivery

Responding on whether weaknesses of urban laws and other development control legislations affecting service delivery, 40.9% of the respondents strongly agreed, 32.3% of respondents disagreed, 7.9% were neutral, 10.2% of respondents disagreed and 8.7% of respondents strongly disagreed. The mean=3.87 implied that respondents agreed and Standard deviation=1.293 suggested that responses were dispersed. The above findings were confirmed by responses obtained from open discussions. The study found out that some existing laws were obsolete and could not effectively impose punitive fines to illegal developers as a mechanism of instilling discipline in the citizens and orderliness in the town. For example, the penalties imposed by Public Health Act, 1964 for erecting illegal structures were not severe enough to act as deterrence to urban residents from breaking the law. Equally Masaka Municipal Council Miscellaneous bye law of 2007 was not punitive enough to discourage residents from violating urban rules. For those who disagreed with the opinion perhaps believed that laws in place were good but the problem was poor enforcement.

4.4.9 LG Act Cap 243 treating urban and rural as regions with the same challenges affect service delivery

The study further established that 42.5% of respondents strongly agreed and 32.3% of respondents agreed that the Local Government Act 1997 treats the urban areas and rural areas as the same

region with the same needs yet the problems that face urban areas were so unique and different and therefore required special attention. However, 8% of respondents strongly disagreed, 14% of respondents disagreed and 10% were undecided. The mean=3.94 suggested that majority agreed that service delivery was affected by unfairness of Local Governments Act Cap 243. The Standard deviation=1.293 implied that responses were dispersed. The above findings were confirmed by responses from open discussions which revealed that Local Government Act 1997 to treat both urban councils and rural local governments as regions with the same needs and requirements was not based on correct facts. The criteria of allocating funds to local governments were the same because they based on the population, the land area and poverty levels. Yet urban areas tend to have more problems, more people and therefore different needs. The Local Government Act 1997 does not reorganize existence of informal settlements yet 60% of the Uganda's urban population lives in slum areas. Local Government Act does not recognize solid wastes as the most pressing problem faced in urban areas. Therefore, the Central Government has accorded little attention in respect of increasing on grants meant to address service delivery challenges in urban areas.

4.4.10 Opening of planned roads and service delivery

Majority of respondents 67.4 % of respondents strongly believe that failure to open planned roads affect physical planning and service delivery. Others 25.2% of respondents agreed with the opinion, 5% of respondents disagreed, 1.6% of respondents strongly disagreed 8% of respondents were undecided. The mean=4.67 suggests that majority of respondents strongly agreed and standard deviation= 0.655 implies that responses did not vary much. This opinion was shared by the respondents who participated in the face to face interviews. Most of them agreed that failure to open planned roads led to development of unplanned settlements where centrally planned services such as roads, piped water and sewerage systems are more difficult and impossible to deliver. The costs of compensating residents who illegally construct in road reserves are high. The fact that local councils were constrained in terms of resources such developments were left to stay because they

do not have land fund. In order to effectively implement development plans, there was a need to budget for land fund to compensate encroachers. The above findings were found similar with observations of the Auditor General as contained in a report made to parliament dated 13th March 2015. The report revealed that although a number of roads were planned for opening and labeling during the development of the Physical Development Plans, some of the roads remained unopened. The report further concluded that inability by urban authorities to open the planned roads leads to encroachment and development of settlement in the areas planned for roads and thus making the opening of these access roads very costly and in some cases impossible.

4.5 Service delivery indicators

On the service delivery indicators, respondents were to give their feeling on what they believed to be service delivery indicators. The responses are presented in the table 4.5.

Table 4.5 Frequencies, Percentages, Means for Service Delivery Indicators

<i>Service delivery indicators</i>	<i>F/%</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>SA</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>
Transparency and accountability of public resources is an indicator of effective service delivery	F	1	1	3	18	104	4.76	0.614
	%	0.8	0.8	2.4	14.2	81.9		
Accessibility to social services such as health, water, and education is an indicator of service delivery	F	2	-	-	13	112	4.83	0.574
	%	1.6	-	-	10.2	88.2		
Mobilization of resources, monitoring and inspection is an indicator of service delivery	F	1	1	1	19	105	4.78	0.576
	%	0.8	0.8	0.8	15	82.7		
Regular cleaning, collection and disposal of solid wastes are indicators of service delivery.	F	1	-	1	29	96	4.72	0.559
	%	0.8	-	0.8	22.8	75.6		
Dissemination of land related information, allocation, and registration of land rights are indicators of service delivery	F	2	1	2	39	83	4.57	0.718
	%	1.6	0.8	1.6	30.7	65.4		
Budgeting for land fund for	F	1	2	0	33	91	4.66	0.645

