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**EFFECTS OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS ON PERFORMANCE OF
UNIVERSAL SECONDARY EDUCATION PROGRAMME IN UGANDA.**

A dissertation presented to

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Master of Science in Development Economics

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this research work to my daughter Hannah Praise Nassozi. I know we missed each other during those busy weekends when i had to attend classes and constantly prepare for exams and coursework.

This work is also dedicated to my pastors, Jackson and Eve Senyonga, their pastoral team and members of Christian Life Church where my Family has fellowshiped since 2003.

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I lastly thank God for the precious gift of life. His abundant grace continues to enable me navigate life's challenges while at the same time allowing me the opportunity to contribute to the development of my country as a knowledge worker.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

MoES	Ministry of Education and Sports
MoFPED	Ministry of finance planning and economic development
NDP	National Development Plan
NPA	National Planning Authority
PEAP	Poverty eradication action plan
WB	World Bank
PCR	Pupil classroom ratio
PTR	Pupil teacher ratio
PPPs	Public-Private partnerships
UBOS	Uganda Bureau of Statistics.
USE	Universal Secondary Education
UPPET	Universal Post Primary Education
MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
FEM	Fixed Effects Model
REM	Random Effects Model
CRE	Correlated Random effect
EPF	Education Production Function

ABSTRACT

The main objective of the study was to assess the effects of public private partnership on performance of USE programme in Uganda. Specifically, capitation grants, school ownership and school learning environment (teachers, facilities like number of classrooms, laboratories and latrine stances) were the primary independent variables. The two dependent variables were school enrolments and UCE performance index as indicators of accessibility and quality for lower secondary education respectively. The study mainly applied the Correlated Random Effects (CRE) model to a balanced panel dataset of 400 schools (45.3% private schools and 54.7% government aided schools) from MoES and UNEB for the years 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016 representing a seven-year period of USE implementation. In addition the Random Effects (RE) model was applied to 181 ppp schools in analyzing their UCE performance index for the same period. The study reveals that capitation grants ($p=0.000$), number of teachers ($p=0.002$) and classrooms ($p=0.003$) have positive significant effects on ppp school enrolments. Capitation grants however had less effect ($p=0.007$) on enrolment in ppp schools than in government aided schools. In addition, a ppp school on average enrolled more students ($p=0.007$) than government aided school implying that school ownership actually influence access to education in USE programme. Concerning the quality of secondary education, findings indicate that science teachers ($p=0.019$), school location ($p=0.035$) and number of latrine stances ($p=0.033$) have a significant effect on UCE performance index in ppp schools. Findings also show that government aided schools registered better performance index ($p=0.039$) than ppp schools on account of better science laboratories. The performance index declined over the years while at the same time rural schools performed poorly compared to urban schools.

These findings point to the need for government to formulate a policy framework of training, recruiting and sustaining science teachers in secondary schools irrespective of school ownership. There is need to expand in-service training of science and mathematics teachers while subsidizing through tax waivers, the supply of science kits, and laboratory chemicals and equipment mainly in rural schools. In view of the recent policy reversal to terminate the current PPP arrangement in USE programme, government needs to sustain gains registered in accessibility by grant aiding deserving private schools in rural areas.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

Many developing countries like Uganda continue to sustain their economies on limited national budgets and have lately adopted alternative means of financing public programmes and projects as a way of extending better services to their citizens. This approach to production and delivery of public services require a partnership arrangement between government and private sector in form of public-private – partnerships or PPPs(WB, 2016). This study intends to provide an assessment of the effect of PPPs on performance of universal secondary education (USE) programme in Uganda. The study will therefore review USE performance in relation to PPP as part of policy interventions since 2007. By assessing progress, strength and weaknesses of the programme, the research will make recommendations for improving implementation of USE implementation.

The Government of Uganda (GOU) started implementing universal secondary education programme in 2007 as a response to high demand for secondary education. This demand for secondary education was triggered by high population growth and increased enrollment rates in primary schools attributed to universal primary education (UPE) program in the country.

The main policy objective of USE/ UPPET was to increase access and quality of secondary education (MoES,2015). The government committed itself to subsidizing costs at secondary school level by paying fees, providing textbooks and other instructional materials for both students and teachers, meeting the costs of co-curricula activities, school administration and maintenance. The programme caters for two categories of schools, that is, USE schools without PPP and schools under PPP. Barrera-Osorio, Galbert, Gaspard, Habyarimana & Sabarwal(2016) state that commencement of USE programme in 2007 was immediately followed by implementation of two policies to address short run needs resulting from high student enrollment. They argue that the first policy intervention focused on introduction of double shifting in suitable and willing public secondary schools while on the other hand

private schools were contracted under PPPs in sub-counties without participating government schools or where such government schools were crowded or where the size of the sub-county would involve very long distances to public schools. PPP programme was therefore under the overall umbrella of the USE policy where schools that enrolled in the partnership entered into a contractual arrangement with the MoES documented by a memorandum of understanding. Partnering schools become eligible to receive grants, including the provision of textbooks and other teaching materials.

It is now 10 years since Government commenced implementation of USE programme and this research will seek to assess the impact of PPP policy interventions on USE performance parameters like level of access and quality of secondary education.

In this context, PPP policy interventions like provision of school grants, classrooms, teachers are conceived as independent variables whereas dependent variables will include enrolment differences between the pre and post inception of the PPP policy, academic performance and completion differences between USE schools without PPP and schools under the PPP.

1.1 Background to the Study

1.1.1 Historical background

The development of Uganda's education system was initially promoted by religious bodies like Protestants and Roman Catholics during the colonial era. Overtime, Uganda government has deliberately focused on gradual expansion of schools, increased government subsidization of voluntary religious groups operating schools and greater government control over school management. Since Uganda's independence in 1962, commissions like the Castle Commission of 1963 and Education Policy Review Commission (EPRC) of 1987 were constituted to propose policy recommendations for improving the education system (Syngellak & Arudo, 2006). The current policy interventions in education are anchored in EPRC recommendations which formed part of the government white paper published in 1992. The education white paper recommended universalizing primary education, and

government in 1997 commenced implementation of free primary education (UPE). Initial years of the programme were characterized by a sudden surge in primary school enrolment from 3.1 million in 1996 to 5.3 million in 1997 and then 7.5 million pupils by the time USE commenced in 2007. Therefore successes registered in UPE particularly through improved access to primary education necessitated government to focus on implementation of Universal Secondary Education (USE/UPPET) policy whose objective was to increase access and quality of secondary education using PPPs.

It can be argued that adequate financing of education programmes by the government is challenged by increasing priority accorded to other areas like health and infrastructure development. It was therefore necessary for government to pattern with private sector in provision of secondary education in Uganda through PPPs. From the historical perspective, interest in use of PPPs grew rapidly in early 1990s particularly in countries like United Kingdom which embraced what were called the private finance initiatives (IPFs) meant to get private participation in provision of public services (Changsik, Zen, Lu & Cho, 2012). These initial British IPFs were concentrated in the transportation sector, but later spread and have been used in a variety of areas like roads, hospitals and schools.

PPPs therefore started in industrialized countries and have been mainly promoted in developing countries by international agencies and international institutions like the World Bank (IE, 2009). It is argued that PPPs are a major mechanism for introducing the private sector into the public services like health and education. According to Laroque (2008); World Bank (WB, 2011) and Education international (EI, 2009), different countries have embraced different models of PPPs in education. These include school infrastructure PPPs, private operation of public schools (Contract Schools), and school Voucher programs and purchase of educational services from Private Schools through sponsoring public students. PPPs have been implemented in countries like Bangladesh, Pakistan, Quarter, Sweden, South African amongst others.

In Uganda the government subsidizes (through capitation grants) public and private secondary schools in order to attain universal secondary education. The Ministry of education chooses the participating schools and signs memorandum of understanding with individual schools to ensure that they comply with policy standards and guidelines.

Private secondary schools under PPP arrangement in USE programme since 2007 were eligible for UGX 47,000 per term per student while public or government USE schools received UGX 41,000. After rolling out the Universal Post Primary Education and Training (UPPET) program for lower Secondary and Post P7 Vocational Education and Training in 2007, government introduced Universal Post O'Level Education and Training (UPOLET) programme in 2011 to cater for Ugandan students who successfully complete and pass their Uganda Certificate of Education (UCE). The implementation of USE programme since 2007 was expected to improve quality and access to secondary education in Uganda. In addition, there has been poor or mixed results in academic performance to students sitting for UCE final examinations. Intermediate numeracy and literacy tests administered by NAPE/UNEB for lower secondary learner have also depicted low academic achievements. This study seeks to assess the effects of PPPs on performance of USE programme with focus on level of access (enrollment) and quality of education (UCE performance) outcomes for participating schools in the country. The researcher contends that PPPs as part of USE programme can have a positive effect on accessibility and quality of secondary education necessary for the country's human capital development, economic growth and development.

1.1.2 Theoretical background

The study mainly reviewed theoretical framework for the education production function (Monk, 1992). The theory of education production function (EPF) was advanced by Monk (1992) and assumes that inputs determine the output of an education system. Jagero (2013) points out that Education is a production process using scarce human, financial and physical

resources and other institutional related factors in the production of educated persons. Since those resources have alternative uses, economic concepts of production theory can be applied to its operations and planning. Accordingly the EPF model or the input-output approach, is a model behind the analysis of education economics where measurable inputs like school resources, teacher quality, classroom peers, family attributes and the outcome is the student achievement (Hanushek, 2015). It is further argued that currently more attention is focused on quality outcome, and the most common measure is test for cognitive skills. Whereas more countries have emphasized more universal access to schooling, they have turned to issues of quality of publicly provided schooling. There reason to believe that there is a causal relationship between cognitive skills and economic growth (Hanushek and Woessmann as cited in Hanushek, 2015). Accordingly, Hanushek (2007) argues that in addition to school inputs (teachers, curricula, school characteristics etc), student achievements are also influenced by student family background which is characterized by socio-economic characteristics such as parental education, income, and family size. He summarized school inputs to include peer inputs combinations of student socio-economic characteristics. Other school inputs include teacher background (like education level, experience, sex, race etc), school organization (class size, facilities, administrative expenditures, etc) and community or district factors. Levin, Jamison and Radner (1976) also considered student achievements to rely on school characteristics such as facilities as libraries, laboratories, age and nature of buildings, personnel inputs (class size) and teacher traits like experience, education, attitude and verbal aptitudes.

Other scholars like Lockheed and Hanushek (1994) argue that a comparison of school inputs and their related outputs provides the level of efficiency of the education system. They believe that the suitable output for efficiency considerations in the context of education is that portion of student growth or development that can be reasonably attributed to specific education experiences; in other words the marginal improvements that would not have

occurred without the inputs of the education system. These outputs might include the development of additional literacy and numeracy skills, attitudes, beliefs that exceed what otherwise would have been developed without the schooling in question. According to Cornali(2012), it pays to study system's ability to achieve assigned aims by making the best use of all allocated resources. The theory of education production function (EPF) is relevant to this study since it elaborates the key inputs and processes necessary for the education system to deliver desired outputs. Such outputs in this study will include indicators of quality (student learning achievement in UCE exams) and accessibility(student enrolments) to secondary education.

1.1.3 Conceptual background

The Ministry of Finance, planning and economic development (MoFPED,2010) defines PPP as a medium to long term contractual arrangement between public and private sector to finance, construct/renovate, manage and/or maintain a public infrastructure, or the provision of a public service. It involves the sharing of risks and rewards and as well delivering desired policy outcomes that are in the public interest. In most instances, the private sector will receive revenue for the service provided either from government budget allocation, user charges, or a combination of the two that is dependent on availability and quality of service provided. It is generally argued that most common Public-Private Partnerships in education are interpreted as contracting models where on one hand contracting involves a government agency entering into an agreement with a private provider to procure a service, or a bundle of education services, in exchange for regular payments(LaRocque,2006; Patrinos et al.,2009 as cited in Brans, 2011). The term contracting in this context is defined to mean the process whereby government procures education or education-related services of a defined quantity and quality at an agreed price from a specific provider. Available literature from Laroque (2008); World Bank (WB, 2011) and Education international (EI, 2009) identify the

following contracting models or forms meant for the delivery of education services. First there are infrastructure PPPs which involves large infrastructure projects in the education sector mainly the build-operate-transfer (BoT). The private operator is granted concession to finance, build and operate an education facility such as a public school, university building or hostel. The government would essentially lease the facility from the private sector for a specific period after which the facility is transferred to the government.

The second contracting model is the private operation of public schools (Contract Schools) where public schools are operated by private firms or organizations under contract to a public agency. The schools remain publicly owned and publicly funded, but are managed by a private sector operator in return for a management fee.

Another form of PPPs is the School Voucher program in which a school voucher is a certificate or entitlement that parents can use to pay for the education of their children at a public or private school of their choice, rather than the public school that is closest to them or to which they have been assigned. Government essentially provides vouchers to students enabling them to attend private schools or direct subsidies to private schools. Vouchers are paid directly from a public entity to parents or to schools directly on parents' behalf. The voucher programs provide funding to students attending not only private but also public schools. These programs may have different objectives – for example, improving quality and/or increasing educational access either generally or for specific groups. Laroque (2008) points out that targeting voucher programs to underserved populations (such as girls and disadvantaged, hard to reach, and minority students) can increase equity in access to schooling and in eventual educational achievement. In Bangladesh such a programme gave stipends to girls and substantially increased girls' enrollment.

The last example of PPP model in education involves purchase of educational services from Private Schools whereby government sponsors public students to attend private institutions as a way of meeting demand for access. Some of the aspects under this arrangement require

government to pay a subsidy for each student enrolled in eligible private secondary schools. In Uganda this subsidy is the capitation grants which represent government financing of PPPs in the USE programme (MoES, 2015). Also, participation in the program is limited to private secondary schools in areas that were previously underserved by public schools. In addition, the participating schools are chosen by government. This implies that ownership of schools participating in the programme was under private (ppps) or public (government aided schools) ownership. Privately owned schools comprised all schools in the USE programmes founded by faith based organization (e.g Islamic, C.OU, Catholics), communities, entrepreneurs without previous formal financing from government. On the other hand, government aided schools in USE programme were founded by government or faith based organization, communities or entrepreneurs but whose management was taken over by government. These schools are managed by government and receive government support in form qualified teachers, improved school facilities, instruction materials amongst others. Accordingly, Laroque (2008) and (WB, 2011) have classified Uganda's Universal Post Primary Education and Training program as an example of this last form of PPPs. The Ministry of education strategic plan (MoES, 2008) points out that government planned to maximize access, improve equity and quality in secondary schools partly through provision of support for USE students in public and non-government schools. Government needed to ensure that all those who complete P7 had the opportunity to pursue secondary education without compromising on quality standards. Laroque (2008) argues that the USE policy was introduced in 2007 to boost enrolment at the secondary level by contracting out the education of students that were not served by public and government aided schools in exchange for fixed fee per enrolled student. Therefore, the roles and obligations for either parties are defined in memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed between government and private school proprietors. Under this arrangement, students can study in a private school implementing USE provided they have the required scores from their Primary Leaving Exam

(PLE). The PLE scores should range between 4 to 28 aggregates. These PPP-schools receive government financing in form of capitation grants from for each eligible learner enrolled in school provided there is signed Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Education and Sports. Since inception of USE programme, each eligible student was expected to receive UGX 47,000 for private schools and UGX 41,000 for public secondary schools (MoES, 2015). PPP schools were expected to have a conducive school learning and teaching environment like classrooms, toilets, science laboratories and trained teachers. This study focused on effects of PPPs on performance of Universal Secondary Education Programme in Uganda. The study specifically sought to assess the effects of government financing (capitation grants), school learning environment (number of classrooms, laboratories, toilet facilities, and teachers) and school ownership on access and quality of secondary education. Access indicators were mainly based on school level student enrollments whereas quality indicators focused on school level UCE performance index. According to MoES, performance index is computed by assigning weights based on number of candidates scoring divisions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and U. This weighted index when computed estimates the level of school achievements pegged on the quality of scores or divisions obtained by students sitting UCE.

1.1.4 Contextual Background

In this study, the focus is placed on PPPs in the provision of education services as a contribution toward improving access and quality of secondary education in the country. This is in line with the country's policy and planning frameworks where education is viewed as a key fundamental element of Uganda's development efforts. In fact the country's vision 2040 considers provision of Universal Primary and Secondary education as a human right (NPA, 2010). In the education system, emphasis is placed on character formation and talent identification as well as well as skills development by the year 2040. Traditionally, Service delivery is mainly implemented directly or indirectly by Government Ministries, Departments

and Agencies. The Ministry responsible for Education therefore plays a big role in the provision of education services to Ugandans. Government policy thrust for secondary education is placed on universal access to secondary education for children from poor households; enhanced quality and relevance of secondary education, as well as efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery (MoES, 2014). Increasing the supply of qualified teachers and better governance and management of secondary schools also constitute part of policy thrust in secondary education in the country. These policy aspirations come against the background of a youthful population and high population growth. According to Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS, 2016), the country's population was 34.6 million growing at a rate of 3% per annum by 2014. About 55.1% of the population was in the age category of 0-17 years. Ministry of education publications indicate that GER for secondary education was only 25.2% (girls 22.4% and boys 27,9%) by 2007 implying limited access to secondary education. Uganda's youthful population has continued to exert tremendous pressure on the country's education system and government capacity to finance UPE and USE programmes as well. The demand for secondary education was particularly reinforced by the growing number of learners completing the free universal primary education. It is against this background that government interventions like double shifting teaching, public private partnerships to support equitable access and quality of secondary education in the country were necessary. There were indeed financial concerns following government pronouncement of free Secondary education in 2007.