infrastructural development is an indicator to effective service delivery	%	0.8	1.6	0	26	71.7			
Effective service delivery is a result of participatory planning and budgeting	F	0	0	1	33	93	4.72	0.466	
	%	0	0	0.8	26	73.2			
Protection, preservation of green spaces, urban parks, wetlands and ecologically fragile environment is a measure of service delivery	F	1	0	12	33	81	4.53	0.7	
	%	0.8	0	9.4	26	63.8			
Effective delivery of services is measured on regular opening and maintenance of roads, control of development and enforcement of building rules	F	0	0	0	42	85	4.67	0.472	
	%	0	0	0	33.1	66.9			
Development and implementation of neighborhood development plans is an indicator of service delivery	F	1	0	9	48	69	4.45	0.698	
	%	0.8	0	7.1	37.8	54.3			
N		127							

Source: Primary data

4.5.1 Transparency and accountability as indicators of service delivery

As regards whether transparency and accountability was an indicator of service delivery, 81.9% of respondents interviewed strongly agreed, 14.2% of respondents agreed, 2.4% of respondents were undecided, 0.8% of respondents disagreed and 0.8% of respondents strongly disagreed. This implied that majority of respondents strongly agreed that transparency and accountability of Physical and financial resources was an indicator of service delivery. The mean=4.76 suggested that majority of respondents strongly agreed. The standard deviation=0.614 implied that responses did not vary significantly. Similarly, open discussions with respondents supported the above development. Respondents who participated in face to face interactions believed that transparency and accountability was critical in effective delivery of services.

4.5.2 Accessibility to health, water, education, power is an indicator of service delivery

Majority of respondents 88.2% strongly agreed that accessibility to health, water, education, power etc is an indicator of service delivery. Similarly, 10.2% of respondents agreed with the opinion.

However, only 1.6% of respondents strongly disagreed. The mean=4.83 suggested that majority of respondents strongly agreed. The standard deviation=0.574 implied that responses did not vary much. In open discussions with respondents, majority agreed that accessibility to water, electricity good roads was a clear indication that services reach to the ordinary citizens.

4.5.3 Resource mobilization, monitoring and inspection are indicators of service delivery

As regards to whether resource mobilization, monitoring and inspection were indicators of service delivery, 82.7% of respondents strongly agreed, 15% of respondents agreed, 0.8% of respondents were neutral, 0.8% of respondents disagreed and 0.8% of respondents strongly disagreed. The mean=4.78 implied that majority of respondents strongly agreed that mobilisation of resources; monitoring and inspection were indicators of service delivery. In the open interviews conducted, respondents opined that service delivery in local governments will only succeed when leaders learn how to mobilise their own resources other than relying on the mercy of central government.

4.5.4 Regular cleaning and disposal of wastes as indicators of service delivery

Majority of respondents 75.6% strongly agreed that regular cleaning, collection transportation and disposal of solid wastes were indicators of service delivery. Similarly, 22.8% of respondents agreed. However, 0.8% of respondents were undecided and 0.8% of respondents strongly disagreed. The mean=4.72 implied that majority of respondents strongly agreed. The standard deviation 0.559 suggested that responses did not disperse so much. The open discussions held with respondents especially the leaders and technocrats, they both agreed that the level of organization and seriousness of the leadership was reflected on the cleanliness of the city.

4.5.5 Budgeting for land fund an indicator of effective service delivery

As to whether budgeting for land fund for infrastructural development was an indicator of service delivery, 71.7% of respondents strongly agreed with the statement, 26% of respondents agreed, 1.6%

of respondents disagreed and 0.8% of respondents strongly disagreed. The mean=4.66 suggested that majority of respondents strongly agreed that budgeting for land fund to compensate land lords and squatters was a strong indicator of service delivery. The standard deviation=0.645 implied that responses were not dispersed significantly. This view was in line with the opinions of respondents who participated in the face to face discussions. Participants observed and concluded that failure to budget for land fund to pay the land lords accounted for the proliferation of slum settlements in Masaka Municipality.

4.5.6 Effective service delivery was a result of participatory planning and budgeting

As regards to whether effective service delivery was a result of participatory planning and budgeting, 73.2% of respondents strongly agreed, 26% of respondents agreed and 0.8% of respondents were undecided. The mean= 4.72 suggested that majority of respondents strongly agreed with the opinion. The standard deviation=0.466 implied that responses did not vary significantly. The results of open discussions support the above findings. Respondents who participated in the face to face interview revealed that failure to involve citizens in planning and budgeting lead to deterioration of public services because there will be no sense of ownership of projects. They also opined that it accelerates a breakdown in accountability relationships between the citizens and the leaders.

4.5.7 Land information and registration of land rights are indicators of service delivery

As far as dissemination of land related information, allocation and registration of land rights as indicators of service delivery, 65.4% of respondents strongly agreed, 30.7% of respondents agreed, 1.6% of respondents were undecided, 0.8% of respondents disagreed and 1.6% of respondents strongly disagreed. The mean=4.57 indicated that majority of respondents strongly agreed. The

standard deviation= 0.718 suggested that responses did not vary so much. This implied that information related to land, allocation and registration is critical in service delivery.

4.5.8 Preservation of green spaces and other ecological system is an indicator of service delivery

Majority of respondents 63.8% strongly agreed and 26% agreed that preservation and protection of green belts, urban parks, wetlands and ecologically fragile environment was an indicator of service delivery in urban areas. However, 9.4% of respondents were undecided and 0.8% of respondents strongly disagreed. The mean= 4.53 strongly suggested that majority of respondents agreed. The standard deviation= 0.7 implied that responses didn't vary so much. Respondents who participated in the face to face interviews echoed similar views and suggested that green belts, open spaces and urban parks perform ecological and esthetic functions which the urban poor enjoy.

4.5.9 Opening of roads and enforcement of rules a measure of service delivery

When respondents were asked whether effective delivery of services was measured on regular opening and maintenance of roads, control of development and enforcement of building rules, 66.9% of respondents strongly agreed and 33.1% agreed with the opinion. The mean=4.67 suggested that majority of respondents strongly agreed with the opinion. The standard deviation=0.472 implied that responses did not vary so much. In open discussions respondents also supported the view that regular opening and maintenance of roads, control of developments and strict enforcement of rules was a clear manifestation that services reach to the people.

4.5.10 Development and implementation of neighborhood development plans an indicator of service delivery

The study revealed that 54.3% of respondents strongly agreed and 37.8% agreed that development and implementation of neighborhood development plans were indicators of service delivery. However, 7.1% of respondents were neutral and 0.8% of respondents strongly disagreed. The mean=4.45 suggested that majority of respondents agreed and standard deviation= 0.698 implied limited dispersion in responses. The open discussions with respondents supported the above observations and said that failure to implement physical layout and neighborhood plans lead to unplanned settlements and poor service delivery.

4.6.0 Analysis of results using correlations and regressions

4.6.1 Measuring the relationship between Leadership and service delivery

To establish whether local leadership had a relationship with service delivery the researcher carried out correlation analysis. The results were as given in table 4.6.

Table 4.6 Correlation matrix of local leadership and service delivery

Correlations^a			
		Local leadership	Service delivery
Local leadership	Pearson Correlation	1	0.502
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.012
	N	127	127
Service delivery	Pearson Correlation	0.502	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.012	
	N	127	127
N=127			

Source; Primary data

Table 4.6 shows the correlations between leadership and service delivery. Results show a correlation coefficient of 0.502 between leadership and service delivery. This implied that there

was moderate relationship between local leadership and service delivery. Further, there was a P.V value of 0.012 which was significant in a two tailed test, implying that local leadership was significant in explaining service delivery. The findings to the effect that local leadership was significant in explaining service delivery is supported by other scholars. For instance, Lambright (2011) pointed out that political interference in local governments is associated with worse local government performance. Lambright appreciated the fact that leaders interfere in revenue mobilization and collection and account for service delivery failures. Similarly, ACODE, (2014) identified capacity deficiencies of local leaders as significant in explaining service delivery failures in local government. Widmalm, (2008:44) pointed out that, the fact that responsibility was given to local leaders by decentralisation, it does not translate that they have the capacity to fulfill them. This creates service delivery gaps which were very hard to close. Tise (2009) reported that failure to create awareness by leaders has sustained uninformed citizenry who fail to understand their obligations and it accounts for service delivery failures. Grindle, 2007 pointed out that failure to involve citizens in the development process led to democratic participation in decentralized countries to remain elusive. Muyomba- Tamale (2011) in his study on local government council's performance on public service delivery in Uganda found out that there was knowledge gap regarding in-depth knowledge of exactly what the constitution required of them in terms of the legislative role. In line with a report by the Inspectorate of Government (2008), the Uganda National Integrity Survey (NIS) documented a lack of awareness of rights by the general public, for example the right to the protection of public property, to ensuring proper use of public utilities, and to access to public utilities, among others.

4.6.2 Measuring relationship between land management and service delivery

The study measured the relationship between land management and service delivery using correlation analysis. The results were as given in the table 4.7.