World Bank (WB 2009:PAD-UPPET:2 cited in Brans,2011) affirms that government of Uganda was highly constrained for resources in education sector as the share of the government budget for education sector dropped to 17.5% in 2007, with 65% allocated to primary education and 23% to secondary education. Furthermore, in the face of budgetary pressure to expand investment in other sectors, there was a great competition for resources to finance the transition to mass secondary education. It was at this time that PPPs came up as

part of USE pronouncement – to improve efficiency, strengthen partnership with the private sector, improve targeting of resources to schools that are in particular need of support and mobilize external resources (WB, 2009). Uganda therefore deliberately commenced implementing PPP arrangements as part of USE policy in 2007 by offering free secondary education to students who passed the primary leaving examinations in 2006. The selection of participating public and private schools was done by the ministry of education and sports. The policy allowed parents to send their children to any secondary school in the country including non-USE schools provided they were able to afford to pay fees.

Government therefore signed MoUs with proprietors of participating private schools spelling out responsibilities and obligations of both parties. Government for example committed to the financing participating schools of education through direct remittance of bursary funds to schools, ascertaining number of benefiting students, guide on admission criterion and supervision of schools. The private partners for instance ensures that capitation grants are utilized for teaching and learning, students have discipline with enhanced welfare, availability of qualified teachers at graduate levels in schools (MoES, 2008). It is argued that the quality of secondary education provided to Ugandan students remained questionable even as government tried to offer new subsidies to cover the education related costs (Asankha and Takashi, 2007).

This study applied panel model to track the level of access and quality of lower secondary education in a sample of 400 schools (219 or 55% public schools and 181 or 45% private PPP schools) in the years 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016 . The consolidated dataset used in the study combined statistics on access (enrolments) from Ministry of education and sports as well as student performance data (UCE scores) from UNEB for the 4 years.

Much as Uganda's youthful population continues to exert pressure on effective and efficient delivery of social services like education, it is not clear whether participating PPP schools scattered in rural/ urban locations across different regions and districts have had any positive

effectt on access and quality of secondary education under USE programme. The researcher's point of view is that PPPs as part of overall USE policy contribute to improved access and quality of secondary education which would positively influence the country's efforts to enhance human capital development in Uganda.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Government USE policy introduced in 2007 was expected to improve access and quality of secondary education by contracting out the education of students that were not served by public and government aided schools in exchange for fixed fee per enrolled student. PPP schools were expected to have qualified staff, classroom, toilet infrastructure while ensuring that government funding is used to improve teachings and learning (Brans, 2011). It has been argued that the main rationale for Public-Private Partnership (PPP) programme in education sector is the potential role of the private sector in expanding access and improving learning outcomes (Barrera-Osorio et.al, 2016).

Since the implementation of USE programme there has been mixed results in level of access and quality of education delivered at secondary level. For example, indicators of access like Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) for secondary education declined from 27.6% in 2008 to 24.5% in 2015 while overall performance index in Uganda Certificate of Education (UCE) declined from 49.8% to 43% in the same period (MoES, 2017). NAPE reports (UNEB, 2011, 2013 & 2014) have consistently revealed poorer proficiency scores for S2 students in PPP schools in English, Mathematics and Biology when compared to all Government and Non-USE private schools. For instance, in 2013 the achieved proficiency scores in PPP schools for English, Mathematics and Biology were 34%, 36% and 9% respectively. This performance was nearly half the scores registered in government schools whose proficiency levels in the same year were 84%, 84.1% and 44% for English, Mathematics and Biology respectively.

If this trend in performance of PPP schools persists then USE programme may not significantly support better access and quality of secondary education in the country. Poor performance of PPP schools may be a result of poor utilization of capitation grants, poor school learning environment (lack of qualified teachers, facilities like classrooms, laboratories and libraries) to support desired level of access and quality of secondary education. The study is therefore timely to assess and understand the effects of PPPs on performance of USE programme while at the same time suggesting efficiency measures for improving access and quality of secondary education in the country.

1.3 Main objective of the Study

The purpose of the study is to assess the effect of public-private partnership on performance of universal secondary education programme in Uganda.

1.4 Objectives

The following specific objectives will guide the study

1. To examine the effect of government financing (capitation grants) in PPP schools on performance of universal secondary education.
2. To determine the extent to which learning environment in PPP schools has affected the performance of universal secondary education.
3. To examine the effect of school ownership on the performance of universal secondary education.

1.5 Research Questions

The following research questions will be asked in the study

1. How has capitation grants to PPP schools affected the performance of universal secondary education?
2. What is the effect of the learning environment in PPP schools on the performance of universal secondary education?

3. What is the effect of school owner(for USE participating schools) on the performance of universal secondary education?

1.6 Hypothesis of the Study

The following hypothesis will guide the study:

1. Capitation grants to PPP schools have no significant effect on performance of secondary education.
2. School learning environment (say teachers, facilities like classrooms or laboratories) in PPP schools do not significant influence performance of secondary education.
3. School ownership (either PPP or Government aided) has no significant effect on performance of secondary education.

1.7 Significance of the Study

Policy makers and technocrats who have been implementing PPP arrangements as a model of financing social services like education may adopt study findings for better policy making and programming in the education sector.

Similarly by assessing the current education PPP model, the study established the extent to which government and proprietors of private secondary schools are complying with the existing regulatory framework meant to improve access and quality of secondary education services. The research findings will also help academics since it is contributing to existing knowledge and literature related to the subject area of this study.

1.8 Justification of the study


Government commenced implementing USE policy since 2007 with the aim of improving access and quality of secondary education in the country. It is not clear whether the current policy of supporting students in both public and PPP schools is effective. Researchers like Balungi, Wokadala and Kasirye(2015) found gross misuse of capitation grants and failure to implement school activities in PPP schools. In light of such findings, it is necessary to gauge effectiveness of the current education PPP model in improving access and quality of

education. The methodology adopted in this research makes use of trend data for both PPP and Non-PPP schools participating in USE program.

1.9 Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework shows the relationship between public private partnership interventions and performance of USE programme.

Figure 1.2 Conceptualization of the study on PPPs and their effect on performance of Universal Secondary Education in Uganda.



Source: Based on the Education production function by Monk (1992) and Principle-Agent Theory by Stigliz (1987)

In the current framework for Uganda's universal education programme, the key interventions required both the government and private school proprietors to provide key inputs for improving performance of USE. The input interventions in the school system will constitute the independent variables for this study. Such interventions are expected to have a positive effect on the dependent variable represented by the performance of USE programme. Thus, it is conceptualized proper implementation of programme interventions will lead to better quality and access to secondary education. Therefore the expected interventions include government financing in form of capitation grants to all USE schools including PPP schools. The capitation grants are remitted to schools on a quarterly basis based on the number of eligible students. Secondly, the private providers are expected to provide a good school learning environment in form of recruiting qualified teachers, providing school facilities like classrooms, laboratories, toilets or libraries to ensure that learning and teaching takes place in their schools. USE programme has both private and government owned schools and the study also seeks to find out how school ownership affects performance of USE in Uganda. In the conceptual framework, performance of USE programme is judged by the delivery of secondary education services measured by the level accessibility and quality of secondary education. In this study accessibility is measured by the number students enrolled in the schools. Students enrollments in schools will be used as proxy for access indicators for secondary education while O'level performance index over the years will be the indicator of education quality. Performance index provides the quality of grades scored by school candidates sitting for UCE examinations.

The conceptual relationship explained above could be reinforced by the effect of moderating variable (adherence to PPP regulations and guidelines). Alternatively, the situation may be made worse with a weak enforcement and adherence to PPP regulatory framework like unpredictable financing from government or misuse of funds remitted to schools.

1.10 Scope of Study

The study focused on USE schools providing lower secondary education from S1 to S4 with particular emphasis on PPP schools. The study covered a total of 400 schools out of which 45% were PPP schools whereas 55% were government aided or Non-PPP schools in USE programme. Those schools were tracked for the years 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016 spanning the period 2010-2016.

The variables of primary interest were the interventions (inputs) in the USE programme (independent variables), PPP regulatory framework (moderating variables), and performance of USE measured by access and quality of secondary education(dependent variable).

1.11 Operational Terms and Concepts

Public-private partnership: is public contracting which involves a government agency entering into an agreement with a private provider to procure a service, or a bundle of education services, in exchange for regular payments (LaRocque, 2006).

Service delivery: refers to the provision of quality, accessible, affordable and equitable services for human development and better welfare of the recipients (WB, 2004 and researcher).

Gross enrollment rate (GER): refers to the Number of students enrolled in secondary level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the official school-age population of 13-18 years.

Government Financing: This refers to funds remitted to USE participating schools in form of capitation grants to a tune of UGX 47,000 and UGX 41,000 per eligible learner for private and government aided schools respectively.

Enrollment: Total number of learners in schools participating in USE programme.

School performance Index – O’level (P.I): Weighted index depicting the quality of grades scored by school candidates in UCE UNEB Exams (Weights W1=20 for candidates Div 1, W2=15 for Div 11, W3=10 for Div111, W4=5 for Div V1, and W5=0 for Div U).

$$P.I = \left[\frac{(\text{Div I} * W1) + (\text{Div II} * W2) + (\text{Div III} * W3) + (\text{Div VI} * W4 + (\text{Div U} * W5))}{\text{Total no. of students who sat} * W1} \right] \times 100$$

If all candidates scored in Division one (Div 1) then this index would be 100%, therefore the higher the index, the better the quality of grades by the learners and ultimately better quality performance outcomes for USE.

School learning environment: Refers to conducive situation or atmosphere which enables proper learning and teaching process to take place in schools. This includes availability of trained teachers, school facilities in good condition like classrooms, laboratories, toilets, libraries amongst others.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

The main objective of this chapter is to critically review the existing literature related to public private partnership and education service delivery in secondary schools. Sources of the literature for this study include journals, research papers, conference papers, government publications and documents, previous proposals and dissertations, textbooks, the World Wide Web (internet) and bibliographies.

2.1 Theoretical Framework

2.1.1 Education Production function theory

The theory that guided this study is derived from the Education production function by Monk (1992). The education production function assumes that inputs determine the output of an education system. Monk (1992, cited in Nakumicha, 2013) describe the production function analysis as the relating of an input measure to an output measure using correlation of multivariate analysis. Education production function involves the study of relationships between purchased schooling inputs and education outputs. Education is therefore looked at as an industry where the inputs automatically lead to outputs. Jagero (2013) points out that Education is a production process using scarce human, financial and physical resources and other institutional related factors in the production of educated persons. Since those resources have alternative uses, economic concepts of production theory can be applied to its operations and planning. Thus, in resource allocation at macro and micro levels efficiency should be deliberately pursued to enable the maximization of the consumption and the investment objectives of education. Hanushek (2007) states that output of the education process (the achievement of individual students) is directly related to inputs that both are directly controlled by policy makers (like the school characteristics, teachers, curricula, scholastic materials) and those not controlled such as families, friends and the innate endowments or learning capacities of students.

The theory is relevant to the current study in that it points out the salient factors that influence level of access and quality of secondary education. Public-private partnership arrangement will essentially bring synergies between government and proprietors of private schools to provide sufficient inputs in the education system necessary to improve access and quality of education services.

2.2 Government Finance and Performance of Secondary Education

Many studies have supported PPPs as alternative model of financing government programmes. According to International institutes for sustainable development (IISD, 2011) PPPs can be used as viable mechanisms for the public sector to crowd in private capital.

USE policy was introduced in 2007 to boost enrolment at the secondary level by contracting out the education of students that were not served by public and government aided schools in exchange for fixed fee per enrolled student (Laroque,2008; MoES,2008). Therefore, the roles and obligations for either party were defined in memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed between government and private school proprietors. Under this arrangement financing arrangements were well spelt out. Both government aided and ppp schools in the programme received government financing inform of capitation grants for eligible learner enrolled. Since inception of USE programme, each eligible student was expected to receive UGX 47,000 for private schools and UGX 41,000 for public or government aided secondary schools.

In his analysis of PPPs as a policy tool for USE in Uganda, Brans (2011) used a qualitative approach to understand stakeholders perceptions on PPPs impact on areas of quality and access of secondary education amongst others. He found that government actors acknowledge the potential quality benefits of PPPs but also recognize problems of financial sustainability because of partnering with weak schools. Education Development partners (EDP) and civil

society organizations (CSO) pointed out structural problems of profit minded private schools leading to poor education. He concludes that quality problems were evident in PPP schools and argued that PPPs potential to provide quality education will depend on future implementation of the programme. One of the factors affecting quality of education was the desire on the side of school proprietors to maximize profits at the cost of quality education. The study highlights an example of JICA funded SESEMAT program meant to train science and mathematics teachers country wide. The research portrays a low opinion of SESEMAT implementers who believed that the quality of education could lower since PPP schools focus on utilizing the minimum resources to get highest output. Secondly, PPP schools did not invest in science-subjects adequately since these were more expensive resulting in a bias for teaching more arts subjects. Thirdly the quality effect of the profit oriented mentality of PPP schools proprietors were worsened by government pressure on PPP schools to take up more students than their capacity. Sometimes the government is late in payment of the capitation grants, producing even more incentives for the private schools to spend less on teachers and science materials. In addition there appeared to be suspicion from government that funds in some schools are diverted from schools for private gain or that schools had ways to extract more money from parents despite receiving the capitation grants under the PPP arrangement. These assertions were affirmed by Balungi, Wokadala and Kasirye(2015) who found governance challenges in private USE schools where capitation grants from governments were mismanaged by school proprietors.

Kombe and Yohana (2013) argue that a well designed PPP in the provision of education is a useful tool for increasing general access, to help students from low-income households to access education in private schools and to reduce the fiscal pressure and government's burden of providing social services. Similarly, if poorly designed, PPP may have negative implications for equity of access to education by children from low-income households. In

Tanzania, private schools in PPPs were found to affect equity of access by students from low-income households. Very few students from low-income households were studying in private secondary schools as government never provided any student bursaries to private institutions.

According to Balungi, Wokadala and Kasirye (2015) contracting out education services enables government to quickly expand access without incurring any up-front expenditure on constructing equipping new schools. Their qualitative study in Arua, Iganga, Kibaale and Luwero found that about 74% of head teachers agreed that USE PPP has yielded substantial increments in school enrolments. Findings showed that three quarters of the head teachers believed that stakeholders like school proprietors, teachers, members of BoGs, and PTAs have an influence on implementation of USE policy. It was reported that in PPP schools, teachers and parents usually take their own initiative to monitor USE PPP activities while parents, religious and political leaders were usually invited to schools for major school level decisions like provision of lunch for students, fees determination for USE students, staff recruitments amongst others. They found some tendencies to disregard USE implementation guidelines especially in the areas of financial management where it is mandatory for the school USE Bank Account to be opened and administered by the Chair person Board of Governors and the Head teacher. Many head teachers however complained that school proprietors often hijack this role and don't spend the grant as per approved work plans. These findings point to school governance challenges that may influence performance of PPP schools. Misuse of grants could lead to failure to implement planned school activities which might negatively affect learning and teaching processes in USE schools.

According to Laroque (2008); World Bank (WB, 2011) and Education international (EI, 2009), different countries have embraced different models of financing education through PPPs. In Bangladesh for example, the government applied the school voucher program where vouchers are paid directly from a public entity to parents or to schools directly on parents'

behalf. The voucher programs provide funding to students attending not only private but also public schools and for Bangladesh, the program gave stipends to girls which substantially increased enrollment of girls in schools (Laroque,2008). Similar programs were implemented in Pakistan (Punjab) and Qatar to improve financing and delivery of education services. In South Africa, they used subsidies where state funding to public and private schools was organized on a quintile system in which schools are divided into five categories according to the poverty levels. Schools in the lowest quintiles receive full funding from the government, but participating private schools had to provide evidence of sound management and financial records. In Thailand, the government provides monthly subsidies as major source of incomes to private schools on a cost-per-student basis. Private schools are allowed to charge fees to improve the quality of education, meals, transportation, health inspections amongst others.

Some countries have implemented build and operate arrangements where the private operator can granted concession to finance, build and operate an education facility such as a public school, university building or hostel. The government would essentially lease the facility from the private sector for a specific period after which the facility is transferred to the government. Financing of education can also be implemented through school management initiatives using private operation of public schools (Contract Schools) where public schools are operated by private firms or organizations under contract to a public agency (WB, 2011). The schools remain publicly owned and publicly funded, but are managed by a private sector operator in return for a management fee. One of the example of such financing highlighted in World Bank report (WB, 2011) is in Punjab where a private entity ‘Educomp’ entered into an agreement with government to establish and run five secondary schools under PPP model. In this case government provided free land leased for 99 years to establish schools. Secondly, both government and private sector shared capital costs for infrastructure development as well as recurrent expenses. Management of schools was by Edcomp –the private pattern who

also provided teaching and non-teaching staff, including their training and effective learning. The Punjab education development board on behalf of government periodically reviews performance of ppp schools.

2.3 Learning Environment and Performance of Secondary Education

This section focuses of previous literature on the role of PPP interventions like teacher deployment, provision of scholastic materials and conducive classroom environment on performance of secondary schools participating in USE programme.

Teachers provide the basic foundation in the delivery of skills and knowledge to learners in schools. According to World Bank simulations based on UNESCO statistics, Sub-Saharan Africa needed more than 1,361,000 new teachers between 2000 and 2015 to meet the demands of primary education (Schwille, Dembele and Schubert 2007). They further argue that as more countries were reaching their UPE goals and commenced expanding secondary education, the requirements for additional teachers increased pressure on an already stretched system (that is training institutions, public expenditures), making the challenge seem insurmountable. This implies that countries like Uganda experiencing a bulge in primary education coupled with high population growth need to take advantage of the private sector in the provision of education using Public-private partnership.

Odumbe, Simatwa and Ayodo (2015) conducted a descriptive research study on the Factors influencing student performance in Day-secondary schools in Kenya, Migori sub county. Their study found a high percentage of trained teachers in schools as an indication of government's commitment towards ensuring high standards of education in day-secondary schools. It is interesting to note that similar research work conducted in 1986, found significant positive correlation between performance and teacher qualification (Kathuri, 1986 as cited in Odumbe, Simatwa & Ayodo, 2015). The study findings showed that in schools

where less than 90% of the staff were qualified teachers, the performance index as proxy for quality education was 5.5, and where more than 90% were qualified, the performance index was 6.0. This therefore implies that overtime, higher percentage of qualified teachers positively influence student performance in examinations and overall quality of education services delivered to learners.