Table 4.7: Correlation matrix of land management and service delivery

		Correlations	
		Land management	Service delivery
Land management	Pearson Correlation	1	0.526
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.007
	N	127	127
Service delivery	Pearson Correlation	.526	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.007	
	N	127	127

Source; Primary data

The results in the table 4.7 revealed a correlation coefficient of 0.526 between land management and service delivery. The table therefore suggests that there was a moderate positive relationship between land management and service delivery. The relationship was significant with a $P=0.007$ in a two tailed test, implying that land management was significant in explaining service delivery. The above findings were supported by other schools. Dawall & Clerk, (1996) identified poor tenure, cadastral and regulation systems as one of the factors hindering the growth and development of cities in developing countries. Similarly, Giddings, (2009) reported that unreformed tenure relations was to blame for insufficient provision of affordable developable land in most cities of Sub-Saharan Africa. Ahene, (2009) reported that implementing policies on land to support economic growth was not possible if there were no good land information. GIC, (2007) reports that ignorance of the public coupled with bureaucratic procedures caused land information inefficiency and management in Uganda.

4.7.3 Measuring the relationship between Physical planning and Service delivery

To establish whether physical planning had a relationship with service delivery, a correlation analysis was carried out. The results were presented in table 4.8.

Table 4.8: correlation matrix of physical Planning and Service delivery

		Physical planning	Service delivery
Physical planning	Pearson Correlation	1	.668**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.002
	N	127	127
Service delivery	Pearson Correlation	.668**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.002	
	N	127	127

****.** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Source; Primary data

The results in the table 4.8 show a correlation coefficient of 0.668. This indicates a strong relationship between physical planning and service delivery with a $P=0.002$ which was significant at a two-tailed test. The results suggest that physical planning was significant in explaining service delivery outcomes. The researcher's conclusions were in line with Kayom, (2014) who reported that development plans of urban councils present lists of activities with strategies for achieving them. However, Muriisa (2008) pointed out that while the decentralisation policy was largely introduced to bring power nearer to the people and to foster citizen participation in the decision making process, planning in most local urban councils was still undertaken with little or no contribution from urban residents. Goodfellow, (2013) pointed out that political will play a significant role in ensuring development control and enforcement of building rules in urban areas. Similarly, Potts, (2006) acknowledged that implementation of development plans could not succeed without strong hand of the state to enforce legal codes on illegal construction.

4.7.4 Regression model of Local leadership, Land management, Physical planning and service delivery

To ascertain whether decentralisation affect service delivery, local leadership, land management and physical planning were regressed on service delivery. The results were as in table 4.9.

Table 4.9 Regression Model of local leadership, land management, physical panning and Service delivery

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta	
1 (Constant)	1	0.086		1
Local leadership	0.24	0.091	0.24	0.012
Land management	0.408	0.099	0.408	0000
Physical planning	0.638	0.101	0.638	0.002

a. Dependent Variable: Service delivery

Source: Primary data

The results in table 4.9 show that Physical Planning was the strongest predictor in service delivery contributing 63.8% followed by land management with 40.8% and local leadership contributing 24%. The results suggest that keeping other factors constant, a unit change in local leadership increases service delivery by 24%. Similarly, a unit of change in land management increases service delivery by 40.8% and a unit change in physical planning increases service delivery by 63.8%. All the three variables were significant in explaining service delivery with $P < 0.01$. The results show a standard error of 0.9 percent which is very small to invalidate the findings on local leadership and service delivery. This is the same case with land management 0.9% standard error. However, physical planning had a slightly big percentage of 10% compared to local leadership and land management. Perhaps this development was caused by the choice of the sample of the respondents.

4.7.5 Regression Model summary

Table 4.10: Results from the multilevel regression analysis (model summary table).

Variable	R	R-square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the estimate
Local Leadership	0.502	0.240	0.607	0.091
Land Management	0.526	0.408	0.561	0.099
Physical Planning	0.668	0.638	0.738	0.101

Source: Primary data

There is a moderate relationship between local leadership and service delivery ($r=0.502$) table (4.10), results further show that local leadership explains service delivery up to 24% ($R\text{-square} = 0.240$) table (4.10) meaning that a unit increase in local leadership increases service delivery by 24%, taking into account 60.7% ($\text{Adjusted R-Square} = 0.607$) of the total respondents. There is a moderate relationship between land management and service delivery ($r=0.526$) and it explains to service delivery by 40.8% ($r\text{-square} 0.408$). This implies that, a unit change in land management increases service delivery by 40.8% ($r\text{-square} 0.408$) taking into account 56.1% ($\text{Adjusted R-square}=0.561$) of the total respondents. Results further show that there is strong positive relationship between physical planning and service delivery ($r=0.668$). Physical planning explains service delivery by 63.8% ($R\text{-square}=0.638$) taking into account of 73.8% ($\text{Adjusted R square}=0.738$) of the total respondents.