Teachers are considered as indispensable elements in the teaching and learning process, and in most developing countries, constitute the main agents of transmission of knowledge. The teacher resource is one of the most important inputs, into the education system. Therefore, efficient management and utilization of teachers is critical, to the quality of learning outcomes, in terms of student performance. In many private secondary schools however, the plight of teachers leaves a lot to be desired. According to New Vision (2016), teacher in private schools continue to work without formal contracts and are exploited by school proprietors who pay little wages with no respect to maternity leave. The issue of poor pay has compelled teachers to engage in moonlighting where teachers provide teaching services in multiple schools and some in other work. Urwick and Kisa (2013) argue that a combination of shortage of science teachers and of low pay creates a situation where their scarcity value may be exploited through supplementary employment. This however has a negative effect of reduced ‘time on task’ for students resulting in poor learning outcomes. In the case of science practical lessons for instance, the prevalence of large classrooms and moonlighting imply that there would be less opportunity for student initiative and guided enquiry as opposed to teacher demonstration (McComas, 2005 as cited in Urwick and Kisa 2013). This implies that poor pay, scarcity of teachers and large classrooms result into moonlighting practices where the quality of teaching and learning processes are compromised. Such a situation might be averted if government implements well regulated and financed PPP school operations.

According to Barrera-Osorio et.al (2016) there are numerous benefits and potential to improve quality education through partnership with private proprietors. It is suggested that public school administrators have less autonomy in hiring teachers and organizing schools like private sector does. On the other hand, private schools can deploy and use teachers more effectively and generally such schools are held to a high level of accountability by the parents as a result of the direct financial transactions involved. This argument has been advanced by a number of researchers and the World Bank who have encouraged developing countries to tap into private sector potential through PPPs with expected outcomes of improved accessibility and quality of education. In Uganda there are many private schools and parents make choices as to where to take their children depending on perceived quality of education offered. Some private schools particularly those in urban areas tap into such efficiency measures to provide quality education mainly measured by performance of their students in national exams like UCE, UACE. Since 2007 government has been engaging private schools under PPP arrangement as part of USE policy with the hope that benefits of private proprietorship would trickle down to better access and quality education. In some countries like Tanzania, Columbia and Pakistan there has been empirical evidence of the causal effects of PPPs on increased accessibility to education(Alderman, Kim, and Orazem 2003; Barrera-Osorio et al, 2011; Patrinos et al. ,2009 all cited in Barrera-Osorio et.al,2016). However evidence about the causal effect of PPPs on quality of education is still emerging.

For effective learning to take place, schools need adequate scholastic materials. These will mainly include lab- equipment and chemicals, chalk and text books. The demand for more classrooms in Uganda continues to rise given the ever-increasing enrolments at both lower and upper secondary levels. For instance, in the first year of USE programme, secondary education registered 17% increase in enrolment resulting from high transition rate from P7 to S1 because of USE policy (MoES, 2008).

Nakumicha (2013) applied a survey design to explore the factors that affect learning in public and privately run secondary schools in Trans-Nzoia West district of Kenya. His findings revealed that textbooks were considered as key in influencing student performance and therefore quality of education services. The student-textbook ratio was a factor that influenced the student performance but only 41.8% of the student had access to enough textbooks compared to remaining 58.2% without books. Furthermore, 72.5% of the teachers strongly agreed that indeed text books are key in affecting the students performance. This percentage was high enough to generalize that text books matter a lot in determining the delivery of quality education and performance of students whether in public or private secondary schools.

Stevenson, Main and Koon (2001) found that school condition and adequacy of a school facilities significantly impacted on school outcomes. It is mainly education facilities, and condition of school buildings which significantly impacted on student achievements in Mathematics and science related subjects. The facilities affect teacher attitudes, which in turn affected classroom productivity.

A study conducted in the slum area of New Delhi by Chugh (2011) found that inadequate and poor quality of infrastructure and physical facilities negatively influenced education of the children. They found that absence of toilets facilities in households poses a great problem especially for girls who have to answer to their biological needs at the early hours of the day. Poor household conditions together with bad learning school environment will negatively impact of learning achievements of students. This situation is aggravated by the fact that families in slum communities are headed by poor parents with low level of education. This is corroborated by Farooq, Chaudhry, Shafiq and Berhanu(2011) who found that socio-economic status and parents education have a significant effect on students' overall academic achievement as well as achievements in the subjects of Mathematics and English.

2.4 School Ownership and Performance of Secondary Education

In this section, the literature reviewed relates school ownership and its effects on performance of schools measured by student achievements and accessibility to education.

Studies conducted by UNEB through the National Assessments in Proficiency and Numeracy (UNEB, 2011, 2013 & 2014) have consistently revealed poorer proficiency scores for S2 students in PPP schools in English, Mathematics and Biology when compared to all Government and Non-USE private schools. For instance, in 2013 the achieved proficiency scores in PPP schools for English, Mathematics and Biology were 34%, 36% and 9% respectively. This performance was nearly half the scores registered in Non-USE government schools whose proficiency levels in the same year were 84%, 84.1% and 44% for English, Mathematics and Biology respectively. However when compared with Government aided schools participating in the USE programme, PPP schools performed poorly but with a relatively small margin. For Instance in 2013, PPP schools scored lower in English, Mathematics and Biology by percentage difference of 4.1, 8.9 and 2.5 respectively.

A study commissioned by World Bank and undertaken by Barrera-Osorio et.al (2016) used randomized control trials to evaluate impact of PPPs on private school performance in Uganda. The study used NAPE results that tested proficiency of senior 2 students in Biology, Mathematics and English for 2011 and 2012 focusing on PPP private schools and non-participating private schools. Their findings show that PPP program helped absorb large number of eligible students in secondary schools. Also student performance in participating private schools was significantly better than nonparticipating private schools. The study linked improved performance of PPP schools to increased input availability as well as positive selection of government aided students in private schools where such selection is most likely a household/parent decision than the schools. This study however never compared performance of PPP schools and government aided schools participating in USE

programme. In addition, study findings may appear to contradict NAPE findings where overall Non-USE private schools consistently performed better than PPP schools in all three subjects for the period 2012-2014(UNEB, 2016).

Another study done by Jimenez and Cox (1989) revealed that though public school students in Tanzania came from poor families, their aptitude test scores exceeded the private school average. They also found that teacher salaries and student teacher ratio were higher for private schools than in public schools. In that study, school characteristics were important determinant of student performance and in observationally similar settings, students in private schools performed much better than those in public schools. This is affirmed by Jimenez, Lockheed, and Paqueo (1991) who principally found that students in private schools generally outperformed their public school counterparts on standardized mathematics or language tests, or both.

A comparative analysis of public and private educational institutions in Pakistan by Awan and Zia (2015) found that private schools are not accessible to poor parents and wealth parents are therefore more likely to send their children to private schools than poor parents. They also found lower teacher absenteeism and better teacher accountability in private schools as compared to public schools. Most important in the private sector, teacher remuneration was more closely linked to student outcomes than in public sector. The study also found that the quality of English, science and mathematics teaching was generally higher in private schools than at public schools.

In a related comparative study in primary schools of Pakistan by Shabbir et,al (2014) revealed that students in private schools performed better than public schools in Mathematics, General science and English. Private schools are not accessible to poor parents. Wealthier parents are more likely to send their children to private schools than poor parents. In

addition, Private schools have better availability of physical facilities as compare to public schools. Private schools additionally had better record keeping practices than public schools.

It is important to point out that such a study focused on NAPE results at Senior 2 which gives intermediate indicator of performance in lower secondary schools. The reviewed literature provide some mixed results on performance of ppp schools based of proficiency estimates in English, Mathematics and Biology. It is therefore not clear whether PPP interventions can eventually translate into improved performance of students in UCE exams. In this context students' achievement in UCE national examinations is a proxy indicator for the quality of lower secondary cycle of education. Student performance in UCE has a strong bearing in the academic progress and direction of one's education endeavors.

2.5 Conclusion

The chapter explored the theoretical approach upon which this study was based. It is evident that Uganda's population structure and growth rate will continue to exert pressure on Uganda's education system. The literature shows that the quality of teachers deployed in schools influence student academic performance. In addition, the learning environment like school facilities like classrooms, laboratories, scholastic materials like textbooks positively affects student performance and access to schools. There appears to be governance challenges in utilization of capitation grants channeled to PPP schools. Whereas much of the literature did not reflect the local situation, those studies done in Uganda were either qualitative in nature or focused on immediate effects like numeracy or literacy tests for senior two in sampled schools. A quantitative study by Barrera-Osorio et.al (2016) focused on S2 learners in PPP schools and non-ppp private schools but whose findings may appear inconsistent with NAPE results for 2012-2014. It is not clear whether PPPs interventions translate into better performance outcomes for students at the end of learning cycle in lower secondary education.

Little is brought forward concerning the performance of ppp schools versus government aided schools participating in USE programme. This study focused on indicators of access and quality of secondary education for ppp schools but also attempted to compare their performance with non-ppp(government aided) schools participating in USE programme. It is therefore worthwhile to undertake this study in order to assess the likely effects of ppp program interventions on access (school level enrolments) and quality (student achievements in UCE Exams) of secondary education.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter provides detailed methodology and procedure that were used in the study. The purpose of this chapter is to inform the readers and other researchers on how findings were generated, including the analysis of data. It is therefore a plan, structure and strategy of how the investigation was conceived so as to obtain answers to the research questions. The chapter covers the research design, study population, procedure of data collection, data analysis and measurement of variables and model specification.

3.1 Research Design

The study is set out to assess the effect of inputs government financing(capitation grants) of PPPs, school learning environment(number of teachers, school facilities like classrooms, laboratories, toilets) and school ownership on accessibility (enrolments) and quality (UCE performance) of secondary education. Since USE programme has been running for the last eight years, the study applied a longitudinal research design because assessment of indicators like student performance for only one period may be misleading. Longitudinal study using panel data is one that follows a given sample of individuals or schools over time, and thus provides multiple observations on each individual element in the sample (Hsiao,2003 pp2). According to Schutt(2011) the design allows the measuring of the value of cases on an independent variable and a dependent variable at different times, allowing the researcher to determine whether variation in independent variable precedes variation in the dependent variable. Reviewed literature revealed that parent education and home environments are important determinants of student performance. However Jimenez, Lockheed, and Paqueo (1991) argue that where it is impossible to measure nonschool or family background effects then the best option is for the analyst to adopt panel model.

The design therefore allowed the researcher to study school level changes in enrolments (access) and academic performance in UCE as outcomes of USE programme. Since the programme has been implemented for 8 years, the design helped in providing answers to research objectives of assessing the effects of interventions in PPP and Non-PPP schools on access and quality of secondary education. Therefore the performance of PPP school interventions was assessed in comparison to Non-PPP schools in USE programme. The design helped to examine relationships between variables, and the causal direction of variables through the correlated random effects model.

In this study, the sampling units (the panel) to be tracked was secondary schools (PPP and Non-PPP) participating in USE programme. Specifically a panel study was applied for the years 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016 all falling between the periods 2008-2017 when the programme has been operational. The research utilized eight datasets of which four were from the ministry education and sports and four from Uganda National Examinations board.

The headcount datasets from MoES (from Statistics, Monitoring and Evaluation Division – Education planning department) provided school level details on enrolments, teachers, indicative school grants, and existing school facilities like classrooms, laboratories and libraries. On the other hand, data from UNEB (accessed from www.africaopendata.org bought from UNEB) provided school level student scores in Uganda Certificate of Education (UCE). For each year, the two datasets were linked using UNEB center number and EMIS school number. This resulted into four datasets for the years 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016. Since the researcher aimed at achieving a balanced panel model, the four datasets were queried to accept schools having data in all the four years. In this regard, those schools that consistently appeared in all the years provided a credible sampling frame for this study.

Sample selection

The research aimed at generating a representative sample of both government and private schools participating in USE programme. The study was based on secondary data from MoES and UNEB. The process of identifying ppp schools for inclusion in the sample was based on private schools which had all study variables for the years 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016. In this respect, a total of 181 ppp schools had consistent data for all the four years and were therefore included in the sample. Panel models were therefore applied to these ppp schools to study the effects of capitation grants, teachers and school facilities on access and quality of secondary education. However since the USE programme had both government aided (non-ppp) schools and ppp schools, it made sense to also perform comparative analysis for the two categories of schools to assess the effect of school ownership on performance of USE programme. This is important because both categories of school ownership(private and government aided) compete for the same government financing inform of capitation grants and the analysis would show the cost-effectiveness of the programme.

The sampling design was therefore meant to select government aided schools proportional to already selected ppp schools.

After merging UNEB and MoES dataset, a total of 434 government aided schools had consistent data for the years 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016. The task was therefore to select the appropriates number of government schools from 434 in proportion to the 181 ppp schools.

According to the national headcount reports (MoES, 2008 & 2015) the share of ppp schools in USE programme progressively increased from 42% in 2008 to 48% by 2015. It was therefore prudent to have average share of about 55% and 45% for government and PPP schools respectively in the final sample. In the final sample of 400 schools per year, the number of PPPs schools was kept at 181 while government schools were scaled down to 219 using stratified random sampling. Neuman (2011) argues that stratified sampling generates a random sample in which the researcher first identifies a set of mutually exclusive categories, divides the sampling frames by the categories, and then uses random selection to select cases

from each category. The final sample of 400 schools was therefore 46% of all USE schools reported in headcount report of 2015(MoES, 2015). Public secondary schools participating in USE programme were included in the panel model for purposes of analyzing school ownership on performance USE. Sample selection for this study is summarized in table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Sample selection

Regions	Target population of government schools		Stratified sample government schs	PPP schs sample	Final sample
	N1	Percentage	n1	n2	n1 +n2
BUSOGA	4	1%	2	5	8
CENTRAL	55	13%	29	28	57
EASTERN	67	15%	33	19	52
KAMPALA EXTRA	15	3%	10	12	22
MID EASTERN	31	7%	14	10	24
MID WESTERN	18	4%	8	17	25
NORTH EASTERN	4	1%	2	3	5
NORTHERN	53	12%	27	11	38
SOUTH EASTERN	27	6%	14	18	32
SOUTH WESTERN	90	21%	44	27	71
SOUTHERN	51	12%	25	20	45
WEST NILE	23	5%	10	11	21
WESTERN	1	0%	0	0	0
Total	434	100%	219	181	400

Source: computed by researcher

3.2 Data Sources

The study used secondary data obtained from the National head-count panel datasets from Ministry of Education and sports, and UCE results from UNEB (Published by Open data Africa) data for the years 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016 spanning the period between 2008-2016 when USE programme has been operational.

3.3 Data Analysis

3.3.1 Preliminary Analysis

Data analysis was done using STATA VERSION 14 software to achieve the desired objectives. In addition Ms Access and Excel were used for merging and cleaning the datasets. The multi-year datasets from each source were merged to constitute two datasets from UNEB and MoES. By using the UNEB school registration number, the two datasets were queried and all matching records constituted the final dataset for further analysis. The consolidated

dataset was subjected to three levels of analysis, that is univariate, bivariate and Multivariate analysis.

At univariate level of analysis, the STATA package was used to generate frequencies and percentages, summarizing the data and facilitating quick interpretation. These were then presented in tabular format for both sample school characteristics and main variables under study. Descriptive statistics like percentages and frequencies, bar charts were used for categorical variables while means, standard deviations, minimums and maximum statistics were used for the continuous variables. The data was also checked for normality to establish if the data forms a normal distribution so as to allow application of correlation and regression analysis.

At bivariate level of analysis, ANOVA for categorical independent variable were run with the dependent variable while Pearson correlation for the continuous independent variables with the dependent variable. As pointed out by Mugenda and Mugenda(1999), bivariate level measures the degree of relationship between the independent variables and dependent variables using Pearson product correlation coefficient. Correlation coefficients will be interpreted as; no correlation ($0 < r < 0.1$), weak correlation($0.1 < r < 0.3$), median($0.3 < r < 0.5$) and strong ($0.5 < r < 1.0$)

Preliminary hypothesis testing was done using the Pearson's correlation coefficients obtained from correlation analysis. The analysis provides the strength and direction of the relationship, together with the statistical significance of the results. In this particular study, analysis mainly based on significance level of 0.05 meaning that there is a 95% chance of getting similar results if the study was repeated using different samples(Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003). For all the p-values (significance levels) less than or equal to 0.05, the study results were considered statistically significant, hence rejecting the null hypothesis H_0 and accepting the

alternative hypothesis H_1 . However, the level of significance was extended to 10% in the final panel model model.

3.3.2 Panel approach

The above preliminary analysis at univariate and bivariate levels provided a general understanding of the variables in the dataset. After this analysis, panel models were estimated and diagnostic test conducted to decide the appropriate choice of model to be used at multivariate level of analysis.

This research built on Kongens (2008) who studied the general impact of rural roads in Nicaragua. The following pooled regression model was formulated;

$$y_{it} = X_{it}\beta + Z_{it}\gamma + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Where y_{it} is the outcome of interest for individual i at time t ;

X_{it} is a vector containing the primary explanatory variables

Z_{it} is a vector containing the control variables

β and γ are the parameters to be estimated and

ε_{it} is the error terms assumed to have standard properties.

The approach adopted in this research involved performing econometrics diagnostic tests for panel data models so as to make a choice between Pooled OLS, Random effects and Fixed effects models. Therefore diagnostic tests like Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier and the Hausman tests recommended use of Fixed effects model. However the recommended model automatically dropped time invariant variables like school ownership status which were useful in study. As suggested by Wooldridge (2012) this research adopted the correlated random effects model which modifies the fixed effects model to retain time invariant explanatory variables.

The adopted approach is in line with Okello, Kasharu and Ocaya (2015) who also applied econometric techniques for panel estimation in sequence from the Pooled Regression model to the differentiation in choice between the Fixed Effect Model and Random Effects Model.

3.3.3 The Pooled Regression Model

The pooled regression model assumes that all coefficients are constant across time and units (Ocaya, 2012). The pooled model is given as follows;

$$y_{it} = X_{it}\beta + \varepsilon_{it} \dots\dots\dots 3.1$$

For $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$

Where, i denotes a unit (school), N is the total number of units (number of schools), ε_{it} is the error term vector, y_t is $N \times 1$ vector, β is the vector of coefficients for the independent variables which include a constant. Equation 3.1 is also called population averaged model under the assumption that any latent heterogeneity has been averaged out. The resultant pooled regression model is stated in equation 3.1 in which parameters β will be estimated.

Detailed description of the variables used in the study is shown in table 3.2 below. The variables are categorized under dependent and independent variables. The first two variables that is *schenrl* (school enrolment) and *pi1* (performance index) reflect indicators of access and quality of secondary education respectively. The independent variable has subcategories depicting primary PPP indicators like government financing, qualified teachers and classrooms, laboratories, school ownership and location of school. .

Table 3.2: Description of the variables

Variable	Data type	Description
1.0 Dependent variable		
<i>Schenrlt</i>	Continuous	Registered enrollment in school will be the indicator of access to secondary education. Logarithmic transformation to be applied to reduce the sensitivity of outliers
<i>pi1</i>	Continuous	School level performance index for lower secondary will be computed using MoES methodology where weights are attached for different grades scored in UCE exams. Therefore the weighted Index (Performance index) $P.I = \{[(\text{No. of candidates in Div I} * 20) + (\text{no. in Div II} * 15) + (\text{NO. in Div III} * 10) + (\text{No. in Div VI} * 5 + (\text{No. in Div U} * 0)) * 100\%] / (\text{total no. of students who sat} * 20)$

2.0 Independent variable		
(a) USE indicators for PPPs		These are the primary explanatory variables in the study
<i>Lncaptg</i>	Continuous	Government capitation grants remitted to private school per year. Logarithmic transformation to be applied to reduce the sensitivity of outliers
<i>Ttrst</i>	Continuous	Total number of qualified teachers employed in schools as part of proxy for school learning environment
<i>sctt</i>	Continuous	Total qualified science teachers employed in schools as part of proxy for learning environment
<i>Clstotal</i>	Continuous	Number of classrooms in a school as part of proxy for learning environment
<i>Labtotal</i>	Continuous	Number of laboratories in a school as part of proxy for learning environment
<i>Lattotal</i>	Continuous	Number of latrine stances in a school as part of proxy for private investment.
<i>Ownership</i>	Categorical	Equal 1 if school is a PPP
<i>Location</i>	Categorical	Equals 1 if school located in rural area
<i>d2010</i>	Categorical	Equal to 0 if the current panel is 2010
<i>d2012</i>	Categorical	Equal to 1 if the current panel is 2012
<i>d2014</i>	Categorical	Equal to 1 if the current panel is 2014
<i>d2016</i>	Categorical	Equal to 1 if the current panel is 2016

Source: Computed by Author

3.3.4 Fixed (Unit) Effects Model

The fixed effects model(FEM) assumes that the slope coefficients are constant for all cross-section units, and the intercept varies over individual cross-section units but does not vary over time. For this study, it is proposed that the results in equation (3.1) could be cross checked using the fixed effects model given by;

$$y_{it} = X_{it} \cdot \beta + \alpha_i + \eta_{it} \dots \dots \dots (3.2)$$

where α_i is individual-specific, time-invariant effects, that takes into account the heterogeneity influence from unobserved variables that may differ across the cross-section units. In the model η_{it} are the error terms that follow the classical assumption that $\eta_{it} \sim N(0, \sigma_\eta^2)$. The reason for using the above standard fixed effects model is due to the fact that pooled regression models only allow controlling for factors to the extent that they are included in the data set. If there are unmeasured factors that affect both y_{it} and X_{it} , it may therefore bias the results (Kongens, 2008). The time dimension and panel structure of the data, will nevertheless have capacity to minimize such issues. The basic assumption in the fixed effects model is that the individual specific effect α_i is correlated with the independent variables. This will imply that $\text{cov}(\alpha_i, x_{it}) \neq 0$. Time invariant factors will be excluded from the model by taking the differences between each observation with the within-group mean values in order to get rid of the individual specific effect term α_i . The alternative to this assertion is to have a random effects model in which α_i is not correlated with x_{it} , so that $\text{cov}(\alpha_i, x_{it}) = 0$. Here α_i is small and becomes part of the error term $U_{it} = (\alpha_i + \eta_{it})$.

3.3.5 Correlated random Effects Model

Diagnostic tests for this study were performed before deciding on the final model to be used. The tests conducted recommended adoption of the fixed effects model identified in equation 3.2 above. However, the recommended fixed effects model automatically dropped important time invariant independent variables like school ownership from the model. The solution was to adopt the correlated random effects approach which modifies the fixed effects model to allow for estimation of such time invariant variables. According to Woodridge (2012), the correlated random effects (CRE) approach takes the form;

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \beta x_{it} + \gamma \bar{x}_i + r_i + \eta_{it} \quad \dots\dots\dots(3.3)$$

It is argued that equation 3.3 still has a composite error term $r_i + \eta_{it}$ comprising of a time – constant unobservable r_i and idiosyncratic shocks, η_{it} . The assumption that $\text{cov}(\alpha_i, x_{it}) = 0$

holds when α_i is replaced with r_i . Since, η_{it} is uncorrelated with x_{is} , all s and t , then η_{it} is also uncorrelated with the mean $\bar{x}_i$. As a result, equation 3.3 is like the usual equation for RE estimation with the important addition of the time-average variable $\bar{x}_i$. It is the addition mean value of $\bar{x}_i$ that controls for the correlation between α_i and the sequence of x_{it} ($t=1,2,...T$). What is left over r_i is uncorrelated with the x_{it} .

In conclusion, Woodridge (2012, pp 497) states that applying RE to equation 3.3 gives the (CRE) correlated random estimators $\hat{\alpha}_{CRE}$, $\hat{\beta}_{CRE}$ and $\hat{\gamma}_{CRE}$. Subsequently $\hat{\beta}_{CRE} = \hat{\beta}_{FE}$, where $\hat{\beta}_{FE}$ denotes FE estimators for the time-demeaned data in equation 3.2.

3.4 Diagnostic Tests

The researcher performed diagnostic tests to choose the appropriate panel model to adopt during data analysis. These tests guided whether to adopt a pooled regression model, random effects model or the fixed effects model. According to Katchova (2013) the process of deciding on the final preferred model will require two diagnostic tests, that is Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test and Hausman test.

The Breusch and Pagan LM test helped to decide between pooled OLS and random effects model, while the Hausman specification test was useful in deciding between random and fixed effects models. In the event that Breusch and Pagan LM rejected the random effects model, then the wald test would be used to decide between pooled OLS and fixed effects model. Scholars like Okello, Kasharu and Ocaya(2015) also applied econometric techniques for panel estimation in sequence from the Pooled Regression model to the differentiation in choice between the Fixed Effect Model and Random Effects Model.

3.4.1 Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test

Breusch and Pagan(1980 as cited in Katchova ,2013) developed a Lagrange multiplier test based on the pooled OLS residuals under the following hypothesis.

$$H_0: \sigma_u^2 = 0 \text{ [or } \text{Corr}(w_{it}, w_{is}) = 0]$$

$$H_0: \sigma_u^2 \neq 0 \text{ [or } \text{Corr}(w_{it}, w_{is}) \neq 0]$$

The test statistics is given by

$$LM = \frac{nT}{2(T-1)} \left[\frac{T^2 \bar{e}' \bar{e}}{e'e} - 1 \right] \sim \chi^2(1) \dots\dots\dots 3.7$$

or alternatively as

$$LM = \frac{nT}{2(T-1)} \left[\frac{e' D D' \bar{e}}{e'e} - 1 \right] \sim \chi^2(1) \dots\dots\dots 3.8$$

Where $\bar{e}$ is the unit means of least squares residuals, $e'e$ is the residual sum of squares (RSS) and D a matrix of dummy variables D_i .

The null hypothesis is that the variance across units is zero implying that we can pool all the cross-sectional and time series data. If the LM statistic is significant, we reject the null hypothesis that the variances across units are zeros and so the random effects model will be the appropriate model.

3.4.2 Hausman Specification Test

The Hausman test is a common specification test in panel data analysis and was used to select between the fixed and the random effects model. Katchova (2013) and Lambert(2013) elaborate on the Hausman test which utilizes the definition of the fixed or random effect model as the correlation of the individual effect term with the regressors. In other words, it is used to test the orthogonality of individual effects and the regressors. In REM individual effects and regressors are orthogonal, while in FEM they are correlated. If the individual effects and the regressors are not orthogonal, the FEM is consistent while REM is inconsistent. However if the individual effects and the regressors are orthogonal then FEM estimator is consistent, but inefficient. In this case the RE estimator is consistent and efficient. The test is based on the following hypothesis;

Ho: $\text{Cov}(u_i, X_{it}) = 0$ [random effects]

Hi: $\text{Cov}(u_i, X_{it}) \neq 0$ [fixed effects]

The test of null hypothesis of orthogonality is to consider the difference between the two estimators, that is $(\beta_{FE} - \beta_{RE})$. If the individual effects are uncorrelated with the regressors, then this difference should be near zero (Hausman, 1978). The variance of this difference vector is given by

$$\text{Var}(\beta_{FE} - \beta_{RE}) = \text{Var}(\beta_{FE}) - \text{Var}(\beta_{RE}) = \Psi$$

The chi-squared test based on wald criterion is:

$$H = (\beta_{FE} - \beta_{RE})' \Psi^{-1} (\beta_{FE} - \beta_{RE})$$

Under the Null hypothesis, H is distributed as X^2 with K-1 degrees of freedom, where K is the number of independent variables. If the test statistic exceeds the critical value at the chosen level of significance, then the null hypothesis is rejected and the individual effects appear to be correlated with the regressors and the fixed effect model is the right choice based on this test. Otherwise the random effect model is the right choice.

CHAPTER FOUR: PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS.

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents findings on how interventions in USE programme particularly PPPs have affected the level of access and quality of lower secondary education in the country. During USE programme implementation, government remitted school capitation grants while school owners provided necessary school learning environment like teachers and facilities such as classrooms, laboratories and toilets. The research findings show how school teachers, school ownership, capitation grants and facilities like classrooms, laboratories, latrine stances affected enrolments and students achievement in UCE examinations. The chapter first presents descriptive statistics for panel variables, results of diagnostic tests for model specification and thereafter focuses on findings and discussion of results of the adopted model for all USE schools (government and private) and another for PPP schools.

4.2 Descriptive statistics for Estimators

In this section, a summary description of variables or estimators used in fitting the panel models is provided. In this research, the panel variable is the school represented by the UNEB center number (unebcno) as unique school identifier. The variable year represents the four time periods in the consolidated panel dataset. These were 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016. The minimum and maximum value for this variable is 1 and 4 respectively. The ‘unebcno’ and ‘year’ (unebcno * year) uniquely identifies each observation. The panel is balanced with a total observation of 1,600 schools where each year reports on the same 400 schools. Table 4.1 shows the overall mean and variation in research variables, and how they behave in each of the four years.


Table 4.1: Descriptive summary statistics for the study variables

Year	Variables	pi1	schenrlt	es4t	candidates	Ttrst	Sctt	Capththus	Latttotal	Labtotal	Clsttotal
2010	Mean	35.4	538.0	104.9	109.1	21.1	7.0	57510.5	3.5	1.2	8.3
	Min	0.0	34.0	0.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	2460.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Max	78.1	3507.0	354.0	355.0	74.0	44.0	242520.0	30.0	11.0	33.0
	Std. Dev	9.1	364.4	69.0	64.4	10.9	8.5	36657.7	2.9	1.2	4.2
2012	Mean	36.2	613.2	106.5	107.1	26.4	9.7	67794.5	2.8	1.8	7.6
	Min	20.6	60.0	0.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	4674.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Max	87.2	2932.0	526.0	436.0	74.0	59.0	343899.0	18.0	11.0	57.0
	Std. Dev	8.9	380.9	67.6	64.9	14.0	6.5	42941.2	2.4	1.6	6.0
2014	Mean	35.3	640.0	126.6	121.4	17.2	10.4	72370.0	4.1	1.6	10.5
	Min	17.9	51.0	0.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	6273.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Max	84.4	2664.0	508.0	499.0	88.0	53.0	326073.0	34.0	11.0	44.0
	Std. Dev	10.4	389.4	78.4	72.8	14.9	9.1	44315.2	3.2	1.2	5.3
2016	Mean	31.5	684.6	129.1	119.4	26.3	9.9	78516.3	14.9	0.8	10.8
	Min	0.0	78.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	5043.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Max	83.2	3149.0	499.0	499.0	93.0	42.0	330624.0	81.0	13.0	47.0
	Std. Dev	10.9	441.8	78.1	72.6	13.9	6.2	50577.1	9.2	0.9	5.5
Total	Mean	34.6	619.0	116.8	114.2	22.7	9.2	69047.8	6.3	1.4	9.3
	Min	0.0	34.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	2460.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Max	87.2	3507.0	526.0	499.0	93.0	59.0	343899.0	81.0	13.0	57.0
	Std. Dev	10.0	398.4	74.2	69.0	14.0	7.8	44527.2	7.2	1.3	5.5

Source: Computed by Author

The performance index (pi1) is an index depicting the quality of passing exhibited by students who sat for UCE examinations. The higher the index, the better the quality of scores in UCE. The overall mean for this indicator was 34.6 although it ranges from 0 to 87.2 across the years. The lowest average performance index was registered at 31.5 in 2016 compared to the highest 36.2 performance achievement in 2012. The low performance index implies that many candidates who sat for UCE exams scored low grades. This can be observed in Figure 4.1 showing overall averages and standard deviation for the different average school level divisions (grades) attained by students.


Figure 4.1 : Average school level UCE Performance



It can be observed that majority of candidates were in division four, division 3 and division U. Estimated average of 25 students per school across the study period were ungraded and couldn't progress to the next level of education. Those who passed UCE scored poorly resulting in average school level achievement of 64 and 25 students getting division 4 and division 3 respectively. Only 5 and 13 students per school on average passed in division 1 and division 2 respectively.

From figure 4.2, we observe a normal distribution of the performance index across schools during the study period. This is good characteristics for this variable since it is one of the dependent variables.


Figure 4.2: Distribution for UCE performance index



School enrolment

The overall average enrolment per school was 619 students but school enrolment range from 34 to 3507 students. The variation in enrolment from one school to another was twice the variation observed in one school across the years. This implies that much of the change in enrolment is between different schools across the study period. A similar pattern is observed for the USE eligible students (usettt), USE eligible students in senior four(es4t) and UCE registered candidates(candidates). The USE programme on average supported 116 senior four students per school compared to 114 candidates registered for UCE. This shows consistence between USE programme information from MoES and UCE data from UNEB. Figure 4.3 shows that the distribution for school level enrolment is normally distributed and this characteristic qualifies the variable suitable for further regression analysis.

Figure 4.3: Distribution of Performance Index



Teachers

The average number of teachers per school was 23 with standard deviation of 14. Some schools had as high as 93 teachers. The variation in teachers between schools and within school was approximately the same. We notice negative values for the minimum levels under within estimates like -27.8 for teachers. This is due to the fact that the within variation refers to the deviation from each individual's school average ($x_{it} - \bar{x}_i$) and some of the deviations will be negative.

Science teachers are expected to play an important role in the learning process for science related subjects. Schools had overall average of 9 science teachers although some schools reported up to a maximum of 59 school teachers.

Capitation grants

During the implementation phase of USE programme, government committed to remit capitation grants to both government aided schools and private schools participating in the USE programme across the country. Table 4.1 shows that overall average capitation grants from government were shilling 69,047,800 across schools and years 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016. This ranged from a minimum of UGX 2,460,000 per school to a maximum of UGX 343,899,000. There is much variation in capitation grants from one school to another, compared to variation within one school across the years. Table 4.2 shows the annual budget figures for capitation grants meant for government aided schools and private schools participating in USE programme. For the sampled schools, capitation grants increased by 36.5% from UGX 22.9 Bn in 2010 to 31.3 Bn in 2016 implying significant investment in the programme.


Table 4.3: Indicative Budget for USE capitation grants

Year	Government aided	Private Partnership	Total
2010	13,392,363	9,593,781	22,986,144
2012	14,426,670	12,691,128	27,117,798
2014	14,983,368	13,964,640	28,948,008
2016	15,650,028	15,730,665	31,380,693

Sources: computed by researcher

As can be observed from Figure 4.4, the percentage share of Capitation grants meant for private schools increased from 42% in 2010 to 50% in 2016. Similarly the corresponding share of capitation grants meant for sampled government aided schools reduced by 8 percentage points in the same period. By 2016 both government aided schools and private schools under the ppp arrangement had the same percentage share of the Budget for capitation grants.

Figure 4.4: Share of capitation grants



School Facilities

This research included school facilities like classrooms, laboratories and latrine stances as part of the variables influencing the quality and access to lower secondary education.

From table 4.1, the overall average number of classrooms was 9.3 across schools and years. However the available classrooms at school level range from 0 to 57 classrooms. The variation in classrooms between schools is close to observed variation in classrooms within a school across the years studied.

In the case of laboratories, sampled schools across years had overall average of 1.4 but these ranged from 0 to 13 laboratories for some schools. The variation in laboratories between schools is not so different from within school variations. The pattern for number of latrine stances is however different. Sampled schools reported an overall average of 6.3 latrine stances. For this variable, the variation within schools is twice the variation observed between schools.