4.76 Hypothesis Results

This research study tested the following null hypothesis: (i) Local leadership does not affect service delivery in Masaka Municipality; (ii) Land management does not affect service delivery in Masaka Municipality and; (iii) Physical planning does not affect service delivery in Masaka Municipality.

Results from the hypothesis tests revealed the following: Hypothesis (1) results show that there was a positive moderate relationship ($r=0.502$) between local leadership and service delivery with a $P<0.01$ implying that local leadership was significant in explaining service delivery and it contributed 24%. Hence we reject the null (H_0) hypothesis and take the alternative hypothesis (H_1) suggesting that local leadership affect service delivery in Masaka Municipality. Hypothesis (ii) results revealed that there was strong positive relationship ($r=0.62$) between land management and service delivery with a $P<0.01$. This implies that land management was significant in explaining service delivery and it contributed 40.8 percent. Thus we reject the null hypothesis (H_0) and take the alternative hypothesis (H_1) Land management affect service delivery in Masaka Municipality. Hypothesis (iii) results show that there was a strong positive relationship ($r=0.768$) between physical planning and service delivery with $P<0.01$. This suggests that physical planning was significant in explaining service delivery and it contributed 63.8% to service delivery. Thus, we reject the null (H_0) and take the alternative hypothesis physical planning affect service delivery in Masaka Municipality.

4.7.7 Conclusion

The study suggests that local leadership, land management and physical planning explain service delivery. In order to improve on service delivery, there must be change in local leadership, land management and physical planning.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the summary of the findings, conclusions and the recommendations on analysis on decentralisation and service delivery.

5.1 Summary of the findings

Data collected provided following findings that are summarized below;

5.1.1 To establish the relationship between local leadership and service delivery

The study revealed a moderate relationship ($r=0.502$, $p=0.012$) between local leadership and service delivery. This was because local leaders have not carried out enough sensitization to their electorates on their obligations to obey regulations and to demand for services (mean=4.12), local leaders abuse decentralized authority for personal interests (mean=4.12), local leaders fail to involve citizens in the development planning and budgeting (mean=4.07) and local leaders rarely participate in the mobilization of resources for local development (mean 4.1).

5.1.2 To establish the relationship between land management and service delivery

The study revealed that there was moderate positive relationship between land management ($r=0.526$, $p=0.007$) and service delivery. This is because land tenure system poses serious challenge in land management and service delivery (mean=3.44), unguided activities of land agents and blockers are a big challenge in physical planning and service delivery (mean=4.5), District Land Board allocates public land in the municipality without taking into account of existing land use plans (mean=3.98), insufficient information related to land is a big challenge in land management and service delivery (mean=4.57) and lack of coordination of activities between District Land Board and Physical Planning Committee affect service delivery (mean=4.41).

5.1.3 To establish the relationship between physical planning and service delivery

The study revealed that there was a positive strong relationship between physical planning (0.668, $p=0.002$) and service delivery. This contribution was a result of lack of enough capacity and resources for physical planning department (mean= 4.11), less involvement of urban residents in physical planning (mean=4.36), lack of political will to enforce physical planning in the municipality (mean=4.8).

5.2 Conclusions

The study drew the following conclusions basing on the findings of the study;

5.2.1 The relationship between local leadership and service delivery

Local leadership affects service delivery and it is significant in explaining service delivery outcomes by 24% ($R\text{-square}=0.240$) taking into account 60.7% ($\text{Adjusted } R\text{-Square} = 0.607$) of the total respondents. This percentage is explained by the fact that local leaders are not empowered with real power and authority to make effective decisions because central government still wields a considerable degree of power. They have not created enough awareness among people to meet their civic obligations. Issues of transparency, accountability and empowerment still affect service delivery outcomes. Citizens are not empowered enough to check their leaders and to hold them accountable for their actions. Consultations with the electorates on issues that affect them were still inadequate. Similarly, in support of the above conclusions, ACODE, (2014) identified capacity deficiencies of local leaders as significant in explaining service delivery failures in local governments. Widmalm (2008: 44) reasoned that, the fact that decentralization decentralised responsibilities to local authorities does not translate that they have the capacity to fulfill them. Tise (2009) concluded that failure to create awareness by local leaders have continued to sustain uninformed citizenry. Muyomba Tamale (2011) reported knowledge gap regarding exactly what the constitution requires local government leaders to do.