4.3 Bivariate analysis

Scatter diagram and regression analysis were used to establish the nature of relationship between enrolment and each predictor at a time. The following independent variables were significant and were therefore put into the final panel model; capitation grants (Incaptg),

science teachers(sctt), classrooms(clstotal), laboratories(labtotal), latrine stances(lattotal) and total teachers(ttrst).


Figure 4.5 is a scatter diagram depicting a positive relationship between students enrolled in schools and corresponding indicative budget for capitation grants.

Figure 4.5: Scatter diagram for school enrolment and capitation grants




For the performance index (pi1), the second independent variable in this research, the variables lncaptg, sctt, clstotal, labtotal, lattotal and ttrst when regressed with pi1 one at a time had significant positive relationship. Figure 4.6 below shows the graphical positive relationship between the quality of performance in UCE examination and the available laboratories in schools.

Figure 4.6: Scatter diagram for performance index and laboratories



Similarly figure 4.7 below shows a positive relationship between the quality of performance in UCE examination and the available number of science teachers in schools.

Figure 4.7: Scatter diagram for performance index and science teachers



4.4 Model determination

This section shows the diagnostic tests done so as to determine the final panel model specification for the study. The tests were meant to help the researcher decide whether the study adopts pooled OLS, random effect or the fixed effects or alternative hybrid model. The two diagnostic tests used to

decide the choice of model to fit were Breusch-pagan Lagrangian multiplier and the hausman tests respectively. Table 4.4 summarizes the results of the different diagnostic.

Table 4.4: Results of Diagnostic tests

Case	Independent variable	Random Effect or pooled OLS	Random or Fixed effects	Preferred model
		(Breusch-pagan LM test)	(Hausman test)	
1	Perfomance index :pi1	Ho is rejected at p = 0.000 (random effect present).	Ho is rejected at p=0.000 (use fixed effects)	Fixed effects model
2	School Enrolment: schenrlt	Ho is rejected at p=0.000 (random effect present)	Ho is rejected at p=0.000(use fixed effects)	Fixed effects model

Source: computed by researcher

From the table 4.4 above, the Breush –pagan LM tests for the random effect based on the OLS residuals. It tests whether the variance of the error term : $\sigma_u^2 = 0$ or equivalently the correlation of the error terms over time [$\text{corr}(u_{it}, u_{is})$] is significantly different from zero. In both cases the breush – pagan test is significant and the use of RE model is suitable instead of OLS.

The RE estimator is more efficient and can be used if the hausman test supports it. If it doesn't support it then we use the FE model. The hausman test tests whether there is a significant difference between the FE and RE estimators. The test is computed on only time varying regressors. If the Hausman test is significant then we use FE, otherwise RE model is used.

In both case as indicated in table 4.4 above, the Hausman test is significant and the best model to use is the FE model. The challenge with this conclusion is that our study contains time invariant variables like school ownership which the fixed effects model drops. The researcher therefore adopted the correlated random effects(CRE) model which is the adjusted RE since means of the regressors are introduced to enable estimation of time invariant variables(Woodridge, 2012 pp 497). It is argued that estimates of time varying estimators for FE and correlated RE models are consistent but in addition the CRE gives estimates of time invariant variables. In other words the equivalence of the CRE in 4.1 and FE estimates of β

provides a nice interpretation of FE for it controls for the average level of $\bar{x}_i$ when measuring the partial effect of x_{it} on y_{it} .

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \beta x_{it} + \gamma \bar{x}_i + r_i + \eta_{it} \dots\dots\dots(4.1)$$

4.4. Findings on Effects of ppps on performance of universal secondary education programme in Uganda

This section presents research detailed findings and discusses the results for each research objective. The results of analysis are summarized in two tables 4.5 and table 4.6. Table 4.5 summarizes findings of the estimated effects of USE interventions (government financing, school environment, and school ownership) on performance of USE programme (enrolment). This table has results of the CRE model for all sampled schools, that is, both private and government aided (M1) on one hand and CRE model for only PPP schools (M2). Results indicate that for government and ppp schools, overall R-squared for correlated random estimators in M1 explain 78.6% of the variations in school enrolment. R^2 (Within schools) shows that the model accounts for 49.7% of the enrollment variation within schools across the four years while R^2 (between schools) means the model could explain 84.4% of the variations in enrolment between schools across the study period. The unexplained variation in school enrolment by the model is due to individual school specific terms (Rho =47.8%) and the rest due to idiosyncratic error. The above statistics did not significantly differ from results of the CRE Model (M2) for PPP schools only.

Table 4.5: Effect of USE interventions on school enrolment

Variable	Response categories	Correlated random effects (CRE)Model for All USE Schools(M1)		CRE Model for PPP schools only(M2)	
		Coef.	P - value	Coef.	P - value
Dependent: schenrlt (school enrolment)					
Number of teachers	Ttrst	1.7704*	0.000	2.1686*	0.002
Log capitation-grants	Lncaptg	380.723*	0.000	304.268*	0.000
Classrooms	Clstotal	4.5033*	0.001	7.425*	0.003
Laboratories	Labtotal	11.628*	0.001	12.239	0.101
Latrine-stances	Lattotal	1.369*	0.026	2.1291	0.092
Location	Urban				
	Rural	-100.881	0.120	9.3453	0.937
Ownership	Government aided			n/a	n/a
	Private partnership	911.117 *	0.007	n/a	n/a
Ownership*Lncaptg	Government aided			n/a	n/a
	Private partnership	-51.576*	0.007	n/a	n/a
Ownership*clstotal	Government aided				
	Private partnership	4.207*	0.042	n/a	n/a
Mean of predictors	Mttrst	4.193*	0.000	5.3012*	0.002
	Mlncaptg	32.559	0.139	95.878*	0.004
	Mclstotal	13.343*	0.000	13.797*	0.013
	Mlabtotal	-16.519	0.105	-35.955	0.082
	Mlattotal	-2.598	0.380	-5.0346	0.389
	Mlocation	85.406	0.205	-38.595	0.748
Constant		-7048.327*	0.000	-6804.2*	0.000
	R ²	0.786		0.7542	
	R ² – Within	0.497		0.4403	
	R ² – Between	0.844		0.8424	
	Sigma u(α)	127.071		122.067	
	Sigma e	132.615		165.770	
	Rho	0.478		0.352	

Source: computed by researcher

Results of the study summarized in table 4.6, indicate the effects of capitation grants, school learning environment and school ownership on performance of USE (performance index).

From table 4.6, estimators in model 3 or M3 (for both government and private schools) explain 36.6 %(overall R-squared) of the variations in UCE performance index, while R² (Within schools) shows that the model accounts for 13.5% of the variation in performance within schools across the four years. R² (between schools) means the model could explain 42.9% of the variations in performance between schools across the study period. On the

other hand, model 4 or M4 (for PPP schools) explain 23.6%(overall R-squared) of the variations in UCE performance index, while R^2 (Within school) show that the model accounts for 15.8% of the variation in performance within ppp schools across the four years. R^2 (between schools) means the model could explain 28.2% of the variations in performance between ppp schools across the study period.

Table 4.6: Effect of capitation grant and school resources on UCE performance index

Variable	Response category	Correlated random effects model for all USE schools(3)		Random effects model for PPP schools only(4)	
		Coef.	P - value	Coef.	P - value
Independent variable: Performance index (pi1)					
Science teachers	Sctt	0.0615*	0.041	0.1182*	0.019
Log capitation-grants	Lncaptg	-0.5550	0.435	-0.2668	0.619
Classrooms	Clstotal	0.0024	0.96	-0.0162	0.820
Laboratories	Labtotal	0.2643	0.123	-0.1152	0.594
Latrine-stances	Lattotal	0.0890*	0.006	0.1177*	0.033
Location	Urban				
	Rural	-5.2066*	0.031	-2.0611*	0.035
Ownership	Government aided			n/a	n/a
	Private partnership	8.8780	0.51	n/a	n/a
Ownership* Lncaptg	Government aided				
	Private partnership	-0.3756	0.621	n/a	n/a
Ownership*labtotal	Government aided			n/a	n/a
	Private partnership	-0.5366*	0.039	n/a	n/a
Mean of predictors	Mscctt	0.5346	0.000	n/a	n/a
	Mlncaptg	1.8971	0.066	n/a	n/a
	Mclstotal	-0.4168	0.003	n/a	n/a
	Mlabtotal	0.4571	0.356	n/a	n/a
	Mlattotal	0.8437	0.000	n/a	n/a
	Mlocation	4.1341	0.113	n/a	n/a
Year	2010				
	2012	0.8554*	0.025	-0.0315	0.963
	2014	-0.1814	0.652	-0.0595	0.922
	2016	-4.7842*	0.000	-5.2461*	0.000
Regions	Northern				
	Busoga	-7.1786*	0.004	-4.2989	0.185
	central	-0.2550	0.864	4.9416*	0.019
	Eastern	-6.0929*	0.000	-0.5296	0.812
	Kampala extra	-0.2616	0.886	7.3945*	0.002
	Mid Eastern	-2.3107	0.197	2.7177	0.292
	Mid Western	0.1601	0.93	5.9147*	0.010

	North Eastern	-3.2722	0.303	0.8385	0.824
	South Eastern	-4.4042*	0.004	-0.3513	0.865
	South Western	0.4990	0.728	3.9196	0.066
	Southern	1.3223	0.394	5.9788*	0.006
	West Nile	-3.7136*	0.051	-2.6512	0.298
Constant		4.8427	0.772	36.4767*	0.000
	R2	0.3666		0.2357	
	R2 – Within	0.1584		0.1345	
	R2 – Between	0.4288		0.2822	
	Sigma u(α)	6.3199		5.1079	
	Sigma e	5.0243		4.8984	
	Rho	0.6127		0.5209	

Source: computed by researcher

4.4.1 Objective one: To examine the effect of government financing(capitation grants) in PPP schools on performance of universal secondary education.

The first objective of this study focused on estimating the effect of capitation grants on enrolments as well as UCE performance index. During implementation of USE programme, government was obliged to remit capitation grants for eligible students in PPP and government aided schools. Specifically, the model for PPP schools (M2) reveals that capitation grants (coefficient of 304.26 and $p=0.000$) have a significant effect on school enrolment. In this case, a one percent increase in capitation grants would increase school enrolment by 304 students in ppp schools.

On the side of performance index, findings in table 4.6 shows that both CRE and RE model failed to detect significance of capitation grants on UCE student performance index.

However there is a negative interaction effect between capitation grants and School ownership(PPP schools) whereby one percent increase in capitation grants would result in fewer students (coefficient of -51.7 and $p=0.007$) enrolled in a PPP school than government aided school by a factor of 51.7 students.

The findings of capitation grants having a positive effect on enrolments in ppp schools are inline MoES(2008); Kombe and Yohana (2013) who argue that a well designed ppp in education provision is a useful tool in increasing general access to secondary education.

Balungi, Wokadala and Kasirye (2015) also affirm that contracting out education services enabled government to quickly expand access without incurring any up-front expenditure on constructing and equipping new schools. They however found governance challenges in PPP schools where school proprietors often hijacked management role and failed to spend the grant as per approved work plans. Such governance and accountability issues were minimized in government aided schools where the board and school management roles are well streamlined. This supports the current study findings where capitation grants for ppp schools had a lower effect on enrolments when compared to government aided schools. This could be the reason why capitation grants did not have a direct effect on UCE performance index in ppp schools.

4.4.2 Objective two: To determine the extent to which learning environment in ppp schools has affected the performance of universal secondary education.

This objective focused on determining whether learning environment in PPP schools has an effect on performance of universal secondary education.

During implementation of USE programme, owners of private schools were expected to provide a good learning environment in their schools, for example recruiting qualified teachers, and providing basic facilities like classrooms, laboratories and toilets.

Findings of the study show that for ppp schools only (Model 2), the number of teachers (coefficient of 2.168 and $p=0.002$) and classrooms (coefficient of 7.425 and $p=0.003$) had a significant effect on enrolments in ppp schools. The findings are consistent with Patrinos, Osorio and Guaqueta (2009) ;World Bank(2015) ; Kombe and Yohana (2013) who assert that well implemented PPPs increase efficiency and choice, and expand access to education services particularly for households that tend to be poorly served by traditional delivery method. A World Bank study conducted by Barrera-Ororio et.al (2016) affirms that PPP program in Uganda helped absorb large number of eligible students in secondary schools.

This study objective also sought to find the effect of learning environment in ppp schools on quality of secondary education. This was done by running the RE model(model 4 in table 4.6) in which ppp school level UCE performance index was the dependent variable while school learning environment variables like number of science teachers, and school facilities like classrooms, laboratories, latrine stances were part of regressor variables in the model.

Findings in this model indicate that science teachers, school location and number of latrine stances have a significant effect on UCE performance index. According to the findings, science teachers in ppp schools have a positive effect (coefficient of 0.1182 and $P=0.019$) on UCE performance index. Secondly ppp schools located in rural areas (coefficient of -2.061 and $P<0.035$) performed poorly compared to those in urban areas by a factor of 2.061. Thirdly the number of latrine stances (coefficient of 0.1177 and $P=0.033$) in ppp schools positively affected students performance in UCE examinations. Results also indicate that performance of students in 2016(coefficient of -5.2461 and $P=0.000$) was lower than what was achieved in 2010 by a factor of 5.246.

The study identifies the importance of science teachers as key predictor of student performance in UCE examinations. This is in line with findings of Odumbe, Simatwa and Ayodo (2015) who found high percentage of trained teachers in day schools as a key factor influencing student performance. Similarly Kathuri (1986 as cited in Odumbe, Simatwa & Ayodo, 2015) found significant positive correlation between performance and teacher qualifications.

4.4.3 Objective three: To examine the effect of school ownership on the performance of universal secondary education.

The third objective of this study was to examine the effect of school ownership on the performance of universal secondary education (enrolment and the performance index).

The categorical variable school ownership [either private (1) or government aided (0)] was the main variable considered whereby government aided response was the reference or base category in comparison to private schools.

Findings in CRE model (M1) shows that school ownership (coeff=911.1 and $p=0.007$) has a significant effect on school enrollments. In other words, the difference between enrolment of a ppp school and government aided school was 911 which imply that PPP schools enrolled more 911 students than government aided schools. Research findings (model 1) also reveal that there is a positive interaction effect between number of classrooms and school ownership(ppp schools) in USE programme. A unit increase in classrooms would lead to more enrolment in a PPP school than government aided school by a factor of 4.2 students ($p=0.042$). It can be argued that such facilities greatly influenced student enrolments in private schools. These findings collaborate with findings in the second objective of this study where school environment increased access to secondary education in ppp schools. Other research findings by Patrinos, Osorio and Guaqueta (2009) ; World Bank(2015) ; Kombe and Yohana (2013) affirm that well implemented PPPs increase efficiency and choice, and expand access to education services particularly for households that tend to be poorly served by traditional delivery method.

There is also a negative interaction effect between capitation grants and school ownership (ppp schools) whereby one percent increase in capitation grants would result in fewer students (coefficient of -51.7 and $p=0.007$) enrolled in a PPP school than government aided school by a factor of 51.7 students.

Lastly, there was a negative interaction effect between number of laboratories and school ownership (coefficient of -0.537 and $P=0.039$) implying that a government aided school performed better than a PPP by a factor of 0.537 in UCE performance index on account of school laboratories. This implies lack of emphasis on sciences and absence of well equipped science laboratories in most PPP schools compared to government aided schools. This is

consistent with Brans(2011) who found that PPP schools focused on utilizing the minimum resources to get highest output and never invested in science-subjects which were more expensive resulting in a bias for teaching more arts subjects. He also found that late payment of the capitation grants by government produced even more incentives for the private schools to spend less on teachers and science materials. UNEB(2010, cited in Brans 2011) also confirms more poor performance of sciences in PPP schools than in government aided schools due to lack of school teachers, laboratory equipment and necessary student exposure to practical science teaching. As highlighted in the both model 1 and 2, schools in rural areas performed worse than those located in urban areas. This is in line with UNEB(2016) report in which performance in sciences continue to decline since majority of the candidates never reach the minimum competency level. Secondly there is acute shortage of science teachers especially in rural areas. Other scholars like Urwick and Kisa (2013) argue that a combination of shortage of science teachers and of low pay creates a situation where their scarcity value may be exploited through supplementary employment which lowers their availability for students resulting in poor learning outcomes.

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a summary of findings of the study, conclusions, recommendations and suggested areas for further research based on the findings.

5.2 Summary of the findings

The objective of the study was to assess the effect of public-private partnerships on performance of universal secondary education programme in Uganda. The scope of the study focused on programme interventions like capitation grants remitted to schools, and learning environment in ppp schools (teachers, and facilities like classrooms, laboratories or latrine stances) and school ownership. Performance of USE was measured in form of school enrolments (access) and school UCE performance index (quality).

Diagnostic tests using the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test and hausman tests recommended the fixed effects model, however the correlated random effects (CRE) model was finally adopted to account for important time invariant variables in the study. The CRE model was applied on a balanced panel of 400 schools (219 government aided and 181 ppp schools) tracked for the years 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016. A second CRE model was exclusively run for 181 PPP schools only for the same period to assess the effect of capitation grants and school learning environment on enrolments.

The study specifically sought to establish whether government capitation grants for ppp schools affected enrollments as a measure of access to secondary education. According to the findings, increasing capitation grants for ppp schools by one percent would increase enrolment by 304.26 students ($p=0.000$). Secondly, research findings reveal a negative interactions effect of capitation grants for ppp schools whereby any one percent increase in

their capitation grants would yield fewer students enrolled in a ppp school than government aided school by a factor of -51.7 students($p=0.007$).

The study also sought to examine the effect of learning environment in ppp schools (teachers and facilities like classrooms, laboratories and latrine stances) on enrolments. Findings of the study show that for ppp schools, the number of teachers (coefficient of 2.168 and $p=0.002$) and classrooms (coefficient of 7.425 and $p=0.003$) had a significant effect on enrolments. In terms of school ownership, findings revealed presence of a positive interaction effect between number of classrooms and school ownership (ppp schools) in USE programme. A unit increase in classrooms would lead to more enrolment in a ppp school than government aided school by a factor of 4.2 students ($p=0.042$). Further analysis of enrolment in USE programme show that ppp schools enrolled more students than government aided schools by a factor of 911 students ($p=0.007$).

For the above findings, estimators in the CRE model for ppp schools explained 75.2%(overall R-squared) of the variation in enrolment while estimators of the CRE model for both ppp and government aided accounted for 78.6%(overall R-squared) of the variation in student enrolment.

The RE model was also used to examine the effect of ppp school learning environment on UCE school performance index as proxy indicator for quality of lower secondary education. Findings reveal that science teachers (coefficient 0.1182 and $P=0.019$), school location (coefficient of -2.061 and $P=0.035$) and number of latrine stances (coefficient of 0.1177 and $P=0.033$) have a significant effect on UCE performance index. PPP schools in rural areas performed poorly compared to urban schools. In addition the performance of students in 2016(coefficient of -5.2462 and $P=0.000$) was worse when compared to performance of 2010. Findings indicate that performance index of a ppp school was lower than performance in a government aided school by a factor of -0.537($p=0.039$) on account of inadequate school

laboratories. The RE (ppp schools only) and CRE (both ppp and government aided schools) estimators respectively explained 23.6% and 36.6 % of the variations in UCE performance index. For both models, over 60% of unexplained variation in performance was due to individual school specific effect and idiosyncratic error.

5.3 Conclusions

This study shows how government financing (capitation grants), learning environment and school ownership affected USE programme in areas of access and quality of secondary education. The following hypotheses on access to secondary education were supported; First, capitation grants to ppp schools have a significant effect on access to secondary education. Secondly, capitation grants remitted to schools have less effect on access in ppp schools than in government aided schools. Thirdly, ppp school facilities like classrooms and laboratories have a significant effect on access to secondary education. Fourthly, teachers in ppp schools have a positive effect of access to secondary education. Fifth, PPPs or privately owned schools provided more access to secondary education than non-ppp(government aided) schools in USE programme.

Regarding the effect of capitation grants and ppp school learning environment on the quality of secondary education, the following hypotheses were supported; First, ppp school facilities like classrooms or laboratories had no significant effect on quality of education provided. However sanitation facilities like number latrine stances in schools had a positive significant effect on student performance.

Secondly, science teachers in ppp schools have a positive significant effect on student performance in UCE exams. Thirdly, the number of science labs in private schools led to lower student performance index for ppp school compared to government ones in USE programme. Fourthly, capitation grants remitted to ppp schools have no significant effect on the quality of secondary education offered.

5.4 Recommendations

In light of the study findings, central government should formulate a supporting policy framework of training, recruiting and sustaining science teachers in secondary schools irrespective of school ownership. In addition to recruiting and paying teachers' salaries in Government aided schools, government should consider subsidizing wage bill for science teachers in deserving private schools mainly in rural areas. Secondly, the Ministry of education and sports should mainstream, strengthen and expand programme for in-service training of science and mathematics teachers to cover supply of science kits, and laboratory chemicals and equipment at subsidized prices through tax waivers particularly for private rural schools. Finally, in light of the recent policy reversal of terminating PPPs from USE, government should reconsider grant aiding deserving private rural schools so as to sustain gains registered in accessibility to lower secondary education over the past years.

5.5 Areas for Further research

1. Research can be conducted at school level to further understand the factors affecting the quality of student achievements in UCE exams. The model used in this study indicates that 61.3% of the unexplained variation in performance was due to individual school specific effects.
2. Future research can be conducted to assess how the new government policy reversal of financing PPP schools in USE programme will affect access to lower secondary education.

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List of Sampled PPP and Government Aided Secondary Schools in USE

S/no	Region	District	School	Ownership	Year	St	Clr	Labs	Sct	P.1
1	NORTHERN	KITGUM	KITGUM HIGH SCHOOL	GOVERNMENT	2010	1034	20	10	31	59.5
2	NORTHERN	LIRA	COMBONI COLLEGE	GOVERNMENT	2010	1137	15	30	37	69.1
3	NORTHERN	GULU	SACRED HEART SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	430	16	5	38	71.7
4	NORTHERN KAMPALA	GULU	GULU HS	GOVERNMENT	2010	1002	15	9	34	55.7
5	EXTRA	KAMPALA	KOLOLO SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	2369	33	2	44	46.7
6	NORTHERN MID	LIRA	LANGO COLLEGE	GOVERNMENT	2010	737	20	5	40	61.9
7	EASTERN	KUMI	NGORA GIRLS' S.S DR OBOTE COLLEGE	GOVERNMENT	2010	447	10	2	9	72.9
8	NORTHERN MID	LIRA	BOROBORO ST. ELIZABETH'S	GOVERNMENT	2010	905	16	10	37	78.1
9	EASTERN	SOROTI	S.S.S KIDETOK ST CHARLES	GOVERNMENT	2010	524	10	3	21	38.7
10	NORTHERN KAMPALA	PADER	LWANGA AGGREY MEMORIAL	GOVERNMENT	2010	686	10	6	24	43.4
11	EXTRA	WAKISO	SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	511	3	3	23	36.5
12	CENTRAL	MUKONO	KASAWO S.S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	888	12	3	33	54.8
13	WEST NILE	YUMBE	YUMBE S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	603	9	5	15	37.0
14	WEST NILE SOUTH	ADJUMANI	ADJUMANI S.S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	390	12	7	20	32.0
15	WESTERN MID	KABALE	KIHANGA S S	GOVERNMENT	2010	551	12	5	13	30.9
16	EASTERN	KATAKWI	TOROMA S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	608	6	2	6	35.9
17	EASTERN	SIRONKO	BULAAGO SSS	GOVERNMENT	2010	286	7	2	6	18.0
18	EASTERN MID	BUTALEJA	MUGULU HS	GOVERNMENT	2010	315	8	3	3	30.6
19	EASTERN SOUTH	KUMI	WIGGINS S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	1181	15	6	28	34.0
20	EASTERN SOUTH	IGANGA	BUSEMBATIA S S NKUUTU	GOVERNMENT	2010	748	10	1	16	25.3
21	EASTERN SOUTH	IGANGA	MEMORIAL SCHOOL ST AGATHA'S S S	GOVERNMENT	2010	1661	20	5	32	30.7
22	WESTERN	KABALE	KAKORE PILKINGTON COLLEGE	GOVERNMENT	2010	313	8	3	10	46.6
23	SOUTH EASTERN	JINJA	MUGULUKA OMONO MEMORIAL	GOVERNMENT	2010	1031	17	4	23	37.8
24	NORTHERN	GULU	COLLEGE MONSIGNOR BALA	GOVERNMENT	2010	162	8	3	12	24.4
25	WEST NILE	ADJUMANI	S.S ST JOSEPH S.S	PARTNERSHIP	2010	294	3	6	0	34.1
26	SOUTHERN	MITYANA	KAKINDU	GOVERNMENT	2010	762	8	2	16	52.5
27	EASTERN SOUTH	BUDAKA	IKI-IKI S.S KISIKI COLLEGE	GOVERNMENT	2010	963	21	4	5	33.5
28	EASTERN SOUTH	NAMUTUMBA	NAMUTUMBA	GOVERNMENT	2010	1391	16	9	30	34.4
29	WESTERN	NTUNGAMO	RUKONI SSS	GOVERNMENT	2010	454	8	5	2	38.6
30	NORTHERN	APAC	IKWERA GIRLS S.S ARCH-JANANI LUWUMU MEM.	GOVERNMENT	2010	312	12	2	11	50.0
31	NORTHERN	KITGUM	SCHOOL	GOVERNMENT	2010	219	8	5	0	26.6
32	WEST NILE	NEBBI	ERUSSI SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	693	12	12	3	36.3
33	SOUTHERN MID	MASAKA	NAKATEETE S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	611	10	3	10	37.3
34	WESTERN SOUTH	MASINDI	IKOBA GIRLS S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	382	8	2	7	37.0
35	WESTERN	MBARARA	RUTOOMA SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	785	13	5	13	39.4
36	CENTRAL MID	MUKONO	KOJJA S.S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	638	12	2	20	36.5
37	WESTERN	KIBAALE	BUYANJA SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	486	9	2	16	33.0
38	EASTERN	PALLISA	KIBUKU SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	384	13	13	14	33.6

39	MID EASTERN SOUTH	KABERAMAIDO	KALAKI SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	1213	8	4	7	31.1
40	EASTERN	IGANGA	KIYUNGA S S	GOVERNMENT	2010	903	15	3	11	31.0
41	EASTERN	MBALE	BUSIU SEC.SCH.	GOVERNMENT	2010	853	11	2	13	28.7
42	CENTRAL SOUTH	MPIGI	KASAKA S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	491	8	2	11	31.7
43	WESTERN	KIRUHURA	KAZO S S S	GOVERNMENT	2010	860	15	9	15	35.9
44	EASTERN	MANAFWA	MAGALE S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	714	13	4	12	32.1
45	CENTRAL	LUWEERO	MPIGI SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	492	7	3	9	25.3
46	CENTRAL	MUKONO	BUVUMA COLLEGE	GOVERNMENT	2010	97	4	2	2	23.1
47	EASTERN	TORORO	ASINGE SSS PADIBE	GOVERNMENT	2010	852	4	2	10	30.5
48	NORTHERN MID	KITGUM	SECONDARY	GOVERNMENT	2010	393	10	3	10	33.6
49	EASTERN	SOROTI	KAMOD S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	428	8	4	14	26.3
50	EASTERN SOUTH	MANAFWA	BUBULO S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	1193	14	8	26	34.3
51	WESTERN SOUTH	KISORO	IRYARUVUMBA H.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	439	13	10	9	27.1
52	WESTERN SOUTH	KABALE	BURANGA SS KAMUGANGUZI	GOVERNMENT	2010	714	12	4	20	33.2
53	WESTERN SOUTH	KABALE	JANAN LUWUM KIHIFI HIGH	GOVERNMENT	2010	328	7	2	12	34.4
54	WESTERN	KANUNGU	SCHOOL	GOVERNMENT	2010	923	11	3	7	35.5
55	EASTERN	SIRONKO	BUDADIRI GIRLS SS ABUDALA ANYURU	GOVERNMENT	2010	303	7	1	8	32.4
56	NORTHERN	OYAM	MEM	GOVERNMENT	2010	203	4	2	14	28.4
57	NORTHERN	DOKOLO	AGWATA SS ST THOMAS MORE	GOVERNMENT	2010	304	8	4	15	43.6
58	NORTHERN	GULU	SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	132	6	4	7	38.2
59	EASTERN SOUTH	BUSIA	LUMINO H.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	1470	15	5	13	36.1
60	WESTERN	RUKUNGIRI	NYABITEETE S.S KIBUUKA	GOVERNMENT	2010	573	12	4	4	40.1
61	CENTRAL	MPIGI	MEMORIAL S.S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	571	10	3	22	35.8
62	CENTRAL	MPIGI	KITAGOBWA S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	537	9	4	10	34.1
63	SOUTHERN KAMPALA	MUBENDE	KASENYI SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	1463	16	2	23	42.4
64	EXTRA	KAMPALA	LUZIRA SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	1638	15	2	28	46.5
65	NORTHERN SOUTH	GULU	OPIT SSS	GOVERNMENT	2010	309	5	3	8	37.3
66	WESTERN SOUTH	BUSHENYI	MAHUNGYE S.S RWANTSINGA HIGH	GOVERNMENT	2010	500	8	2	7	46.1
67	WESTERN	MBARARA	SCHOOL SIR APOLLO	GOVERNMENT	2010	280	7	2	12	39.0
68	CENTRAL MID	MUKONO	KAGGWA S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	375	6	3	9	32.4
69	EASTERN	KATAKWI	USUK S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	466	10	4	11	47.0
70	SOUTHERN MID	MASAKA	KIJJABWEMI S.S ORUNGO HIGH	GOVERNMENT	2010	1622	20	3	26	39.8
71	EASTERN KAMPALA	AMURIA	SCHOOL	GOVERNMENT	2010	601	4	4	12	34.9
72	EXTRA SOUTH	KAMPALA	KITEBI S.S ST. JOHN'S	GOVERNMENT	2010	1216	17	1	4	49.4
73	WESTERN	BUSHENYI	NYABWINA	GOVERNMENT	2010	876	13	5	10	57.8
74	NORTHERN SOUTH	AMURU	KOCH GOMA SS ST GERALDS	GOVERNMENT	2010	849	16	4	16	37.6
75	WESTERN SOUTH	RUKUNGIRI	NYAKIBALE KASHENSHERO	GOVERNMENT	2010	1222	13	4	20	52.1
76	WESTERN SOUTH	BUSHENYI	GIRLS S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	676	10	3	4	46.7
77	WESTERN MID	BUSHENYI	BUTSIBO S.S ST ALBERT SSS	GOVERNMENT	2010	861	13	6	18	45.7
78	WESTERN KAMPALA	KIBAALE	KAKINDO ST DENIS	GOVERNMENT	2010	357	3	2	7	37.3
79	EXTRA	KAMPALA	SSEBUGWAWO SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	733	9	2	17	44.8

GGABA

80	EASTERN	MANAFWA	BUMBO S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	1353	12	5	16	33.3
81	CENTRAL KAMPALA EXTRA	MUKONO	NAKANYONYI S.S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	620	9	2	21	43.8
82		WAKISO	KITENDE SSS ST JOSEPH'S SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	988	15	4	25	59.2
83	CENTRAL	KIBOGA	VVUMBA	GOVERNMENT	2010	298	9	1	7	33.0
84	CENTRAL SOUTH	KAYUNGA	NDEEBA S.S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	511	12	4	21	34.1
85	WESTERN	RUKUNGIRI	KATURIKA S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	578	11	3	9	35.8
86	EASTERN	PALLISA	KAMUGE HS	GOVERNMENT	2010	585	7	3	14	28.2
87	CENTRAL	LUWEERO	WAKATAYI SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	643	10	2	16	29.6
88	EASTERN SOUTH	MBALE	BUKONDE SEC. SCH. SAN GIOVANNI	GOVERNMENT	2010	389	8	2	6	25.6
89	WESTERN SOUTH	KANUNGU	SCHOOL MAKIRO	GOVERNMENT	2010	940	13	3	11	55.8
90	WESTERN SOUTH	ISINGIRO	NGARAMA S.S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	951	14	3	12	37.2
91	EASTERN	IGANGA	BUSIIRO S S S ST PETERS	GOVERNMENT	2010	642	8	5	0	23.1
92	CENTRAL SOUTH	MUKONO	NKOKONJERU ST FRANCIS	GOVERNMENT	2010	653	10	2	9	48.4
93	WESTERN SOUTH	RUKUNGIRI	BUHUNGA H.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	798	10	9	8	33.8
94	WESTERN SOUTH	KANUNGU	NYAMIYAGA SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	260	4	3	4	31.0
95	WESTERN SOUTH	RUKUNGIRI	NYAKAGYEME S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	535	8	2	9	36.8
96	WESTERN SOUTH	MBARARA	MWIZI SSS	GOVERNMENT	2010	395	8	4	5	26.0
97	WESTERN NORTH	BUSHENYI	KIRUGU S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	444	9	2	4	30.1
98	EASTERN SOUTH	ABIM	ABIM S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	1057	12	18	14	41.8
99	WESTERN	NTUNGAMO	RUHAAMA SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	396	8	3	8	52.2
100	EASTERN	TORORO	ATIRI SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	757	9	5	10	29.1
101	EASTERN	TORORO	RUBONGI SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	499	4	3	15	37.6
102	EASTERN	PALLISA	KABWANGASI SS MASABA COLLEGE	GOVERNMENT	2010	848	11	7	11	26.8
103	EASTERN SOUTH	BUSIA	BUSIA ST JEROME S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	1200	14	5	14	28.8
104	WESTERN	RUKUNGIRI	NDAMA	GOVERNMENT	2010	655	8	3	8	47.6
105	EASTERN SOUTH	BUTALEJA	MULAGI GIRLS SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	403	8	2	8	56.3
106	EASTERN SOUTH	KAMULI	BALAWOLI SS NKONO MEMORIAL	GOVERNMENT	2010	997	7	2	11	28.3
107	EASTERN	NAMUTUMBA	S.S	PARTNERSHIP	2010	225	4	1	0	11.1
108	WEST NILE	NEBBI	ALUKA SSS	GOVERNMENT	2010	307	8	2	10	37.7
109	WEST NILE	NEBBI	WADELAI SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	296	4	2	0	27.5
110	WEST NILE	NEBBI	KOCH AWINGA S.S ST CHARLES	PARTNERSHIP	2010	332	8	9	0	26.0
111	SOUTH WESTERN SOUTH	BUSHENYI	LWANGA KASHEKURO	GOVERNMENT	2010	985	15	5	11	43.9
112	EASTERN SOUTH	IGANGA	NAWANDALA S S	PARTNERSHIP	2010	401	5	3	1	28.7
113	EASTERN	KAMULI	KABUKYE SS ST KIZITO	PARTNERSHIP	2010	427	5	1	6	23.8
114	CENTRAL SOUTH	LUWEERO	KATIKAMU KISULE SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	889	14	5	29	61.6
115	EASTERN	NAMUTUMBA	BUDOBI H.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	294	6	1	2	26.1
116	EASTERN	BUTALEJA	HASAHYA SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	616	6	5	12	23.1
117	EASTERN	TORORO	KIYEYI HIGH SCH	GOVERNMENT	2010	485	4	1	11	27.9
118	SOUTHERN	MASAKA	MASAKA ACADEMY	PARTNERSHIP	2010	427	8	1	1	26.7
119	SOUTH	KABALE	RWESASI SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	341	8	2	6	33.3