5.2.2 Relationship between land management and service delivery

Land management affects service delivery outcomes by 40.8% (r-square 0.408) taking into account 56.1% (Adjust R- square=0.561) of the total respondents. This explanation is a result of issues affecting land administration and management such as land tenure system, plot subdivision affects planning decisions and services delivery. District Land Board allocates public urban spaces without following land use plans. Limited information on land issues was still a challenge to land management and service delivery and activities of District Land Board and physical planning committee were not well coordinated. Other studies carried out on the land management and service delivery also obtained similar findings. For instance, Ahene (2009) asserts that implementing policies on land to support economic development is not possible if there is no good land information. Similarly, GIC Ltd, (2007) pointed out that 60% of information in land registry has never been updated, still largely manually managed, incomplete and outdated. GoU, (2013) report that manual record keeping has severely hindered the progress in the delivery of land services to the public making it slow, cumbersome, frustrating and too costly. GIC (2007) concluded that ignorance of the public coupled with bureaucratic procedures has caused land information inefficiency in the country. Giddings (2009) asserts that allocation of public land has not considered ecological, environmental economic and social impacts and as such have displaced vulnerable land and natural resource dependent communities whose rights to land access, food security and livelihoods are lost.

5.2.3 Relationship between physical planning and service delivery

Physical planning affects service delivery and it is significant in explaining service delivery outcomes by 63.8% (R-square=0.638) taking into account of 73.8% (Adjusted R square=0.738) of the total respondents. However, physical planning function is still affected by poor urban governance, inadequate funding and weak enforcement of laws. Poor attitudes, perception and poverty limit people's participation in physical development planning. Clear strategy to foster

public participation in the development of physical plans was still lacking. Institutional weaknesses, lack of political will as well as inappropriate information to facilitate planning still bedevil physical planning. The above conclusion is supported by empirical studies of other scholars. For instance, Goodfellow, (2013) asserts that political will play a significant role in implementation of physical plans. He reported that demolition of illegal structures in urban areas did not take place in Kampala since NRM captured power until 2010. Similarly, Potts (2006) asserts that strong hand of the state to enforce legal codes on illegal construction was still poor in developing countries. Booth & Goloba-Mutebi (2012) asserts that waving formal planning rules for the elites in exchange of favors were dangerous for any growing town and a visible form of corruption. The Auditor General's report (2013) revealed that service delivery in municipalities was affected by inefficiencies of physical planning committees charged with responsibility of approving development applications. The same report indicates that 98% of the developments were completed without any inspections carried out during a construction phase; a reflection of major development control weaknesses.

5.3 Recommendations

The study made the following recommendations based on the conclusions.

5.3.1 Local leadership and service delivery

Create a strong and well respected legal framework which clearly assigns real powers, functions and responsibilities to different levels of local governance.

Invest in building systems of accountability at all levels of local governance. This implies increasing public access to information; establishing funds tracking mechanisms; setting and publicising public performance benchmarks; establishing mechanisms for public debate on key issues (baraza); and establishing and publicising complaints offices and centers.

Promote and encourage interface with the citizens to seek their view and act in accordance to their aspirations. Ask the Mayor's platform be created and convened at least every quarter of the financial year where municipal leaders and technical staff engage with the electorate to discuss their concerns in a rather informal but businesslike manner. This will help build confidence and trust among the municipal leadership and the residents.

Build capacity within local council structures particularly in the core functions of financial management; budgeting, human resource management and development; planning and monitoring and evaluation.

Streamline and strengthen systems for raising own local resources to finance local development plans and budgets. Process and procedures of revenue enumeration, assessment, collection and enforcement should be enhanced in order to attend to service delivery problems urban councils face. Local Councils should engage in constructive partnerships such as twining with other local authorities outside Uganda for assistance on issues of revenue mobilization and innovations.

5.3.2 Land management and service delivery

Strengthen and improve land administration and management function to conform to the needs and development aspirations of the local people. This implies regulating the activities and operations of land blockers and agents, and to establish good land information management to maximise potential benefits that can be obtained from land.

Coordinate and harmonise the activities and operations of Municipal Physical Planning Committee and the District Land Board to ensure that land administration decisions are informed by physical planning.

The Government should amend the law on land to cater for creation of Municipal Land Boards in the interest of ensuring orderly developments in urban centers. This will safeguard the interest of urban centers by protecting public land that serves ecological and esthetic functions.

5.3.3 Physical planning and service delivery

Invest heavily in physical development planning in order to create a beautiful and livable urban centre. Resources should be massively mobilized to facilitate preparation and implementation of plans. Equally, resources should be allocated towards opening of planned roads, open spaces and recreation centers. The local authorities should lobby a grant from central government to facilitate physical planning.

Create a fully-fledged department of physical planning with each division assigned a planner to control and guide physical developments in Masaka Municipality. This requires a change in the organization staff structure.

Change the mindset of both political leaders and the citizens in order to appreciate challenges and importance of physical planning. Attitude change programs should be strongly supported through both print and electronic media.

Amend the local Governments Act cap 243 to address the real needs and challenges in urban centers. Equally, Masaka Municipal Council miscellaneous byelaw needs to be revised such that it can match with trends of prevailing events for instance to impose heavy fines as deterrence to wrong doers.