	WESTERN									
120	SOUTHERN SOUTH EASTERN	MITYANA	NAMUTAMBA SEC SCHOOL	GOVERNMENT	2010	262	3	1	11	43.3
121		IGANGA	BUSALAMU S S ST JOHN'S SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	615	0	2	19	39.2
122	CENTRAL SOUTH WESTERN	MPIGI	MUDUUMA	PARTNERSHIP	2010	103	9	21	0	38.3
123		KABALE	NDORWA S S S ST.MARY'S	GOVERNMENT	2010	744	15	5	16	23.3
124	NORTHERN	AMURU	COLLEGE LACOR BUTAWUKA	GOVERNMENT	2010	431	6	3	10	28.6
125	CENTRAL SOUTH WESTERN	MPIGI	MAGEZI NTAKE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	583	9	4	1	31.4
126		KABALE	LAKE BUNYONYI S S BUYAMBI ST JOHN'S S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	153	7	8	10	30.1
127	SOUTHERN	MITYANA	BUKANDULA MIXED S.S	PARTNERSHIP	2010	394	4	1	0	33.5
128	CENTRAL MID	MPIGI	S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	571	12	5	11	43.5
129	WESTERN SOUTH	MASINDI	MASINDI ACADEMY RUKUNGIRI VOC.S.S	PARTNERSHIP	2010	486	9	5	0	34.4
130	WESTERN SOUTH	RUKUNGIRI	KARUKAATA ST WILLIAM'S S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	80	4	5	6	34.4
131	WESTERN MID	RUKUNGIRI	RWENGIRI ST. MARY'S GIRLS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	177	4	1	0	26.7
132	EASTERN	SOROTI	S.S MADERA	GOVERNMENT	2010	534	10	2	33	63.5
133	WEST NILE	ADJUMANI	ALERE S.S.S ST ANDREW	GOVERNMENT	2010	690	15	4	7	35.4
134	CENTRAL SOUTH	LUWEERO	KAGGWA SSS ST. NOAH S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	665	9	2	14	48.9
135	WESTERN	BUSHENYI	MUTARA	GOVERNMENT	2010	999	12	4	10	53.1
136	SOUTHERN	MASAKA	KIRYASAAKA SEC. ST MATHIAS	GOVERNMENT	2010	322	5	2	8	36.9
137	SOUTH WESTERN	RUKUNGIRI	NYAKISHENYI VOC.SCH.	GOVERNMENT	2010	201	4	4	0	36.2
138	SOUTHERN SOUTH	MASAKA	KABUNGO S.S ST JOHN'S S S	GOVERNMENT	2010	306	6	1	10	37.8
139	WESTERN SOUTH	KABALE	IKUMBA ST CHARLES	PARTNERSHIP	2010	272	6	3	1	29.4
140	WESTERN MID	KABALE	LWANGA SS MUKO ST FRANCIS	GOVERNMENT	2010	630	9	4	12	36.6
141	EASTERN SOUTH	AMURIA	ACUMET SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	593	9	5	10	28.5
142	WESTERN	IBANDA	KAGONGO S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	957	12	4	16	42.2
143	NORTHERN KAMPALA	LIRA	ROYAL ACADEMY	PARTNERSHIP	2010	503	12	3	0	23.6
144	EXTRA	WAKISO	NABITALO SS MAGALE PARENTS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	501	12	7	1	35.6
145	EASTERN	MANAFWA	S.S.S	PARTNERSHIP	2010	689	11	3	5	26.3
146	EASTERN MID	KAPCHORWA	KAPCHORWA S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	1177	22	4	35	29.6
147	WESTERN	KIBAALE	KAGADI ACADEMY	PARTNERSHIP	2010	0	0	0	0	43.2
148	WEST NILE	ARUA	MICU SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	390	8	4	8	40.3
149	WEST NILE	KOBOKO	NYANGILIA S.S NGABO ACADEMY	GOVERNMENT	2010	759	14	12	18	56.0
150	SOUTH WESTERN	MBARARA	OF SCIENCE AND DEV SPRING COLLEGE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	771	10	1	0	33.7
151	CENTRAL	MUKONO	KAWONGO ST MICHAEL VOCATIONAL SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	391	8	3	0	38.6
152	SOUTHERN MID	MASAKA	BUTENDE ST THOMAS MOORE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	368	6	3	4	35.2
153	WESTERN SOUTH	HOIMA	SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	692	12	2	9	27.9
154	EASTERN SOUTH	MAYUGE	KALUBA H.S NAMINYAGWE	GOVERNMENT	2010	566	8	3	4	29.6
155	EASTERN MID	BUGIRI	MUSLIM S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	337	5	1	10	32.8
156	EASTERN	KUMI	MUKURA MEM.S.S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	1297	12	2	19	35.1

157	SOUTHERN	MASAKA	MAWANDA HILL GIRLS SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	72	4	1	0	41.1
158	SOUTHERN MID	MASAKA	KIKUNGWE S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	555	10	5	13	39.1
159	WESTERN	KIBAALE	ST KIZITO SS KIBEDI	GOVERNMENT	2010	448	6	3	5	28.1
160	SOUTHERN	MASAKA	LUTENGO S.S.S ST CLEMENT S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	441	6	2	10	45.3
161	SOUTHERN	MASAKA	NKONI ST JOSEPH S S	GOVERNMENT	2010	638	7	2	12	37.0
162	CENTRAL	MPIGI	KKONGE FAIRLAND HIGH	PARTNERSHIP	2010	85	6	3	0	57.4
163	CENTRAL KAMPALA	MUKONO	SCHOOL BRIGHT FUTURE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	221	7	4	0	33.2
164	EXTRA	WAKISO	VOC SSS VICTORIA S.S	PARTNERSHIP	2010	1116	13	2	1	28.1
165	CENTRAL	MUKONO	BUKUNJA NAMBIASO AGRO	PARTNERSHIP	2010	251	6	2	0	19.8
166	NORTHERN	APAC	S.S ADILANG SECONDARY	GOVERNMENT	2010	483	8	7	8	45.3
167	NORTHERN MID	PADER	SCHOOL MUKITALE DEV'T	GOVERNMENT	2010	566	6	2	18	40.5
168	WESTERN MID	BULLISA	FOUNDATION UGANDA MARTYRS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	813	11	3	0	46.6
169	WESTERN	KIBAALE	SS MUGALIKE BUKANDULA	GOVERNMENT	2010	334	8	2	0	29.8
170	CENTRAL SOUTH	MPIGI	COLLEGE SCHOOL	PARTNERSHIP	2010	275	12	3	2	35.8
171	WESTERN SOUTH	KISORO	KABAMI SSS	GOVERNMENT	2010	357	6	3	12	33.1
172	WESTERN	KABALE	BUHARA S S WAMALA HIGH	PARTNERSHIP	2010	270	6	6	0	38.0
173	SOUTHERN SOUTH	MITYANA	SCHOOL	PARTNERSHIP	2010	82	10	1	0	28.2
174	EASTERN SOUTH	NAMUTUMBA	AGAPE SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	838	7	2	0	40.0
175	WESTERN	BUSHENYI	KABWOHE S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	411	8	3	19	28.7
176	CENTRAL	LUWEERO	LUKOLE SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	329	6	1	0	36.1
177	SOUTHERN MID	MUBENDE	KIYUNI SS KISAALIZI PARENTS	GOVERNMENT	2010	220	4	1	4	29.8
178	WESTERN KAMPALA	KIBAALE	SSS HENRY KASULE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	254	4	2	1	32.7
179	EXTRA	WAKISO	MEM COLL	PARTNERSHIP	2010	644	10	3	1	37.2
180	CENTRAL KAMPALA	KAYUNGA	BUSAALE S.S.S NATETE MUSLIM	PARTNERSHIP	2010	398	8	1	0	29.2
181	EXTRA	KAMPALA	H.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	805	13	1	20	44.7
182	CENTRAL KAMPALA	LUWEERO	KALASA COLLEGE	GOVERNMENT	2010	379	8	2	8	25.9
183	EXTRA	WAKISO	BUWAGGA SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	192	6	4	0	28.2
184	CENTRAL	LUWEERO	BOMBO ARMY SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	1109	9	3	21	37.5
185	WEST NILE	KOBOKO	NYARILO S.S ST ANTHONY SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	357	14	2	15	29.1
186	SOUTHERN MID	MASAKA	KYAZANGA SERERE TOWNSHIP	PARTNERSHIP	2010	300	6	13	0	42.6
187	EASTERN	SOROTI	S.S NAKIFUMA HIGH	PARTNERSHIP	2010	302	4	3	0	38.5
188	CENTRAL SOUTH	MUKONO	SCHOOL KYABAZINGA	PARTNERSHIP	2010	746	12	3	0	27.1
189	EASTERN	NAMUTUMBA	BENEVOLENT S.S	PARTNERSHIP	2010	429	5	2	0	28.1
190	WEST NILE	YUMBE	ARINGA S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	844	12	3	16	40.0
191	CENTRAL SOUTH	MUKONO	MBALALA S.S.S	PARTNERSHIP	2010	1127	14	15	2	43.6
192	EASTERN SOUTH	KAMULI	MATUUMU SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	1085	13	6	15	34.5
193	EASTERN	MAYUGE	BUSOGA S.S.S ST KIZITO SSS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	871	13	6	2	37.9
194	SOUTHERN	MITYANA	BBANDA NAMPUNGE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	377	5	3	0	26.9
195	KAMPALA EXTRA	WAKISO	COMMUNITY HIGH SCHOOL	GOVERNMENT	2010	433	9	1	9	0.0

196	SOUTH WESTERN	NTUNGAMO	RWENTOBO HIGH SCHOOL	PARTNERSHIP	2010	754	12	5	0	44.4
197	SOUTH WESTERN KAMPALA	RUKUNGIRI	BUYANJA GRAMMAR SCH.	PARTNERSHIP	2010	715	12	4	0	32.2
198	EXTRA	WAKISO	MMANZE SSS ST ANDREW KAGGWA MADUDU SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	392	9	2	12	50.5
199	SOUTHERN MID	MUBENDE	AMURIA HIGH SCHOOL	GOVERNMENT	2010	315	8	2	10	34.6
200	EASTERN KAMPALA	AMURIA	ST PETERS SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	863	13	5	0	28.6
201	EXTRA	WAKISO	BUKALANGO KITGUM COMPREHENSIVE COLLEGE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	173	8	3	0	31.1
202	NORTHERN	KITGUM	HARAMBEE KAHARO HIGH SCHOOL	PARTNERSHIP	2010	1848	16	4	3	45.0
203	SOUTH WESTERN	KABALE	ALLIANCE VICTORY SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	277	3	4	0	30.7
204	SOUTH EASTERN	BUGIRI	KANGULUMO SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	513	12	1	0	27.2
205	EASTERN	NAMUTUMBA	NAMUTUMBA COMPREHENSIVE HIGH SCHOOL	PARTNERSHIP	2010	660	10	2	0	30.2
206	SOUTHERN	MASAKA	BAJJA MUBENDE LIGHT SSS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	372	9	3	1	29.2
207	SOUTHERN	MUBENDE	NAGOJJE SECONDARY SCHOOL	GOVERNMENT	2010	1050	11	2	13	43.3
208	CENTRAL	MUKONO	NAKIBANO S.S (ST KIZITO)	PARTNERSHIP	2010	217	4	2	0	41.3
209	CENTRAL SOUTH	MUKONO	COUNTRY SIDE COLLEGE	GOVERNMENT	2010	361	4	4	15	31.3
210	EASTERN MID	IGANGA		PARTNERSHIP	2010	821	14	2	0	27.2
211	WESTERN	MASINDI	GREENFIELD SS KING DAVID HIGH SCH.	PARTNERSHIP	2010	606	9	2	2	37.1
212	SOUTHERN	MASAKA		PARTNERSHIP	2010	692	10	4	1	36.6
213	CENTRAL	LUWEERO	KASANA SS KAYABWE HIGH SCHOOL	PARTNERSHIP	2010	578	8	3	0	34.5
214	CENTRAL	MPIGI	KING FAISAL BBUYE ISLAMIC ST PAUL'S SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	290	6	2	0	37.5
215	SOUTHERN SOUTH	MITYANA	KAGONGI	PARTNERSHIP	2010	335	6	5	1	36.9
216	WESTERN	MBARARA		GOVERNMENT	2010	454	5	4	16	40.0
217	NORTHERN SOUTH	GULU	ALLIANCE HS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	1242	16	4	1	29.0
218	WESTERN	RUKUNGIRI	BLESSES P.V.S.S SHANAMU BOMBO HIGH SCHOOL	PARTNERSHIP	2010	648	9	4	0	32.5
219	CENTRAL MID	LUWEERO	BIISO WAR MEMORIAL S.S	PARTNERSHIP	2010	790	13	3	0	29.6
220	WESTERN MID	BULLISA		GOVERNMENT	2010	638	11	3	9	36.9
221	EASTERN MID	SOROTI	ST. STEPHEN S.S KABERAMAIDO COMP.SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	345	12	6	20	36.7
222	EASTERN	KABERAMAIDO	MITYANA COLLEGE KIKUMBI	GOVERNMENT	2010	608	9	4	7	27.0
223	SOUTHERN SOUTH	MITYANA		PARTNERSHIP	2010	858	12	4	0	29.8
224	WESTERN	ISINGIRO	BUKANGA S.S	PARTNERSHIP	2010	308	4	3	2	33.6
225	WEST NILE MID	MARACHA	KIJOMORO S.S ST FRANCIS XAVIER MODERN SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	562	8	4	0	40.7
226	WESTERN	KIBAAL	NAMOKORA VOC S.S	PARTNERSHIP	2010	319	0	0	1	44.1
227	NORTHERN	KITGUM		GOVERNMENT	2010	811	9	4	16	51.5
228	EASTERN SOUTH	BUKWO	ST. JOSEPH'S S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	428	7	6	10	34.5
229	EASTERN	IGANGA	IGANGA COMP. SS TRIANGLE SECONDARY SCHOOL	PARTNERSHIP	2010	278	6	2	1	24.0
230	SOUTH EASTERN SOUTH	IGANGA	IGANGA DYNAMIC S S	PARTNERSHIP	2010	468	6	2	1	26.5
231	EASTERN	IGANGA		PARTNERSHIP	2010	1041	15	1	0	29.0

232	SOUTH EASTERN MID	IGANGA	ST PAUL COLLEGE NAKABALE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	470	8	1	1	24.1
233	WESTERN KAMPALA	KIBAALE	PUBLIC SS MABALE CRANE HILL S.S	PARTNERSHIP	2010	351	4	2	0	27.9
234	EXTRA KAMPALA	KAMPALA	MAKERERE BULASIO KONDE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	866	9	8	1	37.7
235	EXTRA	WAKISO	MEM. SS BUKASA	PARTNERSHIP	2010	242	6	1	0	37.5
236	SOUTHERN	KALANGALA	BUKASA S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	34	4	5	4	40.6
237	SOUTHERN	MASAKA	MASAKA PARENTS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	411	8	1	0	39.7
238	EASTERN	TORORO	PAYA SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	261	3	2	10	18.7
239	EASTERN	TORORO	HEREIGNS SS ST. ELIZABETH SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	578	6	4	0	31.2
240	EASTERN SOUTH	BUSIA	BUTANGASI	PARTNERSHIP	2010	84	5	3	6	28.6
241	EASTERN	IGANGA	NAKALAMA	GOVERNMENT	2010	408	7	3	17	34.8
242	CENTRAL MID	MUKONO	KAWUKU S.S.S KIDONGOLE SEED	PARTNERSHIP	2010	460	8	1	0	34.5
243	EASTERN	BUKEDEA	SS OMBACI SELF-HELP	GOVERNMENT	2010	472	5	3	11	28.6
244	WEST NILE	KOBOKO	S.S KOBOKO TOWN	PARTNERSHIP	2010	415	7	3	1	28.2
245	WEST NILE	KOBOKO	COLLEGE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	947	9	3	0	28.6
246	NORTHERN	OYAM	AMWA COMP S.S KITGUM	GOVERNMENT	2010	149	4	7	10	33.5
247	NORTHERN	KITGUM	PROGRESSIVE COLLEGE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	444	0	0	0	22.5
248	NORTHERN	APAC	CHEGERE S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	235	6	7	12	30.1
249	NORTHERN	DOKOLO	KWERA SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	344	6	6	16	46.0
250	SOUTHERN SOUTH	MUBENDE	BAGEZZA SEED SS ARCH BISHOP VOC.	GOVERNMENT	2010	451	3	3	10	32.4
251	WESTERN	BUSHENYI	S.S	PARTNERSHIP	2010	515	11	3	0	49.4
252	SOUTHERN	MASAKA	KYATO S.S MATEETE	GOVERNMENT	2010	221	4	1	9	30.6
253	SOUTHERN SOUTH	SEMBABULE	COMPREHENSIVE SS BUTOGOTA TRINITY	GOVERNMENT	2010	788	10	3	10	35.6
254	WESTERN SOUTH	KANUNGU	COLLEGE IGANGA TOPCARE S	PARTNERSHIP	2010	500	10	4	0	37.6
255	EASTERN	IGANGA	S KANGULUMIRA	PARTNERSHIP	2010	1603	16	4	2	28.0
256	CENTRAL	KAYUNGA	PUBLIC S.S VISION HIGH	GOVERNMENT	2010	652	11	3	14	29.9
257	CENTRAL SOUTH	MUKONO	SCHOOL KASAMBIRA HIGH	PARTNERSHIP	2010	411	8	3	0	33.2
258	EASTERN MID	KAMULI	SCHOOL	PARTNERSHIP	2010	479	7	2	1	34.8
259	EASTERN	SOROTI	SAGICH ROYAL S.S BRAIN TRUST COLLEGE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	220	4	1	0	23.7
260	CENTRAL	MPIGI	KAWUMBA LCI ST PETERS COLLEGE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	276	8	2	0	40.4
261	SOUTHERN	MASAKA	SCHOOL KISOJO ST MUGAGGA S.S	PARTNERSHIP	2010	220	7	1	0	44.2
262	CENTRAL	MPIGI	JALAMBA	PARTNERSHIP	2010	284	6	2	0	36.0
263	EASTERN SOUTH	PALLISA	KIBALE SS ST STEPHEN BUGIRI	GOVERNMENT	2010	436	4	8	9	26.6
264	EASTERN SOUTH	BUGIRI	S.S NAKAVULE	GOVERNMENT	2010	463	0	0	0	28.8
265	EASTERN SOUTH	IGANGA	COLLEGE SCHOOL	PARTNERSHIP	2010	307	5	1	0	33.7
266	EASTERN MID	BUGIRI	SIGULU S.S ST JOHN'S COLLEGE	GOVERNMENT	2010	417	4	3	10	40.3
267	EASTERN KAMPALA	BUKEDEA	KACHUMBALA CITYSIDE COLLEGE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	456	8	3	0	29.7
268	EXTRA	KAMPALA	MAKERERE ST.JOSEPH'S VOCATIONAL HIGH	PARTNERSHIP	2010	632	16	2	0	28.2
269	CENTRAL	NAKASONGOLA	SCH.NAKASONGOLA FISHER BRANCH	PARTNERSHIP	2010	548	7	2	0	40.5
270	CENTRAL	MPIGI	KALAGALA HIGH	PARTNERSHIP	2010	404	6	2	0	50.4

			SCH.							
271	CENTRAL	MPIGI	KIKOMEKO S.S KITUNTU	PARTNERSHIP	2010	556	0	18	0	30.3
272	SOUTHERN	MASAKA	GREEN HILL SS KYAMULIBWA	PARTNERSHIP	2010	576	11	2	1	43.8
273	SOUTH WESTERN	KISORO	ST JOSPEH'S RUBUGURI VOC. SSS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	263	7	3	7	34.9
274	SOUTH WESTERN	KABALE	ST THOMAS AQUINAS S S S	GOVERNMENT	2010	186	3	2	2	30.7
275	SOUTH WESTERN	MBARARA	KASHAKI							
276	MID EASTERN	BUKEDEA	RWENYANGA SS BUKEDEA LIFELINE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	364	5	3	0	32.5
277			SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	523	7	2	1	44.2
278	CENTRAL SOUTH	MUKONO	SIMEX VOCATIONAL SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	79	7	3	2	28.6
279	EASTERN	IGANGA	PRAGMATIC S S NABITENDE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	719	10	3	0	36.4
280										
281	EASTERN SOUTH	BUSIA	EBENEZER PROG.SS ST PETER'S	PARTNERSHIP	2010	290	4	1	0	35.4
282	EASTERN	KAMULI	NAMULIKYA	GOVERNMENT	2010	595	8	2	0	24.0
283	NORTHERN	LIRA	AMACH MODERN SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	843	16	5	0	34.0
284	SOUTHERN MID	MITYANA	KIGGWA S.S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	253	1	1	9	25.7
285	WESTERN	KIBAAL	KINGS WAY SS KIBIBI MUSLIM	PARTNERSHIP	2010	410	5	6	0	43.2
286										
287	CENTRAL MID	MPIGI	SEC.SCH. BULINDI	PARTNERSHIP	2010	1142	23	6	1	31.3
288	WESTERN	HOIMA	INTERGRATED	PARTNERSHIP	2010	226	4	3	0	31.0
289										
290	NORTHERN MID	OYAM	ACABAS S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	237	5	3	18	33.9
291	WESTERN	KIBAAL	MPEEFU SEED SS MASAKA ISLAMIC	GOVERNMENT	2010	662	4	3	4	42.5
292										
293	SOUTHERN	MASAKA	S.S LWANGULA MEMO.	PARTNERSHIP	2010	255	8	3	0	46.5
294	EASTERN	BUSIA	S.S AGAPE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	327	10	3	0	34.1
295										
296	SOUTH EASTERN	IGANGA	INTERNATIONAL SS BUSEMBATIA	PARTNERSHIP	2010	514	8	2	8	36.8
297	MID									
298	EASTERN	KUMI	ONGINO S.S ST MARY'S	GOVERNMENT	2010	239	5	2	6	28.3
299	SOUTH	JINJA	COLLEGE BUWENG	PARTNERSHIP	2010	813	9	4	3	23.9
300	EASTERN									
301	CENTRAL SOUTH	KIBOGA	NANKANDULA SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	122	4	2	6	25.8
302	WESTERN	ISINGIRO	RUGAAGA MODERN	PARTNERSHIP	2010	469	7	4	0	30.0
303	NORTH									
304	EASTERN	NAKAPIRIPIT	NAMALU SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	346	8	3	4	29.3
305	SOUTH									
306	EASTERN	IGANGA	KITUUTO S S S BUGEMA	PARTNERSHIP	2010	651	7	2	1	26.7
307										
308	EASTERN	MBALE	COMPREHENSIVE SEC.SCH	PARTNERSHIP	2010	932	16	11	0	33.6
309										
310	EASTERN	MBALE	SEMEI KAKUNGULU HIGH	PARTNERSHIP	2010	453	5	3	1	28.3
311	SOUTH									
312	EASTERN	BUGIRI	KUBUSA SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	555	7	1	1	37.3
313	MID									
314	EASTERN	SOROTI	TUBUR S.S BUDAKA	GOVERNMENT	2010	453	5	6	17	34.3
315										
316										
317	EASTERN	BUDAKA	UNIVERSAL COLLEGE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	1299	21	5	20	30.1
318	KAMPALA									
319	EXTRA	KAMPALA	MIDFIELD SS MATUGGA GIRLS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	427	10	7	2	35.9
320	KAMPALA									
321	EXTRA	WAKISO	SSS WAKISO SS FOR THE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	392	14	2	0	41.0
322	KAMPALA									
323	EXTRA	WAKISO	DEAF BULUGE	GOVERNMENT	2010	102	6	10	14	29.6
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307	SOUTH WESTERN	NTUNGAMO	KAJARA SSS NTUNGAMO	PARTNERSHIP	2010	439	7	2	1	39.2
308	SOUTH WESTERN	KISORO	CHAHI SEED SSS ALEREK	GOVERNMENT	2010	722	7	3	6	43.7
309	NORTH EASTERN	ABIM	PROGRESSIVE ACADEMY	PARTNERSHIP	2010	675	5	3	0	36.6
310	CENTRAL	KAYUNGA	KITIMBWA BRIGHT FUTURE SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	3507	7	1	0	41.1
311	EASTERN	BUTALEJA	BUGALO COLLEGE BWIRVA	GOVERNMENT	2010	310	5	2	8	34.0
312	EASTERN	PALLISA	HIGH LIGHT SS KOBOKO PUBLIC	PARTNERSHIP	2010	2212	2	0	3	40.2
313	WEST NILE	KOBOKO	S.S.S KITGUM ALLIANCE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	330	6	3	0	29.7
314	NORTHERN	KITGUM	COLLEGE KITGUM VISION	PARTNERSHIP	2010	332	5	3	0	29.3
315	NORTHERN MID	KITGUM	COLLEGE ST. CYPRIAN'S S.S	PARTNERSHIP	2010	531	16	3	0	25.2
316	WESTERN MID	HOIMA	BUTEMA KYAKABADIIMA	PARTNERSHIP	2010	229	4	4	1	37.7
317	WESTERN	KIBAAL	PARENTS SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	242	5	2	0	32.0
318	SOUTHERN	MUBENDE	KALWANA SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	359	5	2	0	35.9
319	CENTRAL KAMPALA	MPIGI	KIBIBI PARENTS' SS HOPE BOARDING SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	315	10	3	1	29.1
320	EXTRA SOUTH	WAKISO	-LUTEMBE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	483	10	3	0	42.7
321	EASTERN	BUGIRI	NAMASERE HS UNIVERSAL	GOVERNMENT	2010	479	4	1	10	30.1
322	EASTERN MID	TORORO	COLLEGE TORORO	PARTNERSHIP	2010	415	11	5	1	30.4
323	EASTERN	BUKEDEA	MALERA SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	478	5	3	0	30.3
324	CENTRAL	KIBOGA	KATOMA SS TRINITY COLLEGE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	308	6	1	0	30.8
325	NORTHERN	GULU	GULU CRESTED HIGH	PARTNERSHIP	2010	1136	13	4	1	30.2
326	SOUTHERN SOUTH	MASAKA	SCHOOL KASHAKA HIGH	PARTNERSHIP	2010	420	4	2	0	48.7
327	WESTERN	MBARARA	SCHOOL	PARTNERSHIP	2010	309	10	3	1	32.1
328	SOUTHERN NORTH	LYANTONDE	KINUUKA SEED S.S POPE JOHN PAUL II	GOVERNMENT	2010	260	4	3	6	32.1
329	EASTERN	KAABONG	MEM.COLLEGE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	327	8	2	0	36.4
330	EASTERN	BUKWO	KABEI S.S DRAJINI HILL SEC	GOVERNMENT	2010	477	6	6	9	33.2
331	WEST NILE	YUMBE	SCHOOL ST PHILLIPS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	204	5	1	0	34.3
332	CENTRAL	MPIGI	EQUATORIAL SEC SCH.NABUSANKE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	427	5	1	1	34.1
333	SOUTHERN	MASAKA	LAKES HIGH SCH.KALINGA	PARTNERSHIP	2010	386	8	2	0	40.3
334	EASTERN	BUDUDA	BUKIGAI COLLEGE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	354	7	2	0	29.6
335	WEST NILE	ADJUMANI	BEZZA AL-HIJI S S	PARTNERSHIP	2010	331	7	5	1	21.6
336	EASTERN	PALLISA	CITIZENS INTER COLLEGE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	429	6	2	0	35.4
337	EASTERN	TORORO	ST LAWRENECE SS KWAPA	PARTNERSHIP	2010	469	5	3	0	22.7
338	SOUTH EASTERN	BUGIRI	KYEMEIRE INTERNATIONAL	PARTNERSHIP	2010	297	5	2	1	36.1
339	EASTERN	PALLISA	VOC SS PETETE COLLEGE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	548	8	8	0	32.2
340	EASTERN SOUTH	BUDAKA	LYAMA S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	174	4	3	12	45.0
341	EASTERN SOUTH	JINJA	ST.MONICA SEC SCH	PARTNERSHIP	2010	40	6	6	0	23.7
342	EASTERN SOUTH	JINJA	BUYENGO S.S	PARTNERSHIP	2010	627	11	3	0	30.5
343	EASTERN	NAMUTUMBA	BUKONTE S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	404	4	3	11	39.6
344	CENTRAL SOUTH	MPIGI	BULAMU SEC.SCH.	GOVERNMENT	2010	390	4	10	12	41.4
345	WESTERN	NTUNGAMO	KIYAGA SSS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	253	7	2	1	28.3

346	CENTRAL SOUTH	KAYUNGA	NALINYA IRINE NDAGIRE S.S	PARTNERSHIP	2010	608	7	2	1	47.2
347	EASTERN	KAMULI	GWASE PREMIER COLLEGE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	887	9	3	0	26.9
348	SOUTH EASTERN	JINJA	GLORYLAND CHRISTIAN COLLEGE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	770	5	2	0	37.6
349	WEST NILE	NEBBI	NEGRINI SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	132	7	2	0	17.3
350	CENTRAL KAMPALA	LUWEERO	LUWEERO CENTRAL SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	77	7	4	0	27.4
351	EXTRA MID	WAKISO	HOLY FAMILY SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	193	5	1	3	45.4
352	WESTERN	MASINDI	KIRYANDONGO SS DJRA	PARTNERSHIP	2010	267	4	2	1	42.5
353	NORTHERN SOUTH	LIRA	COMPLEHENSIVE SS AKIA	PARTNERSHIP	2010	375	16	5	0	42.1
354	EASTERN	IGANGA	NDEGE COLLEGE BUTIMBWA	PARTNERSHIP	2010	478	4	2	0	27.2
355	SOUTHERN	MITYANA	TOWNSHIP S.S.S MITYANA	PARTNERSHIP	2010	449	7	1	1	24.0
356	NORTHERN MID	DOKOLO	DOKOLO PROGRESSIVE SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	155	4	4	0	36.1
357	WESTERN MID	MASINDI	KINGS COLLEGE MASINDI	PARTNERSHIP	2010	472	8	2	2	29.7
358	WESTERN	MASINDI	ST DOMINIC SAVIO BOYS' SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	268	7	2	0	44.8
359	SOUTHERN	SEMBABULE	UGANDA MARTY'S SS SEMBABULE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	197	6	2	2	46.3
360	EASTERN	BUSIA	BUSIIME S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	254	4	8	16	46.1
361	CENTRAL SOUTH	MUKONO	KKOME SEED S.S ST MATHIAS	GOVERNMENT	2010	176	4	3	12	41.3
362	EASTERN	IGANGA	MAWAGALA S S BUYAKA PARENTS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	305	4	1	0	22.6
363	EASTERN SOUTH	SIRONKO	SSS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	368	4	3	0	37.5
364	EASTERN MID	IGANGA	NAKABAALE H S KATINE SEN. SEC.	PARTNERSHIP	2010	640	5	2	0	36.0
365	EASTERN SOUTH	SOROTI	SCHOOL NABINYONYI	PARTNERSHIP	2010	382	6	3	0	27.7
366	EASTERN	NAMUTUMBA	PARENTS S.S ST JOSEPH SSS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	381	4	2	0	27.6
367	EASTERN	SIRONKO	BUYAGA	PARTNERSHIP	2010	522	6	2	0	21.9
368	EASTERN	SIRONKO	BULUGANYA SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	316	6	3	10	35.5
369	EASTERN	BUDUDA	SHITUMI S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	281	4	3	8	34.1
370	EASTERN	PALLISA	APOPONG SS ST BONIFACE	GOVERNMENT	2010	267	4	3	11	38.6
371	CENTRAL	KAYUNGA	S.S.KASOKWE	PARTNERSHIP	2010	123	5	1	3	28.8
372	CENTRAL	KAYUNGA	GALIRAYA SEED S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	159	4	3	1	37.5
373	WEST NILE SOUTH	NEBBI	MAMBA S.S NTEKO	PARTNERSHIP	2010	279	4	5	0	26.6
374	WESTERN	KISORO	COMMUNITY SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	187	5	3	0	30.7
375	NORTHERN	GULU	KOCH ONGAKO SS NABINGOOLA	GOVERNMENT	2010	249	4	3	14	35.0
376	SOUTHERN MID	MUBENDE	PUBLIC SCHOOL ST CATHERINE S.SS	GOVERNMENT	2010	329	5	2	18	26.4
377	WESTERN	KIBAALE	KICUCURA ST PETER'S S.S	PARTNERSHIP	2010	155	4	2	0	21.6
378	SOUTHERN	MASAKA	KIGUMBA FATIH ISLAMIC	PARTNERSHIP	2010	350	6	1	0	43.6
379	SOUTHERN	MASAKA	KABALE BUGONZI S.S	PARTNERSHIP	2010	251	5	3	0	30.6
380	SOUTH WESTERN SOUTH	MBARARA	ST CHARLES LWANGA SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	295	7	3	0	38.9
381	WESTERN SOUTH	MBARARA	AKASHANDA	PARTNERSHIP	2010	447	6	3	0	28.8
382	WESTERN SOUTH	KISORO	NEW HIGH SCHOOL NYANAMO VOC SSS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	260	9	12	0	28.5
383	WESTERN	KISORO	KASENYI MWUMBA	PARTNERSHIP	2010	242	7	2	1	32.3
			PROGRESSIVE SSS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	242	7	2	1	32.3

384	KAMPALA EXTRA	WAKISO	NAGGULU SEED SS TEEN MISSIONS INTERNATINAL BUNALWENYI	GOVERNMENT	2010	323	4	3	7	44.7
385	SOUTH EASTERN SOUTH	IGANGA	IKUMBYA S S	PARTNERSHIP	2010	692	8	3	0	27.9
386	EASTERN MID	IGANGA	ATIIRA SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	322	4	1	0	24.3
387	EASTERN MID	SOROTI	ST MICHEAL SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	158	4	3	1	36.3
388	EASTERN	AMURIA	WERA HIGH WAY	PARTNERSHIP	2010	324	5	2	0	39.1
389	EASTERN	TORORO	INTERGRATYED SS PETTA COMMUNITY SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	483	5	3	2	29.3
390	EASTERN	TORORO	BORDER COLLEGE BUMASIFA SEED SCHOOL	PARTNERSHIP	2010	333	5	3	2	29.5
391	EASTERN	BUKWO	MARACHA HIGH SCHOOL	PARTNERSHIP	2010	327	5	4	0	35.2
392	EASTERN	SIRONKO	NABISWERA PROG.S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	385	4	3	7	43.3
393	WEST NILE	MARACHA	LOKUNG SS OMOT SECONDARY SCHOOL	PARTNERSHIP	2010	210	4	2	1	19.5
394	CENTRAL	NAKASONGOLA	RUGASHARI SS KAWANDA PARENTS ST THERESA SS	PARTNERSHIP	2010	311	6	2	0	35.5
395	NORTHERN	KITGUM	KUNGU KAMDA COMMUNITY S.S	GOVERNMENT	2010	258	0	0	6	53.1
396	NORTHERN MID	PADER		GOVERNMENT	2010	383	4	3	6	35.6
397	WESTERN	KIBAALE		PARTNERSHIP	2010	509	10	2	0	36.7
398	SOUTHERN	SEMBABULE		GOVERNMENT	2010	283	7	6	0	33.1
399	SOUTHERN	MUBENDE		PARTNERSHIP	2010	590	6	2	0	30.8
400	CENTRAL	MUKONO		GOVERNMENT	2010	137	4	1	8	39.4

St= Number of enrolled Students, Clr=Number of Classrooms , P.I=School performance Index, Labs= Number of Laboratories