Provide a policy and legislative framework that foster public participation in physical planning. New feasible strategies should be developed to encourage urban residents participate in planning and implementation of the physical development plan at all levels.

5.3.4 Suggestions for future research

This research study contributed to significant understanding on how decentralisation affects service delivery specifically by looking at how local leadership, land management and physical planning affect service delivery. However, this study used extensively quantitative approach and less on in-depth analysis of the problem under consideration. Future researches therefore should make efforts to adopt qualitative approach as a dominant one for in-depth analysis of the problem at hand. However, future research should investigate the effect of Central- Local Government relations on decentralisation and service delivery in urban areas.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Questionnaire for local leaders, DLB & ALC members and staff

I am Nfitumukiza Muhamed, an M.B.A student of Uganda Martyrs University, carrying out an academic research on Decentralization and Service Delivery in Urban Areas of Uganda; A case of Masaka Municipality. You have been sampled to participate in this study as a respondent. Your participation is voluntary. Your identity will not be revealed and equally your contribution will be used for purely academic purposes.

PART I

RESPONDENTS' BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Tick where appropriate

- 1 Sex Male 1 Female 2
- 2 Age 18-30 years 1 31- 44 years 2 45 and above Years 3
- 3 What is your highest level of education?
- Primary Education
- Ordinary Level education
- Advanced level Education
- Post A Level Education

PART II

Decentralization and Service delivery

Use the following scales to tick where appropriate

1	Strongly Disagree	SD
2	Disagree	D
3	Neutral	N
4	Agree	A
5	Strongly Agree	SA

Local leadership and service delivery

No	Questions	SD	D	N	A	SA
		1	2	3	4	5
LL1	Decentralisation has not empowered local leaders to make effective decisions for service delivery					
LL2	Local leaders fail to sensitise the electorates their obligations to pay					

	taxes to and to demand for services.					
LL3	Local leaders abuse decentralised authority for personal interests					
LL4	Decentralization has not empowered citizens to check abuses and power of local leaders					
LL5	Leaders sensitise their electorates to obey urban rules and regulations					
LL6	Leaders rarely consult citizens and hold accountability meetings.					
LL7	Leaders fail to involve citizens in development planning and budgeting.					
LL8	Leaders rarely participate in mobilisation of resources for local development					
LL9	Leaders discharging their duties with due regard to personal interests.					
LL10	Low levels of education affect service delivery					

Land management and service delivery

No	Questions	SD	D	N	A	SA
		1	2	3	4	5
LM1	Land tenure system is a big challenge in service delivery					
LM2	Plot subdivisions by land agents is a challenge to physical planning and service delivery					
LM3	DLB allocate public land without considering land use plans					
LM4	Un guided activities of land agents are a big challenge in land management					
LM5	Lack of land information is big challenge in land management and service delivery					
LM6	Allocation of green belts, open spaces and urban parks to private developers by DLB affect service delivery					
LM7	DLB and ALC members are nominated with lay skills and sometimes abuse their powers.					
LM8	Lack of coordination between the DLB and physical planning committee affect service delivery					

Physical planning and service delivery

No	Questions	SD	D	N	A	SA
PP1	Lack of institutional capacity and resources of physical planning department affect service delivery	1	2	3	4	5
PP2	Poor involvement of urban residents in the physical planning affects service delivery					
PP3	Lack of clear strategy of physical planning affect service delivery					
PP4	Poor attitude, perception, illiteracy and poverty affect planning and service delivery					
PP5	Lack of awareness of physical development plan affect service delivery					
PP6	Weak laws and development control legislations are a hindrance to Physical planning & service delivery					
PP7	Local Governments Act Cap 243 treating urban and rural areas as regions with the same needs and challenges affect service delivery in urban areas					

PP8	Lack of actual data and information are key challenges to enforcement of physical planning					
PP9	There is lack of political will to enforce physical planning in urban areas.					
PP10	Failure to open planned roads affect service delivery					

Social service delivery

No	Questions	SD	D	N	A	SA
SSD1	Transparency and accountability of public resources is an indicator of effective service delivery	1	2	3	4	5
SSD2	Accessibility to social services such as health, water, and education is an indicator of service delivery					
SSD3	Mobilization of resources, monitoring and inspection is an indicator of service delivery					
SSD4	Regular cleaning, collection and disposal of solid wastes are indicators of service delivery					
SSD5	Dissemination of land related information, allocation, and registration of land rights are indicators of service delivery					
SSD6	Budgeting for land fund for infrastructural development is an indicator to effective service delivery					
SSD7	Effective service delivery is a result of participatory planning and budgeting					
SSD8	Protection, preservation of green spaces, urban parks, wetlands and ecologically fragile environment is a measure of service delivery					
SSD9	Effective delivery of services is measured on regular opening and maintenance of roads, control of development and enforcement of building rules					
SSD10	Development and implementation of neighborhood development plans is an indicator of service delivery					

Appendix II: Interview guide for local leaders and technical officers

1. What are your duties in Masaka Municipality?
2. What key services do you offer to the community and how have those services helped to improve on the welfare of your people?
3. Do you think that decentralization gives you real powers and authority to make decisions? Yes, or No. if no what key challenges that have undermined your authority to effectively deliver services to the community.
4. What key resources at your disposal do you have to deliver services to the community?
5. Do you participate in the mobilization of resources for service delivery? Yes/No. If yes, how do you do it and how often do you participate in the mobilisation of such resources?
6. Do you consult communities on the issues that affect their areas? Yes/No. If yes, how do you consult them?
7. Do you think decentralized authority and power have been abused by leaders? Yes, or No. If yes explain how it has been abused and its impact on service delivery.
8. Comment on the political relationship between the Central Government and local authority and how has this relationship affected service delivery?
9. Comment on the relationship between political leaders and technocrats and how this relationship affects service delivery.
10. What are your views on the role of the district land board in the management of land in Masaka Municipality and how have the actions of the district land board affected service delivery?
11. What other issues in your opinion affect land management and service delivery in Masaka Municipality
12. Explain the challenges faced by Masaka Municipal council in ensuring planning and orderly developments and what has been your role so far?
13. How best do you think decentralization can improve service delivery at the local level?

Appendix III: Table for determining sample size

TABLE 1
Table for Determining Sample Size from a Given Population

<i>N</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>S</i>
10	10	220	140	1200	291
15	14	230	144	1300	297
20	19	240	148	1400	302
25	24	250	152	1500	306
30	28	260	155	1600	310
35	32	270	159	1700	313
40	36	280	162	1800	317
45	40	290	165	1900	320
50	44	300	169	2000	322
55	48	320	175	2200	327
60	52	340	181	2400	331
65	56	360	186	2600	335
70	59	380	191	2800	338
75	63	400	196	3000	341
80	66	420	201	3500	346
85	70	440	205	4000	351
90	73	460	210	4500	354
95	76	480	214	5000	357
100	80	500	217	6000	361
110	86	550	226	7000	364
120	92	600	234	8000	367
130	97	650	242	9000	368
140	103	700	248	10000	370
150	108	750	254	15000	375
160	113	800	260	20000	377
170	118	850	265	30000	379
180	123	900	269	40000	380
190	127	950	274	50000	381
200	132	1000	278	75000	382
210	136	1100	285	100000	384

Note.—*N* is population size.
S is sample size.

Appendix IV: Introduction letters

Uganda
Martyrs
University



making a difference

25th August, 2017

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

RE: NFITUMUKIZA MUHAMED , MBA STUDENT, UGANDA MARTYRS UNIVERSITY.


MR. NFITUMUKIZA MUHAMED (2015-M102-30014) is our student pursuing a Master of Business Administration and Management of Uganda Martyrs University, in year two.


As part of the Course requirement, he is carrying out a research project entitled "Decentralization and Service Delivery in Urban Areas of Uganda; A Case of Masaka Municipality)". He has asked us to recommend him to you as a key stakeholder in his research project.

We have no reservations in recommending Muhamed since the proposed research will go a long way in concretizing his work experience, deeply enrich his practice and hopefully add to the existing knowledge in the sphere under study.

Kindly access him with relevant facilities, literature and interactions he may need to obtain information and exposure towards successful completion of the research project.

Yours,


Nabukenya Maty



Administrator

Uganda Martyrs University.

MASAKA MUNICIPAL COUNCIL

Telephone: 0481-432596/0382-271274
Telegram "MUNICIPAL"
E-mail: mskmuncou@gmail.com

Office of the Town Clerk
P.O.BOX 201
MASAKA- Uganda



Our Ref: CR/103/8
Your Ref:

Date: 29th August 2017


Mr. Nfitumukiza Muhamed
Student Uganda Martyrs University

PERMISSION TO CARRY OUT RESEARCH PROJECT IN MASAKA MUNICIPAL COUNCIL

I have received a letter from Uganda Martyrs University dated 25th August 2017 recommending you to carry out a research project titled "Decentralisation and Service Delivery in Urban Areas; A Case of Masaka Municipality"

This serves to officially inform you that I have no objection and permission is granted. All heads of departments and sections are requested to accord you all the necessary support required to successfully complete your research project.

Wishing you success.


Nabawanuka Frida
For TOWN CLERK



Appendix V: Map of Masaka Municipality

